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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines how European Union law and regulation address concentrations of 
private economic power which impede free information flows on the Internet to the detriment 
of Internet users’ autonomy. In particular, competition law, sector specific regulation (if it 
exists), data protection and human rights law are considered and assessed to the extent they 
can tackle such concentrations of power for the benefit of users. Illustrative case studies - of 
Internet provision, search, mobile devices and app stores, and the cloud – are chosen to 
demonstrate the gaps that exist in current EU law and regulation when applied to 
concentrations of private power online. It is argued that these gaps exist due, in part, to 
current overarching trends guiding the regulation of economic power, namely neoliberalism, 
by which only the situation of market failures can invite ex ante rules, buoyed by the lobbying 
of regulators and legislators by those in possession of such economic power to achieve 
outcomes which favour their businesses. Given this systemic, and extra-legal, nature of the 
reasons as to why the gaps exist, some ‘quick fixes’ from outside the system are proposed at 
the end of each case study, namely the potential for applying regulation and/or applying ‘self-
help’ solutions, which are mainly technical measures using peer-to-peer design.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The phenomenon of the Internet is widely believed to have been a revolution in society akin 
to that of Gutenberg's printing press 600 years ago. One aspect of this revolution initially was 
perceived to be the ungovernable, indominable nature of the Internet, especially as compared 
to the control that could be exerted over previous communications technology, such as 
television, print media and the telephone, due to the decentralised nature of the ‘network of 
networks’.  
 
However, after twenty years of the Internet being widely available as a public medium, this 
thesis will examine the rise of private economic power online, in the form of for-profit 
corporations, which control the flows of information between Internet users. As will be 
explored in greater detail in the thesis, this private power has manifested in concentrations of 
power which do not promote and facilitate an optimally free flow of information online for 
users.  Existing law and regulation in the European Union, in particular antitrust/competition 
law,1 sector-specific regulation, data protection and human rights will be considered as to the 
extent to which they can remedy problems identified with this concentration of private power 
over Internet data flows. Absent any ex ante regulation, mono- and oligopolies are prima facie 
governed by competition law (as the ‘legal regime of last resort’2) and so competition law and 
its ‘head’ of abuse of dominance or misuse of market power will accordingly occupy a 
prominent role within this thesis’s analysis. Indeed, in only one of the case studies which 
make up the substance of this thesis is ex ante regulation present, namely telecoms markets, 
and is a legacy of the privatisation and liberalisation of this sector from the 1980s rather than 
a response to the new challenges set by the Internet. Given the Internet is used as a 
communications medium going beyond a mere economic marketplace, EU data protection 
law and fundamental rights - in particular privacy and free expression – are also relevant to 
the thesis’ discussion. 
 
                                                             
1
 ‘Antitrust’ is the US term, whereas ‘competition’ is used in most other jurisdictions, including the UK and 
European Union. In this thesis, ‘competition’ will be the primary term used, except when referring to the 
American system, in which case ‘antitrust’ will be used. 
2
 Alfonso Lamadrid, ‘On Privacy, Big Data and Competition Law (2/2) On the nature, goals, means and 
limitations of competition law’ (Chillin’Competition, 6 June 2014) 
<http://chillingcompetition.com/2014/06/06/on-privacy-big-data-and-competition-law-22-on-the-nature-goals-
means-and-limitations-of-competition-law/> accessed 14 August 2014 
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Each chapter of the ‘substantive’ part of this thesis forms a case study provides an example of 
where existing law and regulation in the EU - namely competition, sector-specific regulation, 
data protection and fundamental rights - leave a ‘gap’ where Internet users’ interests, 
encapsulated in the idea of ‘autonomy’ explained below, are not protected and indeed left 
exposed to the negative effects of concentrations of private economic power affecting online 
information flows.  
 
It is argued that these gaps exist due, in part, to current overarching trends guiding the 
regulation of economic power, namely neoliberalism, by which only the situation of market 
failures can invite ex ante rules, buoyed by the lobbying of regulators and legislators by those 
in possession of such economic power to achieve outcomes which favour their businesses. 
Given this systemic, and extra-legal, nature of the reasons as to why the gaps exist, some 
‘quick fixes’ from outside the system are proposed at the end of each case study, namely the 
potential for applying regulation and/or applying ‘self-help’ solutions, which are mainly 
technical measures using peer-to-peer design.  
 
 
1.1 Research question 
 
This thesis explores how information flows on the Internet are controlled by for-profit 
corporations at various important ‘choke-points’, and whether existing law and regulation in 
the EU can operate and be applied to ensure that these flows occur in an ‘optimal’ way. As 
will be explained in more detail throughout the thesis, in practice the corporate ‘gatekeepers’ 
of these online information flows at the choke-points are private, for-profit undertakings 
which have a monopolistic or oligopolistic character.  
 
Optimal free information flows from an Internet-user-centric perspective will be defined, with 
a particular focus on facilitating users’ capacity for autonomous conduct online. Although 
competition law and regulation for that matter are more familiar with ‘consumers’ (and 
occasionally ‘citizens’), for various reasons which will be explained later, Internet users 
cannot be fully equated with the 'consumer' of competition law, and for them the Internet is 
more than just an economic marketplace. Why these free flows are valuable for individuals 
and society, and thus desirable goals of a legal and regulatory system, will be explained.  
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Then, once establishing free information flows for the benefit of Internet users’ autonomy is 
desirable, the focus will move to considering the ways in which this free flow is threatened by 
private economic power, namely by acting as gatekeepers and controlling certain important 
choke-points for information flows. The case studies of the thesis each concern a particular 
choke-point, encompassing the network infrastructure providing Internet access to users, 
search engines organising web content, mobile Internet ecosystems (including the devices and 
application platforms) and cloud providers.  
 
The discussion in the thesis then examines how far the current legal and regulatory system in 
the EU addresses the interference with the free flow of online information by these axes of 
private economic power, for the benefit of Internet users. Competition law and pertinent 
sector-specific regulation concerning concentrations of economic power, namely that for 
telecommunications, will be considered primarily as the parts of the system which are 
designed to address the problems that economic power can cause, since the corporations 
under consideration may be considered to be abusing their positions of power in 
contravention of the rules. Data protection and fundamental rights, especially free expression 
and privacy, are also considered as subsidiary parts of the legal and regulatory system which 
might provide some remedy to the interference with free information flows, although, as will 
be explained below in greater detail, these legal regimes have their deficiencies, particularly 
given their aims are not primarily to address these concentrations of private power. 
 
Each case study establishes that the current legal and regulatory system in the EU does not 
address fully the negative impact that concentrations of private economic power have over the 
free flow of information online and thus Internet users’ autonomy. Why that is the case, that is 
to say why these ‘gaps’ in current law and regulation exist is discussed and explained, with 
the neoliberal critique of EU competition law and economic regulation considered in 
particular as a possible factor accounting for these gaps in practice. 
 
 
1.2 Focus of research  
 
The focus of the research is on Internet markets whose subject matter (in terms of product or 
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service) concerns online information flows. While the Internet is transnational by its very 
nature, the EU is the principal jurisdictional locus of the thesis since it is one of the two most 
advanced competition and regulatory regimes in the world, as well as having a highly 
complex and developed Internet infrastructure, both physical and virtual, the majority of 
which is privately-owned (as opposed to being the property of the State). The analysis 
contained within the thesis is comparative in part, drawing as well from the experience of the 
United States of America where relevant, given its position as having the other most advanced 
competition and regulation regime globally, as well as the (even more) highly developed 
Internet sphere there. In addition, many of the Internet corporations managing online 
information flows considered in this thesis are transnational entities, which operate in both 
the EU and the US. This also triggers a comparative analysis since what happens to such a 
corporation in one jurisdiction in terms of competition investigations and regulatory action 
can have spillover effects in the other jurisdictions in which that corporation operates.3 
 
The Internet has been chosen as the partial focus of this research for various reasons. Firstly, 
the novelty and complexity of the Internet as a social, political and technical phenomenon 
also makes it an interesting contemporary object of study in related or applied disciplines 
such as law. Secondly, the Internet is conceptualised as comprising highly innovative markets 
subject to a very fast pace of change, with certain additional complexities such as two-sided 
natures. Furthermore, claims have been made about the freedom-enhancing nature of the 
Internet: initially by the ‘cyberlibertarians’ of the 1990s who denied the ability and authority 
of the nation-state to control the Internet,4 and believed they were seeing a ‘freeing’ of culture 
and information in the online environment;5 and subsequently, the advent of Web 2.0 and the 
birth of social media was also supposed to usher in a new era of freedom for users.6 However 
the freedom-enhancing nature of the Internet is not clear cut:7 aside from the overall success 
of repressive regimes such as China to contain their citizens’ Internet access to ‘permitted’ 
practices, it seems that so-called ‘liberal democracies’, led by the US, have engaged in mass 
                                                             
3
 Jack L Goldsmith, ‘Unilateral regulation of the Internet: a modest defence’ (2000) 11 (1) European Journal of 
International Law 135, 142-145 
4
 John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 8 
February 1996) <https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html> accessed 9 February 2015 
5
 Esther Dyson and others, ‘Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age’ 
(Progress and Freedom Foundation, August 1994) <http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html> accessed 14 August 2014 
6
 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(Yale University Press 2006) 
7
 James Curran, ‘Reinterpreting the internet’ in James Curran and others (eds), Misunderstanding the Internet, 
(Routledge 2012) 
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surveillance of their citizens’ online activities as well as the online activities of citizens (and 
leaders) of other countries, including supposed allies.8  While it could be said that some 
‘ungovernable’ (or very difficult to govern) parts of the Internet remain at the edges with 
decentralised initiatives such as Tor, cryptocurrencies and other activities ‘under the radar’ in 
the deep web,9 governments’ attempts and successes in controlling their citizens’ Internet 
experiences would at least dampen how freedom enhancing the Internet actually is. In 
addition to this, the twenty years of the publicly available Internet has seen the emergence of 
large Internet corporations such as Google and Facebook, and the fact that the Internet 
traverses virtual and physical realms entails too that relations in the physical world have a 
bearing on the amount of freedom available in the virtual.10 
 
As regards the type of Internet corporations under consideration, the research focuses on 
those involved in the management and facilitation of online information flows, by providing 
either physical or virtual infrastructure through which this information flows between Internet 
users. These corporations can be termed ‘gatekeepers of information’ online since through 
their infrastructure they channel information to users, and they also have the power to switch 
on or off these flows, as well as manipulate the flows in other ways: thus, they exert control 
over the information flows.11 Online information flows have been selected for study due to 
their social and economic importance in developed societies, given the data they contain may 
be the ‘new currency’ 12  of the information economy provoking the ‘third industrial 
revolution’,13 with the ‘raw material’ of data and information a business input which may be 
                                                             
8
 See The Guardian’s Snowden Files <http://www.theguardian.com/world/series/the-snowden-files> 
accessed 14 August 2014 
9
 Peter Biddle and others, ‘The Darknet and the Future of Content Protection’ in Eberhard Becker, Willms 
Buhse, Dirk Gunnewig and Niels Rump (eds), Digital Rights Management: Technological, Economic, Legal and 
Political Aspects (Springer 2003); Jerry Brito, quoted in: Danny Bradbury, ‘Whether or Not Bitcoin Needs it, 
Regulators are Going to Regulate’ (CoinDesk, 18 November 2013) <http://www.coindesk.com/whether-bitcoin-
needs-regulators-going-regulate/> accessed 14 August 2014; Primavera De Filippi, ‘Bitcoin: a regulatory 
nightmare to libertarian dream’ (2014) 3(2) Internet Policy Review 
<http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/bitcoin-regulatory-nightmare-libertarian-dream> accessed 14 August 
2014; Lawrence J Trautman, ‘Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now after Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and 
Mt. Gox?’ (2014) 20(4) Richmond Journal of Law and Technology. 
10
 JM Pedersen, 'Conclusion: Property and the Politics of Commoning' (2010) 14 The Commoner 290 
11
 Karine Barzilai-Nahon, ‘Toward a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A Framework for Exploring Information 
Control’ (2007) 59(9) Journal of the American Society for Information Technology 1493 
12
 William D Eggers and others, ‘Data as the new currency: Government’s role in facilitating the exchange’ 
(2013) 13 Deloitte Review 18; David Zax, ‘Is Personal Data the New Currency?’ (MIT Technology Review, 30 
November 2011) <http://www.technologyreview.com/view/426235/is-personal-data-the-new-currency/> 
accessed 14 August 2014  
13
 The Economist, ‘The third industrial revolution’ (21 April 2012) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/21552901> accessed 14 August 2014 
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as important as capital and labour.14 The rise of ‘Big Data’ (ie the collection and analysis of 
large volumes of information) - and the associated hype around it – 15  reinforces the 
importance of data in the information economy, and the crucial role of the entities which 
control that information and data.16 Indeed, the transition to the ‘Internet of Things’, whereby 
a plethora of objects beyond computer and mobile devices will be Internet-enabled (such as 
clothes and accessories, coffee machines, smart energy meters, and so on), is likely to cement 
data gathering and analysing as key functions of the economy – yet the problems that are 
generated by control of information are also likely to be amplified as a result of this 
development too.17  Moreover, while this thesis focuses on online information flows, the 
proliferation of devices connected to the Internet culminating in the ‘Internet of Things’ and 
the amount of activities in our lives in developed Western societies which take place 
involving the Internet in some way or other blurs the online/offline distinction – in the sense 
that more of what used to be ‘offline’ is now also ‘online’ – and makes this thesis and the 
issues it interrogates all the more timely. 
 
Such corporations operating in markets in which data- and information-gathering is of 
paramount importance may challenge conventional EU competition and regulation analysis, 
due to facts such as the nature of their products and services being highly complex and 
technical, the fact that users may pay nothing to access the services or products which make 
up examples of two- or multi-sided markets,18  the rise of peer production and free/open 
source to (part) produce informational products and services, and the increased role of 
consumers as producers and users, as explained further in the second chapter of the thesis. 
These factors may challenge traditional applications of competition law, as well as 
competition’s paternalistic attitudes towards passive consumers and a failure to see or deal 
with the ‘non-economic’ aspects of the issues that are raised.  
 
This thesis looks at available law and regulation to address the issues brought about by the 
                                                             
14
 The Economist, ‘Data, data everywhere’ (25 February 2010) <http://www.economist.com/node/15557443> 
accessed 14 August 2014  
15
 Stephen Fox and Tuan Do, ‘Getting real about Big Data: applying critical realism to analyse Big Data hype’ 
(2013) 6(4) International Journal of Managing Projects in Business 739 
16
 danah boyd and Kate Crawford, ‘Six Provocations for Big Data’ (A Decade in Internet Time: Symposium on 
the Dynamics of the Internet and Society, Oxford, September 2011) 
17
 Vincent Ryan, ‘The Internet of Things: Data Goldmine and Social Nightmare’ (CTO, 20 May 2014) 
<http://ww2.cfo.com/it-value/2014/05/internet-things-data-goldmine-social-nightmare/> accessed 14 August 
2014  
18
 Stephen King, ‘Governing the ungovernable: the market, technology and you’ (2014) 15 Insights 55  
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control of online information flows by concentrations of private economic power. Absent 
specific regulation, as will be seen in the substance of the thesis, competition law is the main 
legal player, operating as a residual regime to address accumulations of economic power 
through its sanctions for abuse of dominance. There are other legal and regulatory regimes 
which intersect with parts of the Internet and its information flows – for example, the network 
infrastructure is governed by sector-specific telecommunications regulation, and intellectual 
property law and data protection law cover many online interactions, alongside more general 
regimes such as contract and consumer protection law being pertinent to online transactions. 
However, these regimes leave gaps where Internet corporations involved in online 
information flows are concerned, opening up room for the residual operation of competition 
law. These laws also are not designed primarily to tackle corporate dominance resulting from 
concentrations of private economic power, and for this reason too cannot be relied upon to 
deal with this issue. Furthermore, it is posited here that their objective is not always to protect 
the consumer/user, or to work positively in favour of overall welfare - this seems especially 
true of contract and intellectual property law.19  
 
These other legal regimes will be considered throughout the thesis and the extent to which in 
practice (regardless of their stated aims) they can work to solve problems of corporate control 
of online information flows in the interest of users. As mentioned above, data protection laws 
in the EU, and fundamental/constitutional rights to free expression and privacy are highly 
pertinent to the governance of online information flows, in a normative sense at least if not 
also in terms of legal enforceability, and so are the areas of law outside of competition which 
are principally considered in this thesis in terms of addressing economic power over online 
data flows. Furthermore, the objectives of these other areas of law converge with the idea of 
user autonomy which is central to the argument of this thesis. Data protection law has the 
objective of protecting individuals’ privacy, which itself protects individuals’ autonomy.20 In 
Europe, the right to free expression is conceptualised as centring on the individual, and being 
based on the ideas of autonomy and human dignity.21 
 
                                                             
19
 Although others such as Posner would probably disagree, given his assertion that virtually all areas of private 
law are concerned with efficiency. See: Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown 1973) 
20
 Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2014) 9-15; 
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University 
Press 2009) 
21
 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005); Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, La 
Liberta d'espressione Media, mercato, potere nella società dell'informazione (Il Mulino 2004) 
 22 
  
There are various related areas which are outside the scope of this thesis. Firstly, the 
discussion concentrates on exercises of private economic power, and thus excludes state-only 
control of online information flows, such as for the purposes of preventing crime (eg child 
pornography, fraud), addressing copyright infringement and restricting ‘adult’ material. 
While, as will be discussed in greater detail below, sometimes the state and private economic 
power will cooperate with each other for mutual benefit and this is of relevance to the 
discussion in the thesis, purely state conduct is excluded from this discussion as being outside 
the concentration on private economic power online. 
 
Secondly, the thesis’s discussion centres on whether current law and regulation in the EU is 
capable of addressing the problems caused by the control of online information flows by 
private economic power, and thus ensure that users’ autonomy is preserved and protected. 
Accordingly, this thesis has another limit inasmuch it does not consider in great detail 
possible conceptual reforms to this law and regulation to promote user autonomy. The 
omission of such discussion in this thesis is due in part to concerns of space – a consideration 
of the prospects for reform and what shape this reform might take for each area of law and 
regulation considered are each likely to comprise a stand-alone doctoral thesis. However, this 
discussion’s omission is also due, it is submitted, to the fact that such conceptual reform is 
also likely to be a longer-term project in terms of time as well. Instead, a more pragmatic 
approach is taken to the problems that exist now with these large concentrations of private 
power online manifesting in commodified information gatekeepers and how they may be 
resolved in the short term with existing law, regulation and extra-legal methods. Nevertheless, 
the reform of existing law and regulation in ways which would promote user autonomy online, 
and perhaps autonomy for citizens in other areas of life as well may be a much larger project, 
part of a broader and more profound societal change which embraces more radical, heterodox, 
schools of economic theory such as participatory economics (and participation beyond just 
the economic sphere).
22
  
 
Thirdly, this thesis contains illustrative examples of the gaps left by the current legal and 
regulatory system in terms of addressing the adverse effects on online information flows for 
Internet users resulting from concentrations of private economic power. For reasons of inter 
alia space, it does not attempt to cover all such examples. Indeed, for instance, the domain 
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names and root server system overseen by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) is outside the scope of this thesis, even though ICANN may fall into the 
definition of an online private gatekeeper, or at least a ‘public-private gatekeeper’.23 The 
reason for this is multifaceted: ICANN and the system it oversees can be seen as sui generis 
in various respects.
24
 Despite its global reach and the ‘public’ nature of some of the power it 
wields, in terms of legal structure ICANN is currently a private, not-for-profit organisation 
incorporated under Californian law. The extent to which the law of other jurisdictions, for 
instance European law, applies to ICANN in any way is far from a settled point,
25
 and indeed 
could be worthy of another doctoral thesis devoted just to this point. Furthermore, even in the 
US, ICANN has claimed that antitrust law does not apply to its activities so even in its ‘home’ 
jurisdiction it is unclear what aspects of the legal system govern its activities.
26
 
 
 
1.3 The Internet and user autonomy 
 
One of the overarching themes of the publicly-available Internet from the early 1990s was the 
perceived difficulty if not impossibility in exercising centralised control over it, due to the 
decentralised nature of the network’s design, as well as its transnational character and the 
1960s countercultural values that underpinned the initial development of publicly-available 
online services.27 While the commercialisation of the Internet from the late 1990s onwards 
has put private corporate power into the ascendance online, Web 2.0 applications and services 
engendering ‘user-generated content’ have also opened up collaborative possibilities to many 
Internet users, all of which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
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Suffice it to say, the Internet, at least vis-à-vis previous communications mediums, has the 
potential to uphold and enhance the autonomy of its users.28 This is due to the many-to-many 
nature of Internet communications (as opposed to the one-to-one nature of the telephone, or 
the one-to-many nature of broadcast and print media), the very low cost of copying and 
disseminating data via the Internet (once Internet access and equipment have been bought), 
and the rise of the ‘prosumer’ or ‘user’ ie individuals with the capacity to create online as well 
as consume the creations of others.29 
 
The idea of autonomy in this thesis is inspired by Raz’s conception of personal autonomy, 
which sees it as an end in itself ie deontologically: 
 
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make 
their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life. The ideal of 
personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own 
destiny, fashioning it through successive decision throughout their lives.30 
 
Raz’s conception of personal autonomy is not antithetical to state action: indeed, he sees a 
role for the government to ‘take positive action to enhance the freedom of their subjects’, 
(while warning of the dangers of concentrating power in the hands of the few).31 This idea of 
autonomy involves the importance of meaningful choice in individuals’ lives as being a facet 
of their freedom:  
  
To be autonomous, therefore, meaningful choices have to be present and one needs to 
be given the opportunity to make those choices, appropriately informed and free from 
coercion, restraint, or excessive or undue influence. This means not only choices must 
be available, but that these choices must be meaningful… Accordingly, for autonomy 
to function it is necessary to ensure that choice exists, that there is an opportunity to 
exercise choice and often more to the point in our modern, seemingly choice-filled 
society, that these opportunities are appropriately informed and free from coercion, 
restraint, and excessive or undue influence… Freedom from manipulation is as 
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importance in this context as freedom from coercion.32 
 
This idea of autonomy, then, entails that individuals should have real choices as to what 
happens in their lives and should have the freedom to make those choices – and the state 
should act to facilitate this. This kind of action would go against the minimal state advocated 
by Nozick for instance, who argues that anything beyond ‘the narrow functions of protection 
against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on’ is an unjustified interference 
in individuals’ freedom.33 While Nozick’s state would go some way to protecting individuals 
against coercion, it would seemingly not protect against manipulation – nor necessarily set up 
the conditions in which there is an opportunity to exercise choice, such as by addressing 
societal inequalities which impede that choice from being exercised in the first place via the 
redistribution of resources.  
 
It would seem that autonomy also ought to resist the undue influence of concentrations of 
power which may manipulate or coerce choices and choice-making. Dissenting from 
Nozick’s view, it is submitted that these concentrations of power can have both public (ie 
state-controlled) and private (ie corporate) characters, and so the malign influence of power 
with either of these provenances on individuals’ autonomy ought to be viewed as suspect. 
 
Choice is a concept which also features in competition law with the idea being that 
competition law, or competitive markets, should operate to give consumers a choice of 
products. This is obviously a far more limited idea of choice and choice-making than that 
envisaged by Raz above, since there is no great concern with the background conditions 
against which the choice is made, such as imbalances in power, inequalities of resources and 
other deficiencies in how that choice is facilitates, so long as there have been no recognised 
violations of the competitive process, such as the formation of a cartel. In any event, even this 
narrow conception of choice is not dominant within competition analysis, as will be seen later 
in the thesis – in general, contemporary competition law, in theory anyway, operates to 
maximise ‘consumer welfare’ as an objective, and not to preserve the competitive process per 
se in order to offer choice to consumers. The accumulation of market power to arrive at a 
monopoly situation, as long as it has not been acquired illegally eg via participating in a 
cartel, is not in itself a target for competition law.  
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It is submitted that, the idea of ‘user autonomy’ is also a departure from the traditional value 
of ‘consumer welfare’ which is generally accepted as the objective of contemporary 
competition law, via the process of securing competitive markets.34 While this is a goal shared 
by both EU and US competition law due to the influence of Chicago School neoclassical 
economic theory on both systems,35 the EU variety diverges in also having the creation and 
maintenance of the Single Market as an additional goal.36  
 
Although ‘consumer welfare’ itself is a highly disputed term, open to differing 
interpretations,37 competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic carry out their analyses 
of whether consumer welfare is harmed primarily through the prism of the price for goods 
and services (including the effect of hypothetical increases and decreases in price on 
consumers) in order to define markets in the first place and determine how competitive they 
are. While other factors can be included in this analysis, such as a decline in quality of goods 
or services, or restrictions on innovation in a sector, competition analysis uses primarily 
quantitative methods which are adept at measuring price, and is not so well suited to 
assessing these other, less easily quantifiable values.  
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that consumer welfare does not usually encompass the entirety of 
values that might make up user autonomy. This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2; 
suffice it to say here that user autonomy comprises both economic and non-economic 
elements and is more expansive than the economically-inclined idea of consumer welfare as 
currently used in competition analyses. It is submitted that conventional competition analysis 
is not well-suited to measuring and protecting user autonomy in its entirety. Conceptually, 
user autonomy encompasses a different idea of the relevant actor compared to consumer 
welfare ie the user versus the consumer (which is also discussed in greater detail in the 
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following chapter). In practice, due to the More Economic Approach which guides 
contemporary EU competition law, the non-economic concerns at the heart of user autonomy 
are unlikely to be addressed by its application. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in the 
substantive part of the thesis that even if competition law does apply to a given situation it 
does not address all user autonomy concerns that have been identified.  
 
While it might be argued that competition law and its consumer welfare standard are simply 
not supposed to mirror entirely the interests and concerns of autonomous users, the situation 
remains that absent sector-specific regulation, competition law acts as the regulator of last 
resort of these Internet players (as will be seen in the thesis), and the Chicago School’s 
ideological arguments that there should be no government intervention aside from correcting 
market failures, since the market is presumed to be a more efficient allocator of resources 
than the state. Yet, as Cohen remarks, ‘[i]dealized models of market choice cannot provide a 
useful template for evaluating the dynamics of constrained, path-dependent choice that 
predominated in markets for networked or network-capable information technologies’.38 
 
Perhaps this deficiency with existing competition law has led commentators to discuss 
explicitly how a more expansive idea of what is termed here ‘user autonomy’ might be 
applied to the normative governance of the Internet. For instance, Benkler is of the view that 
the Internet should be regulated in a way which enables a wide distribution of the capacity to 
produce and disseminate information.39 Furthermore, Elkin-Koren and Salzberger advocate 
that markets on the Internet should be evaluated 'not only like any other market by the criteria 
of efficiency, but also as a public sphere, commons or mechanism for private and collective 
actions'.40 Frishmann has also argued that the Internet should be managed as a ‘commons’, 
and the debate should be around the question of what kind of Internet environment is 
demanded by society as a whole rather than the narrow view of competition and neoclassical 
economics-driven regulation.41 Finally, Brown and Marsden have advocated that both human 
rights and economic efficiency concerns be taken into account when regulating the Internet in 
order to take account of individuals’ productive as well as consumptive functions - what they 
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term ‘prosumer law’.42 
 
Thus, due to the normative value of personal autonomy, the capacity for Internet users to 
produce as well as consume and the significance of the Internet beyond a mere economic 
marketplace for wider social and political activities leads to the adoption of ‘user autonomy’ 
in this thesis as a key criterion against which the success of law and regulation of 
‘gatekeepers’ of online information flows will be judged. 
 
The idea of autonomy is preferred to the consumer welfare standard as encompassing more 
than a mere consumer-oriented, neoclassical conception of Internet users when it comes to 
their interactions with the private, for-profit Internet gatekeepers of information in the EU. 
This thesis will assess the extent to which current laws in the EU, especially competition and 
existing regulation, are effective in upholding users’ autonomy. An ideal of how user 
autonomy in terms of optimal online information flows will be conceptualised as a state of 
affairs in which users are in control of their data and what is done with it, they are not subject 
to censorship, illegitimate restrictions on what they can send and receive, they have the fullest 
capacity possible to produce and disseminate information as well as consume it, and they are 
not subjected to blanket surveillance of their activities, whether for the benefit of the state or 
the benefit of for-profit corporations.  
 
Although as mentioned above, user autonomy is considered in this thesis according to Raz’s 
deontological view, user autonomy and free online information flows can also be seen to have 
significance beyond being worthy objectives to pursue in themselves. Free flows of 
information fit within the conceptualisation of free speech and expression, either explicitly in 
terms of Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which encompasses 
the right ‘to receive and impart information and ideas’, or implicitly in the First Amendment 
to the US Constitution which protects free speech.43 Furthermore, free flows of information, 
or at least political information, for some time has been viewed as a constituent part of a well-
functioning (liberal) democracy,44 and even a hallmark of a more ‘radical’ digital democratic 
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project such as that of WikiLeaks.45  
 
There are, however, some limitations in the idea of user autonomy and its discussion in this 
thesis. It is submitted that only natural persons ie real human beings and not legal persons ie 
corporations should be the beneficiaries of user autonomy. Conflicts of autonomy among 
individuals are also outwith the scope of this thesis –such conflicts might include the use of 
the Internet to vilify others on the basis of their race, sexual orientation, gender and so on, or 
the conflict between free speech and privacy which might arise in online defamation or the 
right to be forgotten. Here, instead, the concentration is on the detrimental effects of private 
economic power in the form of corporations on online information flows. This is  not to 
belittle the adverse effects of other actors on an individual’s online (or offline) autonomy, but 
for reasons of space not all of these issues can be addressed in this thesis, hence the need for a 
particular focus as elaborated here. 
 
 
1.4 Corporate dominance and control online 
 
While the Internet has its origins in a US military project and in its early years was influenced 
by scientific and countercultural values and European public service ideals, the 
commercialisation of the Internet from the mid-1990s ushered in the development of the 
online marketplace in its initial, somewhat anarchic, version under limited state control.46 
Running parallel to this was the transition to privatised telecoms utilities in the EU from 
being state-owned enterprises, the liberalisation of these new markets and the generation of 
competition within them, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. The results of both processes, 
spurred on by similar ideological drivers, has been that the Internet and the infrastructure over 
which it runs in the US and EU are highly privatised spheres, with the majority of key actors 
being for-profit corporations. There are a few telecoms companies in the EU which retain 
some state ownership shares, but these are in the minority. Moreover, aside from these 
telecoms providers, the only online actor of note which is not a for-profit corporation is 
Wikipedia. In this sense the Internet and online information flows can be said to be 
‘dominated’ by for-profit corporations inasmuch as there are not strong state-sponsored, 
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charitable or commons-based alternatives to the major ‘gatekeepers’ of online information 
flows, or at least not very many of these alternatives. 
 
One problem of having a preponderance of for-profit corporations supplying physical and 
virtual infrastructure for online information flows is that the profit motivation can entail that 
they do not view it worthwhile to service non-lucrative or otherwise controversial consumers 
or supply non-lucrative or otherwise controversial content, applications and services, or if 
they are carried, give little prominence to them.47 Furthermore, if the corporations depend on 
advertising as a source of revenue (and some of the gatekeepers of online information flows 
considered in this thesis are indeed dependent on advertising as a revenue source, most 
notably Google’s search engine business), then there is the danger of replicating aspects of 
Herman and Chomsky’s ‘propaganda model’ - namely the bias they found present in ‘old’ 
media due to the competition among news outlets for advertising revenue and profit, the 
dependence of the media on the government for information and so the outlets avoided 
government disfavour (since that could exclude them from future access to government 
information as well as resulting in financial disadvantage due to losing readers/viewers and 
advertising), and the favourable coverage of corporations, especially those which advertised 
in these outlets.48 Indeed, a good (bad?) example of the propaganda model being replicated in 
the online sphere can be found in the controversy surrounding WikiLeaks’ release of US 
embassy cables and the accompanying withdrawal of online services from WikiLeaks. 49 
These corporations ceased to provide WikiLeaks with various services under pressure from 
the US government and politicians yet without any legal authority ordering this to happen – 
the corporations seemed to bow to the political and governmental pressure due to the 
‘controversial’ nature of WikiLeaks’ activities, demonstrating their risk-aversion lest it 
somehow saddle them with liability, damage their relationship with the government and other 
contractors such as advertisers - and thus hurt their profits.  
 
The corporate dominance of the Internet in this sense of services only being offered by for-
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profit corporations rather than state, charitable or commons-based entities may amount to 
Illich’s ‘radical monopoly’: a monopoly not in the conventional sense of ‘the exclusive 
control by one corporation over the means of producing (or selling) a commodity of service’ 
which ‘restrict the choices open to the consumer’, but ‘the dominance of one type of product 
rather than the dominance of one brand’, a type of standard product Illich sees only ‘large 
institutions’ being able to provide rather than individuals or small groups of people.50 Illich 
views a radical monopoly as being dangerous or undesirable because it ‘imposes compulsory 
consumption and thereby restricts personal autonomy’. Although Illich acknowledges what 
constitutes ‘compulsory consumption’ is difficult to determine in practice, it certainly goes 
beyond coercion by the law to do something, and includes the more subtle social norms or 
cultural hegemony which exclude alternative possibilities and views of doing things. Radical 
monopolies of thought in capitalism might exclude the possibility that other structures than 
highly centralised private for-profit corporations can provide certain products and services, 
and individuals can only consume these products and services, rather than innovate 
themselves – given they do not have the tools to do so – or are not permitted to have them.  
 
This idea can be enforced by Horkheimer and Adorno’s view that choice in consumer 
capitalist societies is illusory: even though consumers may be able to choose among products 
that differ in shape, colour and design but all of these products have the same basis or set of 
fundamental assumptions. 51  Indeed, this illusory choice produces the spectacle of 
competition, even if there is not a true alternative to what is on offer, and individuals may also 
be unable to choose an entirely new category of product and service ie those that they 
produce themselves. By engaging in this illusory choice, individuals perpetuate the existing 
system and its deficiencies. 
 
The idea of user autonomy used in this thesis takes account of these concepts, that the choice 
produced in capitalist consumerist societies may well not be a ‘true’ choice given the 
conformity, at a fundamental level, of products and services on offer, and that users also need 
the tools of production such that they can create information as well as consume and receive 
the information created by others rather than be subject to radical monopolies in the Internet 
space. 
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This can be contrasted with the narrower idea of ‘dominance’ from competition law. 
Competition law, in its attempt to maximise consumer welfare through securing competitive 
markets, attempts to ensure that a measure of ‘market power’ amounting to a ‘dominant 
position’ cannot be wielded by firms (especially monopolists) to the detriment of consumers. 
This could be manifested in the firm charging higher prices for goods and services while still 
making a profit, but could also be limiting output, suppressing innovation or depriving 
consumers of choice (defined in a similar limited way to how Adorno and Horkheimer see it). 
 
The accumulation of market power by a company or group of companies to form a “dominant 
position” is not in itself illegal, but when that dominant position is “abused” it is sanctioned 
under legal regimes such as that of the European Union, where an “abuse” of a dominant 
position is prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. This is also reflected in American antitrust law in 
the reference to “monopoly power” in Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which has been 
interpreted to mean that a dominant position in itself is not illegal, but an abuse of that 
position is, and, accordingly will be sanctioned.  
 
Dominance in these circumstances is analysed economically,52 which involves defining the 
relevant market (mainly based on demand substitutability), and then making an assessment as 
to whether a firm or group of firms within that market possess substantial market power or a 
dominant position. This definition exercise is not without controversy, especially given the 
more narrowly defined the market, the more likely a finding of market power.53  Market 
shares are an important prima facie way of determining a firm’s market power, but they are 
not conclusive since they do not reveal anything about the influence of potential competitors 
nor the bargaining strength of customers. However, a dominant position in EU law is 
presumed when a firm or group of firms possesses 50% or more of the market,54 and usually a 
higher market share is necessary for dominance to be found in the US. 
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It is the contention of this thesis that in the context of communications technology such as the 
Internet, there are also consequences of a dominant position or even just corporate control 
whether there is a monopoly, oligopoly or not. Communications technologies do not only 
exist solely as commodities to be bought and sold in markets – they also have an important 
social role in facilitating communication between people and organisations for innumerate 
purposes, some of which are linked to the functioning of capitalist markets and some of 
which are definitely not. In addition, control over communications by an entity can lead to 
that entity using that control in a way that is advantageous for it financially (which, 
depending on the circumstances, might be characterised as an abuse of a dominant position in 
violation of competition law), or in a way which may be prejudicial to the interests of the 
users of the particular communications technology but in a way which is not quantifiable: 
such as censoring information coming from a particular (legitimate) political group or 
individual to which no revenue is attached (and so is unlikely to be characterised as an abuse 
of a dominant position). Since, as will be explained in more detail below, fundamental and 
civil rights regimes tend to be largely inapplicable to private entities, and the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism with its corresponding doctrine of 'light touch' regulation of private entities, as 
well as the capture by corporate interests of public regulatory bodies has meant that 
governments in liberal democracies have been loath to extend regulation and competition 
policy to private entities especially for seemingly 'non-economic' purposes with the mantra 
that the market will provide.  
 
The current legal and regulatory framework which applies to concentrations of private 
economic power can in some circumstances produce beneficial results for users’ interests as a 
whole, both the economic and non-economic. However, any beneficial effects for users’ ‘non-
economic’ interests which flow from the framework’s application are incidental to the 
framework’s main focus on the economic issues. Unless the non-economic can be framed as 
economic, users may be left without legal recourse when there is an abuse of power which 
prejudices users’ non-economic interests. Furthermore, a lack of competition in the market 
can worsen the conditions for users and their non-economic activity online since they cannot 
turn to alternatives - however inadequate from the radical monopoly perspective these 
alternatives may be. Nevertheless, even markets which would be deemed competitive 
according to the paradigm of contemporary EU competition law, such as those examined in 
Chapter 6 on cloud computing, can give rise to unsatisfactory results for users’ ability to 
manage and control their devices and information flows.  
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As mentioned above, for reasons of length and scope the discussion in this thesis does not 
extend to a full consideration of the possibilities of conceptual reform of the law and 
regulation applicable to concentrations of private economic power in the EU, and in particular 
an examination of whether competition law and its operation could be reconceptualised to 
encompass more ‘non-economic’ values in its analysis and results. Instead, what is conducted 
here is a study of the extent to which current law and regulation, however imperfect in its 
formulation and application, can operate to uphold users’ autonomy vis-à-vis the 
concentrations of private economic power which act as online gatekeepers of information.    
 
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
This thesis takes an overall ‘law in context’ approach to the subject of corporate dominance 
over Internet data flows, taking into account perspectives from other disciplines, notably 
Internet studies.55 More specifically, the thesis is comparative in part between the EU and US 
for the reasons explained above. Furthermore, the thesis is influenced by legal realism/critical 
legal studies to give further attention to the context in which the laws considered in this thesis 
– principally competition law and sector-specific telecoms regulation, as well as data 
protection law and fundamental rights. The subset of critical legal studies relevant to the 
discussion in this thesis is that which emphasises the political economic and socio-economic 
context of the legal decisions and issues applicable to the operation of law vis-à-vis the 
Internet gatekeepers under consideration.  
 
The thesis is divided into theoretical and empirical parts. The theoretical part of the thesis can 
be found in Chapter 2 which presents the backdrop to the empirical part by discussing the 
emergence of private economic power online, the position of consumers and the application 
of competition to online markets. The empirical part of this thesis follows this theoretical 
chapter, and utilises a qualitative method encompassing document analysis of primary 
(legislation, case law) and secondary legal sources (principally academic scholarship and 
policy output) encompasses in four case studies (Internet provision, search engines, mobile 
devices and the cloud).  
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The empirical analysis in these case studies comprises two parts: 
1. a descriptive element (which can be seen as closer to a ‘traditional’ black letter law 
approach) which demonstrates how existing EU law and regulation apply to the 
circumstances at hand; 
2. a normative element encompassing whether EU law and regulation’s application to the 
circumstances at hand adequately promotes the normative value of user autonomy. 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that existing EU law and regulation does not adequately 
address concentrations of private economic power adversely affecting online information 
flows to the detriment of Internet users’ autonomy due to the neoliberal basis of the existing 
law and regulation. Neoliberalism has been a guiding current in EU policy (and accordingly 
the law and regulation produced by this policy) over at least the last 20 years if not longer,56 
and competition and sector-specific regulation have been influenced by its ideas.57 
 
According to Harvey,  
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to 
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state 
has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up 
those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure 
private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of 
markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, 
health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by 
state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State 
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, 
according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to 
second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will 
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inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their 
own benefit.58 
 
Neoliberalism, inspired by neoclassical theories, as a capitalist political movement has 
promoted economic liberalisation, free trade, open markets and the privatisation of previously 
nationalised industries and public services and deregulation/regulation in the most 
unobtrusive way possible vis-à-vis the functioning of the free market.  
 
EU competition law has been critiqued in Europe by Buch-Hansen and Wigger from a critical 
political economy perspective, who have argued that EU competition regulation has 
undergone a 'neoliberal transformation' which has been primarily in the interests of 
transnational globalised capital rather than in the interests of other social groups, challenging 
the established view that it is consumers who are the main beneficiaries of competition.59 As 
already mentioned, consumers are supposed to be the beneficiaries of competition due to 
competition bringing about lower prices, as well as fostering innovation to improve the 
quality of products and services, and so on. However, consumers are in fact multi-
dimensional human beings, who may be workers suffering from degradation of working 
conditions and rights, or even the unemployed and must have a certain amount of financial 
resources before they participate in the market as consumers. Indeed, this recognition of 
individuals as being more than mere passive consumers leads in part to this thesis’ preference 
for the value of ‘user autonomy’, as discussed above.  
 
Nevertheless, the relationship between competition and capital is complex, including the 
neoliberal take on capital. Marx himself considered competition to be the 'inner nature' of 
capital, and it was realised as the interaction of many capitals with each other.60 Competition 
law can thus be seen as the ‘rules’ to govern the situation of different capitals interacting with 
each other, with one objective being that no one 'capital' dominates the rest and behaves 
abusively, and is considered to be one of the few ‘permissible’ interventions in the 
functioning of markets.  
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Yet from a capitalist perspective, it is contested whether these rules of competition should 
exist, inasmuch as either they are unnecessary regulation of the private sector (the libertarian 
Chicago School view), 61  or essential for the proper functioning of markets (the liberal 
capitalist view). This paradox has been recognised by Meiksins Wood, who notes that to 
achieve dominance, competition must be suppressed but conditions must also be maintained 
which permit the existence of markets and profit.62 Neoliberalism seems to sit on the side of 
still believing some competition law is needed, especially in situations such as breaking 
national monopolies and opening these liberalised markets up to foreign competition, with a 
gradual ‘fading out’ of the state when competitive markets have been achieved – ironically 
mirroring Engels’ ‘withering away of the state’ once true communism has been reached. 
 
Thus, in a neoliberal discourse, competition law may be seen as one of the only acceptable 
checks on private power (or the remnants of public power when it comes to formerly State-
owned companies). However, as will be explored in this thesis, it is submitted that this view 
is mistaken since competition law as an implementation of this neoliberal belief does not 
adequately address (nor do the other available legal regimes) the prejudice and harm suffered 
by users in the situation of corporate dominance of online information flows.  
 
It is submitted that EU competition law’s contemporary neoliberal influence has entailed that 
values aside from those encompassed by the nebulous goal of consumer welfare cannot be 
promoted easily within the competition analysis and limitation of private economic power. 
This is a proposition that will be explored empirically in the case studies, to determine 
whether the hypothesis elucidated above. 
 
Sector-specific regulation, including of telecoms markets in the EU has also been exposed as 
following neoliberal principles. Telecoms services were formerly run by state-owned 
monopolies in each EU Member State, but since the 1980s have been subjected to a process 
of privatisation, with the liberalisation of telecoms markets which have opened the telecoms 
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incumbent up to competition, reflecting neoliberal ideology.63 Thus the state has gone from 
having a very large amount of control over telecoms by owning and operating the monopoly 
provider, to a much-reduced role in their operation, as the arbiter of the conduct of the 
privatised players. In the wake of these developments, ex ante regulation is only imposed to 
aid these markets in becoming competitive, such that when they are deemed competitive, 
market-based solutions to problems will suffice. Accordingly, there is an intertwining of 
competition and regulation in these areas in line with neoliberal ideas:  regulation should only 
apply when markets are not competitive, and then should ‘fade out’. Competitive markets do 
not require ex ante regulation unless there is a market failure, and regulation can be 
introduced only to address that failure – and not for other reasons, for instance of social 
policy. It is submitted that the triumphalism of neoliberalism in promoting minimalist ‘light 
touch’ ex ante regulation of private economic power in EU communications markets explains 
the general lack of anterior regulation in this area. 
 
While fundamental rights may be conceptualised as a part of the law which is not inherently 
(neoliberal) capitalist,
64
 their application has also been shaped by neoliberal norms. As will be 
discussed in more detail later in the thesis, fundamental rights are mainly enforceable vis-à-
vis the state despite there being certain transnational accumulations of capital which are more 
powerful than certain countries, and also despite the very real violation of individuals’ rights 
that these corporations’ business practices can entail in certain circumstances.65 
 
Data protection stands out as an area of EU law which has its theoretical basis in fundamental 
rights (namely privacy), yet which applies to private entities and not just the state and its 
emanations. While data protection, thus, would appear not to fit into the neoliberal paradigm, 
it could be argued that these ex ante rules exist to correct a market failure, namely the lack of 
privacy protection of personal information that market forces alone would entail.
66
 In any 
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event, as will be discussed later, data protection law is narrow in its scope of application: it 
only applies to ‘personal data’ and is not always well-enforced in practice. Furthermore, 
neoliberal forces can be seen at work in the large amount of industry lobbying currently 
underway to influence the proposals for reform of EU data protection law, in a way which 
would minimise the effect of these reforms on these companies’ business practices. 
 
In conducting this research, this thesis takes a ‘realist’ approach to determining the extent to 
which the current paradigm’s legal rules and regulation protect and advance user autonomy 
vis-à-vis concentrations of private economic power performing a gatekeeper function over 
online information flows through the use of the case studies described above. This 
perspective centring on user autonomy is important given the potential user-autonomy-
enhancing qualities of the Internet, both vis-à-vis the State and private corporations and the 
increased space for 'non-market' production (ie production that does not depend on market 
strategies and the mechanism of monetary exchange) that the Internet may include – which is 
currently the ‘immaterial’ production of information, but inventions such as 3D printers open 
up the possibility of non-market production of many more, tangible things,67 as opposed to 
previous forms of mass production requiring the involvement of either the State or the profit-
making firm,68 thus subverting these radical monopolies over the productions of information 
and objects and placing the tools of production back into the hands of the multitude.  
 
Applicable EU law and regulation, including their neoliberal apparition, have been 
formulated and developed in a historical epoch prior to non-market, non-State mass 
production and dissemination of information and information-based products and services. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the communications industry until the dawn of the 
publicly-available Internet was based on a one-to-many model of disseminating information 
publicly, as opposed to the many-to-many nature of the Internet. Accordingly, given the more 
liberated position of Internet users as producers and consumers of information, and the lack 
of need of recourse to the State or private firms to achieve this production of information, the 
law and regulation of the Internet should adapt to reflect this new reality. These areas of law 
and regulation must be viewed critically as to how they respond to this new situation. 
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This critical perspective on competition law, sector specific regulation, fundamental rights 
and data protection regarding the Internet differs from what is standard and believes another 
world beyond that envisaged by neoclassical economics and its assumptions, as well as their 
implementations in neoliberal politics is indeed possible, and in fact is present.69 In legal 
scholarship and especially scholarship on competition law, the dominant paradigm of 
neoclassical economics is usually implicitly accepted as being true or good, and the analysis 
thus follows. In this thesis, assumptions from neoclassical economics and neoliberal political 
theory which are normally brushed over in other competition and economic regulation 
analyses are exposed and dealt with critically. This thesis professes an explicitly normative 
consideration of the issues, in contrast to 'orthodox' or 'conservative' approaches, which in 
practice also adopt normative perspectives, even if they often purport (explicitly or implicitly) 
to be neutral. In addition, the explicit normative position in this thesis is taken that users’ 
autonomy is promoted above the interests of the centralised state and capital.  
 
In each of the case studies, where it is seen that the existing law and regulation is unable 
adequately to uphold users’ autonomy, technical solutions are instead proposed. This is not 
done on a technodeterministic basis (that ‘code’ is a better regulator of human conduct that 
law, markets, norms etc) but on the basis that these particular technical solutions, often 
designed explicitly with iedas of privacy, expression and decentralised commons 
infrastructure in mind, better uphold the normative value of user autonomy and so form 
pragmatic alternatives to the offerings of the poles of private economic power under 
consideration in each case study. 
 
 
1.6 Intended contribution 
 
With the Internet now increasingly the subject of law enforcement and regulatory 
interventions by governments, including competition investigations, as well as the growing 
concentration of private for-profit power in the jurisdictions under consideration - while 
dialectically the Internet holds the potential for more liberated activity by individual users 
than previous communications media - this thesis aims to contribute to the academic (and, it 
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is also hoped, the digital rights activist) discussion in various ways. 
 
Firstly, the thesis aims to demonstrate the limits of the current legal and regulatory approach 
in the EU to addressing private economic power in a gatekeeping function over online 
information flows. The discussion and analysis in the thesis is based upon Buch-Hansen and 
Wigger’s critical political economy approach to EU competition policy, which was originally 
directed at merger control, and expands upon it by applying it to how the current system in 
the EU addresses concentrations of private economic power in Internet markets.  
 
The discussion in the following chapters will show that the Internet is capable of being 
captured by for-profit corporations (including - and especially - ones that claim to do no evil), 
with the associated accumulation of market power and concentration in online markets, and 
that this is harmful for not just the ‘welfare’ of ‘consumers’ but also users and their autonomy. 
Except in the case of Internet Services Providers considered in Chapter 3, there is no ex ante 
regulation which applies to concentrations of for-profit corporate power exercised online, and 
it is competition law, in its sanctioning of abuses of dominance, which operates residually to 
address these accumulations of power.  
 
While competition law can solve some of the problems created by this concentration of 
private for-profit corporate power through its sanctioning of abuses of dominance, is not a 
panacea for all issues involving such an accumulation of private economic power on the 
Internet, and that the approach to thinking of competition law as the only or one of the only 
permissible checks on this private economic power is misguided. Indeed, it can be seen that 
an accumulation of market power to form a dominant position in an Internet market can have 
consequences which are prejudicial to Internet users, but are not adequately captured by 
competition law. Due to EU competition law’s current More Economic Approach, its inability 
to take account of the changed identity of the consumer into user, competition law cannot 
adequately respond to all of the issues created by such accumulations of private power. 
Furthermore, this thesis will also display that in situations where there is no dominant 
position in a given market, the profit-seeking characteristic of online corporations entails that 
all players in a given market may compete with each other on price and other features, but 
may all still be acting in a similar way which is prejudicial to users' interests – and thus users 
lack a ‘real choice’ of alternatives, in accordance with Adorno and Horkheimer’s view of the 
illusory choice. 
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Furthermore, it will be shown that certain other legal regimes may be applicable to these 
situations where users’ autonomy is being eroded by accumulations of private power, namely 
fundamental rights and EU data protection law. However, as will be explained in greater 
detail, their operation alongside competition law still does not address the entirety of the 
prejudice and harm suffered by Internet users. In the case of fundamental rights, this is mainly 
due to the fact they operate primarily vis-à-vis state action rather than that of private entities, 
and data protection law applies to a small subset of information, namely that which can be 
classified as ‘personal’, and, as mentioned above, it is also not always strongly enforced. As a 
result, the operation of these existing laws and regulation leaves ‘gaps’ - where the system 
does not promote autonomy for Internet users vis-à-vis concentrations of private economic 
power. 
 
The thesis aims to show that these 'gaps' in the legal and regulatory system exist because the 
system does not promote autonomy for users, and is still focussed on their character as 
consumers vis-à-vis corporations (and citizens vis-à-vis the State). A blending of these 
identities along with cognisance of the new nature of the user and her autonomy online is 
necessary in order to address the harm that users suffer from an accumulation of economic 
power. However, this thesis is also critical of the law itself in being able to provide such an 
adequate outcome, especially where new technologies are concerned, given their very quick 
rate of change and development, and so any legal/policy/regulatory solution, aside from 
potential substantive inadequacies, may also procedurally be too little, too late. In addition, 
corporate regulatory capture gives rise to scepticism as to the possibility of regulation being 
mooted in the first place and its successful adoption and implementation.  Moreover, the 
‘Invisible Handshake’ and the nation-state’s interest in the surveillance of Internet users, 
particularly through privately-owned infrastructure,70 entails that in practice, fully public/state 
control over the Internet is undesirable, let alone unlikely to happen (eg via expropriations) 
given the neoliberal currents at play in the EU and beyond.  
 
While this thesis identifies the need for a new approach in addressing the problems caused by 
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concentrations of private economic power acting as online information gatekeepers for 
Internet users, it also does not see advocating for new laws and regulation as an easily-
accomplished solution. This is due to the deep penetration of neoliberal ideas in competition 
law’s ‘More Economic Approach’ and ‘light touch’ sector-specific regulation in the EU, the 
regulatory capture of institutions and the lobbying which the intended targets of regulation 
engage in to avoid being regulated in the first place. Thus, the thesis advances the view that 
the short-term promotion of user autonomy may be better accomplished by users taking 
matters into their own hands and designing non-hierarchical, non-exploitative online tools 
and infrastructure, possibly operated on a cooperative basis, rather than requesting more state 
intervention such as ex ante regulation. Indeed, peer-to-peer commons-based alternatives are 
suggested in the substantive case studies of this thesis as pragmatic options for users 
unwilling to wait for the benevolence of state and for-profit corporate power to protect and 
promote their autonomous interests. 
 
 
1.7 Structure of research 
 
This thesis is structured into five chapters followed by a concluding chapter. Of the six 
chapters making up the body of the thesis, the first expands upon the themes of this 
introductory chapter in examining the position of competition and consumers on the Internet 
and sets the background for the following four chapters which each provide a case study 
comprising a situation of online information gatekeeper performed either by a single for-
profit entity with a dominant position according to competition law or by a few for-profit 
entities providing an illusory choice between their offerings. These case studies have been 
chosen as they illustrate the issues at the core of this thesis, namely the gaps that the current 
legal and regulatory system in the EU produces when protecting and promoting users’ 
autonomy vis-à-vis private economic power online, and are representative of these issues 
occurring in other parts of the Internet. 
 
Prior to the substantive case studies, Chapter 2 (‘Competition and Consumers in Cyberspace’) 
outlines the dialectical nature of the Internet by providing a historical account of the rise of 
privatised power on the Internet and the conditions for competition, before detailing the 
development of consumers’ position, from passivity to activity in information production. The 
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chapter shows that, despite the Internet in the West being a largely commodified space, it has 
a radical potential to augment the autonomy of Internet users. However, the legal and 
regulatory system in the EU, and in particular competition law, is not well-placed to take into 
account ‘other’ values like user autonomy – its application on any given occasion may 
promote these values incidentally but does not necessarily do so on every occasion. The 
ability of competition law to take ‘other’ values beyond those contributing to ‘economic 
efficiency’ and ‘consumer welfare’ is considered in order to determine whether the current 
system could promote user autonomy, especially its non-economic aspects, more effectively. 
It is argued that given the More Economic Approach in EU competition law, as well as 
regulatory forbearance advanced by neoliberal theories, entails that the accommodation of 
‘other’ values in competition analysis is unlikely to occur in practice, and that thus certain 
‘gaps’ are created where accumulations of private economic power act in prejudicial ways 
towards users which are not recognised by the current system. 
 
The following four chapters form case studies of situations in which there are concentrations 
of private economic power in the EU which perform a gatekeeper function over a certain 
‘choke-point’ for online information flows going to and from Internet users. As mentioned 
above, these case studies are illustrative of what, it is submitted, are broader trends in both 
how Internet markets are set up, and also the gaps left by the application of current law and 
regulation in the EU. An assessment is made in each chapter of the extent to which these 
accumulations of private for-profit power online harm user autonomy, and the extent to which 
pre-existing EU law and regulation can address these issues. In each case, it is found that 
while current law and regulation go some way to addressing user autonomy concerns, they 
still leave some aspects of these concerns unaddressed, so there is a ‘gap’ in the law and 
regulation where user autonomy is not protected vis-à-vis private power, and that this is an 
undesirable state of affairs, yet one which is unlikely to be remedied easily within the current 
system.  
 
The case studies consist of an examination of Internet provision, search engines, mobile 
device ecosystems, and cloud computing. These case studies encompass both the physical and 
virtual infrastructure facilitating Internet users’ communications and other activities online, 
and each form a point at which a gatekeeping function can be performed over the information 
that users send and receive over the Web and Internet. They are illustrative of concentrations 
of online private power whose negative consequences for Internet users are not fully 
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addressed by existing law and regulation in the EU, and demonstrate greater trends in the 
commodification of the Internet, particularly the contemporary and forward-looking chapters 
on mobile devices and apps, and the cloud, given these are directions that are being pursued 
with new devices developed as part of the Internet of Things. 
 
In particular, Chapter 3 (‘Dominance and Internet Provision’) looks at issues of dominance in 
how Internet access services are provided to users. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) offering 
this access perform a gatekeeping function over online information flows, particularly in the 
‘last mile’ to and from users: they are in a position to censor or otherwise manipulate what 
users send and receive. These ISPs under consideration are almost all private for-profit 
corporations, although some of the European ones have emerged out of what used to be state-
owned telecoms monopolies, which underwent a process of privatisation and market 
liberalisation from the 1980s. The ex ante sector-specific regulation of these entities is a 
legacy of that process, accompanied by competition law. However, as is explored in more 
detail in the body of the chapter, these have been insufficient to address the rise of ‘net 
neutrality’ as an issue for Internet provision which is born of corporate dominance and 
encompasses both competition concerns and digital rights issues. While in both the EU and 
US, net neutrality has been a subject of regulatory activity, it can be seen that this activity, 
where it exists, is ‘too little, too late’, and so demonstrates the inadequacies of the system in 
instituting ex ante regulation to address pre-existing legal and regulatory ‘gaps’.  
 
Chapter 4 (‘Dominance and Internet Search’) turns the attention to search engines, which 
perform a major gatekeeping function over information available to users on the Web. They 
also represent an important example of almost total dominance by one single entity, namely 
Google, especially in the EU. Google’s functioning has been subject to competition 
investigations for alleged abuses of dominance in both the US and EU, which will be 
analysed, along with the extent to which the results of these investigations alongside the 
operation of other relevant areas of law uphold online user autonomy. 
 
Chapter 5 (‘Dominance, Devices and App Stores’) charts the transition to Internet-enabled 
mobile devices, namely tablets and smartphones, providing a more ‘closed’ Internet 
experience to user. The position of gatekeeping that device vendors and app store operators 
possess vis-à-vis users is considered, which again raises the, by now familiar, issues of 
competition and users’ digital rights. There have been some competition investigations in this 
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field, which again are examined to determine whether they have resulted in gains for users’ 
autonomy online. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 (‘Dominance and the Cloud’) is more forward-looking than its 
predecessors, in examining the migration of various previously offline functions of data 
storage, software and applications to centralised Internet-enabled cloud providers. Again, 
cloud providers occupy a gatekeeping position regarding the information users send and 
receive. The prospective application of competition law and the other relevant areas of law 
will be examined to determine whether these gatekeeping issues can be addressed adequately 
to protect and promote users’ autonomy. 
 
The ultimate chapter will summarise the outcomes of the case studies vis-à-vis how 
dominance of online information flows by concentrations of private economic power is 
addressed in the interests of user autonomy by the available legal tools in the EU. It will be 
seen that the case studies add up to presenting a situation in which gaps exist in the 
application of current EU law and regulation to concentrations of private power. What 
possible next steps could be for law and regulation will be discussed, while acknowledging 
that these gaps arise from more deep-seated currents in society that are likely to be too 
profound to be addressed in the short-term.  
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CHAPTER 2 COMPETITION AND CONSUMERS IN 
CYBERSPACE 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the situation regarding competition and consumers in 
the Internet realm, setting out the background conditions against which the following 
substantive chapters, each representing a case study of corporate dominance over online 
information flows, can be observed. The rise of private economic power and the conditions 
for competition in online markets will be explored in the first part of this chapter – 
highlighting the break with early cyberlibertarian theories that the Internet, due to its 
decentralised nature, could not be dominated in either the sense of the ‘radical monopoly’ or 
the competition law conception of market power, nor regulated by state power. In parallel to 
the rise of private corporate power online is the development of consumers’ position in 
cyberspace, from passivity in consuming the products and services of other, to a more active, 
information-producing function, via social networks, other user-generated content platforms 
as well as software-building initiatives – an idea explored in the second part of this chapter. 
Both of these lines of progression have a direct bearing on the themes of this thesis: while 
consumers in Internet markets might be more accurately conceptualised as ‘users’ with both 
consuming and producing functions, the rise of private economic power online poses new 
threats to the autonomy of these users, encompassing both ‘consumer welfare’ in the 
competition law sense, but also their sense of a ‘real’ choice among offerings and in ways 
which enhance and protect their rights and freedoms beyond the economic. Furthermore, the 
ability of competition law to include such other values beyond economic efficiency in its 
analysis and enforcement is explored. While this is not an issue confined to the Internet 
realm, the emergence of user autonomy as a desirable value, whether constituted by free 
expression, privacy and data protection or going beyond those other norms, prompts an 
evaluation of the suppleness of competition law in adapting to pursue other goals in this 
sphere. 
  
 
2.1 The emergence of private power online 
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This section explores the development of the Internet and the rise of private online power 
over information flows. Early perceptions of the Internet were that it was a space free of state 
or corporate influence. Even if this had been the case at one point, the commodification of the 
Internet has put paid to the idea that the Internet was somehow ‘different’ from the offline 
world in these senses. Indeed, recent years have seen not only the entry and assertion of 
private for-profit entities but also their concentration and functioning as somewhat centralised 
‘gatekeepers’ of information. 
 
 
a) Technical origins 
 
The Internet can be defined as: 
the global information system that – 
(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet 
Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons; 
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, 
and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and 
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services 
layered on the communications and related infrastructure described herein.71 
Essentially the Internet is a global network of interconnected computer networks (hence the 
‘network of networks’ as it is often known) that use the standard Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to 
link several billion devices throughout the world together. 
 
There are many developments since the end of World War II which have contributed to what 
we know today as the Internet, arguably starting with the development of electronic 
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computers in the 1950s.  In the 1960s, packet switching networks - whereby all transmitted 
data regardless of content, type or structure is grouped into blocks called packets - were 
developed separately by Paul Baran at the RAND Corporation in the US (whose network 
design was decentralised and distributed) and Donald Davies at the National Physical 
Laboratory in the UK. These packet switching networks were developed by the end of the 
1960s and in the early 1970s in the US, UK and France using a variety of protocols.  
 
Retrospectively, the most prominent of these networks was ARPANET, arguably the 
forerunner of the contemporary Internet, which was a US government-sponsored (ie publicly 
funded) project run by the US Department of Defense with corporate and academic partners. 
Researchers working on ARPANET developed an architecture to facilitate the seamless 
interconnection of separate, pre-existing computer networks without changing these 
networks. In doing so, they developed the TCP/IP protocol, to which ARPANET officially 
transitioned in 1983.  
 
Alongside ARPANET, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) founded the Computer 
Science Network (CSNET) to connect universities. (Other networks such as USENET and 
BITNET provided similar proto-Internet services.) The NSF then developed a larger network 
called NSFNET for science and education organisations which complemented ARPANET, 
using the TCP/IP protocol.   
 
NSFNET used the ARPANET ‘backbone’ to carry inter-network traffic, which was eventually 
decommissioned due to its age, and so ARPANET essentially became part of the NSF 
network.. NSF’s conditions of acceptable use forbade the use of the network for commercial 
purposes at the backbone level, but actually encouraged  regional networks to take on 
commercial customers so that they would expand their facilities and then use the economies 
of scale gains to reduce the cost of subscription for all customers. 
 
The privatisation of the Internet happened due to commercial providers ‘supplementing the 
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NSFNET backbone with a separate (though connected) national network capacity’,72 which 
was the result of encouraging commercial traffic in the local and regional networks but 
excluding it from the national network, so stimulating the creation of private, commercial 
long-haul networks.73 Alongside this development, ‘the NSF quietly stepped out of the scene 
by selling off its assets, a process that was completed by April 30, 1995 at which point the 
Internet was unequivocally a private entity’.  
 
In addition to the development of the network, private commercial products which 
implemented the Internet’s technology (especially the TCP/IP protocol) also appeared. Private 
entities such as MCI, the first commercial ISPs (PSINet, Advanced Network Services), the 
Commercial Internet Exchange, and the London Internet Exchange provided Internet 
hardware, consumer data transmission, and functioned as Internet service providers (ISPs).74 
Originally the sphere of private and commercial activity online comprised entities providing 
basic networking products, connectivity and basic Internet services such as those just 
mentioned. The development of the World Wide Web application by Tim Berners-Lee at the 
publicly-funded CERN and the release of its code to the public (in its entirety – including 
legal persons) paved the way for various Web-based companies such as Web browsers and 
search engines to provide more ‘user friendly’ infrastructure. The early browser Mosaic in 
particular ‘would help popularize the Web and therefore the Net as no software tool had yet 
done’.75 
 
Rosenzweig situates the Internet’s development as ‘rooted in the 1960s - in both the “closed 
world” of the Cold War and the open and decentralized world of the antiwar movement and 
the counterculture’.76 ARPANET rose out of a Cold War-era US military program, yet ARPA 
money also ‘supported the “hackers” at MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Lab’ including Richard 
Stallman,77 who would later become a luminary of the free software movement. Arguably this 
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dialectic between centralised control and antiauthoritarian decentralisation which is rooted in 
the historical events leading up to the creation of the Internet has persisted throughout the 
Internet’s public emergence from the 1990s until the present day – as will be seen in this 
thesis. 
 
 
b) Cyberlibertarianism 
 
By the mid-1990s, the Internet (in the developed West, and particularly in the US) was 
viewed as ‘an open public space which was decentralised, diverse and interactive’ with a 
‘largely uncritical reception given to the commercialisation of the internet’.78  
 
Indeed, the absence of government control was lauded, and developed into a socio-political 
discourse producing various ‘cyberlibertarian’ manifestos. Due to factors which mostly 
concerned the content of what was being placed on the Internet (such as the lack of 
restrictions on what kind of information could be up/downloaded to/from the Internet), its 
seemingly transnational nature, the lack of de facto government control over the medium (at 
least the layers of it which were more ‘visible’ to users), and the initial lack of prominence of 
large corporate entities at these layers more visible to users (or at least the absence of them 
acting in a way which impeded users seeing and doing what they wanted on the Internet), it 
appeared that the Internet represented an autonomous space in which users had control over 
their actions and online destiny (or at least more control as compared to previous mass 
mediums such as television or the press).  
 
The most prominent of these manifestos are John Perry Barlow's A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace, 79  which denied the sovereignty of nation-states over the 
Internet, and asserted the ability of the Internet community to self-govern, as well as defining 
the Internet as the place where ‘whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced and 
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distributed, infinitely at no cost’, thereby claiming the Internet's capacity to collect and 
disseminate to a potential mass global audience any and all ideas. Dyson and others’ 
somewhat less utopian article Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the 
Knowledge Age nevertheless proclaimed the death of ‘bureaucratic’ (ie governmental) power 
and the ‘demassifying’ or ‘freeing’ of institutions and culture (given financial costs were 
being driven towards zero in cyberspace),80 which would implicate a lack of necessity for 
economic regulation and oversight as well. 
 
Following a more legalistic approach, somewhat analogous arguments appeared in the context 
of early discussions of free expression online. Free expression was considered to have found 
its best outlet so far in the Internet. Information could be created and disseminated for a 
minimal cost to a worldwide audience, entailing a huge increase in the capacity of individuals 
to express themselves, as compared to the situation with the one-way broadcast media which 
preceded the Internet. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation with broadcast media in the 
liberal democracies under consideration, there were no mono-/duo-/oligopolies of large 
companies providing these information services (or if they did exist, they were not manifestly 
interfering with the information being conveyed). In addition, the way in which the 
technology functioned gave users a much greater choice over what they wanted to see as 
compared to broadcast media: users were no longer passive viewers as they had been in front 
of the television, but had access to a vast wealth of information at their fingertips, which they 
actively opted to access. Moreover, due to the Internet being a convergence of 
telecommunications and media, the legacy regulatory schemes that were platform- or 
technology-specific did not initially extend to the entirety of the Internet. The 
telecommunications infrastructure and retail services were still subject to ex ante regulation 
(as will be seen in greater detail in the following chapter), but at that time there were not 
specific laws and regulation to deal with purely Internet-based services. 
 
Indeed, the implications of the early Internet for users’ free expression were commented on 
by Volokh, in which he noted the differences between the ways in which the 'speech market' 
formerly operated in the previous mass media context, and how it now operated given the 
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Internet.81 He asserted that these new technologies would enable all ideas, regardless of the 
wealth of their proponents, to participate in this ‘marketplace’. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is a 
traditional American rationale for free expression, initially attributed to Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.82 The changes entailing this assertion were the much lower cost of disseminating 
information on the Internet as compared to printing, and the much larger (potential) audience 
for information on the Internet, which was formerly reserved for one-way broadcast media. In 
addition, this would weaken any justification for positive government regulation of speech 
(such as the fact various points of view are not disseminated via mass media due to their 
proponents for whatever reason not having access to these forms of communication), and so 
accord with some cyberlibertarian ideals of freedom from government. Free expression, thus, 
had found its best manifestation in the Internet. 
 
The US Supreme Court also gave its view of the state of affairs on the Internet regarding 
context of free expression in its decision in Reno v ACLU.83 Justice Stevens, delivering the 
opinion of the Court, stated that 'the Internet is 'a unique and wholly new medium of 
worldwide human communication', and repeated the District Court's finding that 'it is “no 
exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought”.' 
Key to the question of dominance on the Internet here, Stevens reiterated the District Court's 
finding that '[n]o single organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any 
centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked from the Web', 
professing the view that the Internet was free from the political, economic and social forces 
restraining behaviour in the offline world.  
 
This perception may have been informed by the fact that at this time, the Internet even in 
developed jurisdictions still did not have a high rate of penetration, and the popular view was 
that it was a more sophisticated and up-to-date toy for the entertainment of computer nerds 
and teenagers. In addition, corporate involvement at the more ‘visible’ levels was still limited: 
‘e-commerce’ has not quite yet matured, due to factors such as this relatively low rate of 
penetration, online security for credit card payments not being adequate and consumers not 
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having sufficient trust in online corporations. What for-profit corporate involvement there 
was, however, was not met with much criticism, ‘accord[ing] with the ethos of the time… a 
moment of triumphalism when democracy and capitalism had defeated communism’.84 
 
While implicit in the narrative around the Supreme Court judgement is the fact that nation-
states such as the US were at least attempting to control the Internet by the mid-1990s by 
enacting legislation, the corporate axis on the Internet until this point was not acting in a way 
which was manifestly restrictive of user behaviour, nor were there obvious poles of corporate 
dominance being seen. The user experience of the Internet in the 1990s and the legalistic 
conception of it would suggest that it was an arena without centralised control either from 
dominant corporate bodies or nation-states, a truly public sphere for debate, culture and 
human flourishing.  
 
 
c) The commodification of cyberspace 
 
However, all was not quite as rosy a picture as the cyberlibertarians painted. Various authors 
acknowledged their hyperbole or at least normative utopianism rather than descriptive 
accounts of what was actually happening online. As Goldsmith and Wu have observed, 
governments of both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, instead of fading out of 
cyberspace, have in fact managed to assert political and legal control over the medium in 
various ways.
85
 Furthermore, Solum notes that, while during the 1990s states and markets had 
not fully acknowledged the important of the Internet, ‘[g]overnments and large multinational 
firms now have pervasive presences in cyberspace’.86  
 
Indeed, Lessig declared the ‘change from a cyberspace of anarchy to a cyberspace of control’, 
with this control being exercised through the means of code, leading to his proclamation that 
                                                             
84
 Curran, ‘Rethinking internet history’ (n 27) 41.  
85
 Jack L Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 
86 Lawrence Solum, ‘Models of internet governance’ in LA Bygrace and T Michaelsen (eds), Internet 
Governance: Infrastructure and Institutions (Oxford University Press 2009) 58 
 57 
  
‘code is law’ (given that code for him is the primary form of regulating behaviour on the 
Internet).
87
 Lessig observes that the ‘first generation’ of Internet architecture was built by a 
noncommercial sector of programmers and universities, whereas the 'second generation' was 
built by commerce, responding to the demands of users, an example of which he gives being 
the development of IP mapping services to permit geographically-targeted advertisements. 
These geotargeting developments allowed the reassertion of geography online by identifying 
particular IP address as being based in particular countries. Furthermore, governments could 
also regulate what was occurring physically in their territory, and so online companies with 
assets or physical infrastructure in a certain jurisdiction could be subjected to local laws.88  
 
Advertising also rose as a ‘side-effect’ of commercialisation, which contributed to changing 
the character of the web to being a more market-oriented and commodified space. Another 
important development contributing to this commodification was the re-assertion of 
intellectual property rights over both software and content being shared online, and corporate 
lobbying for their increased enforcement in cyberspace – a process which has been described 
by Boyle as ‘the second enclosure movement’.89 This imagery evokes the feudalism of the 
first enclosure of private property and the dispossession by the masses which that entailed, 
while this time round the enclosure affects the ‘commons of the mind’. The WIPO Copyright 
Treaty from 1996 and its implementations in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the US 
and via a series of EU Directives are examples of this attempt to ‘beef up’ intellectual 
property rights and their enforcement when faced with disruptive new information 
technologies, for the benefit of large corporate copyright holders.
90
 The rise in importance of 
intellectual property rights – in terms of them being asserted by these online corporations, and 
the corporate pressure to update these rights and enforce them more strongly in the online 
environment – proved an initial motivation to force government intervention into the online 
space in the West.
91
 
 
Furthermore, many online business models introduced an element of user surveillance into 
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the equation: in providing products or services for no financial cost to users, the product and 
service providers instead gathered data on those users and their conduct in using the products 
and services. Various search engines and social networks represent examples of this trend. 
While the purpose of this data gathering for the corporations concerned is primarily to use it 
for their own economic purposes or sell it on to advertisers or other firms, these large pools of 
data about users’ conduct has proved useful also to law enforcement and espionage agencies 
in both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, particular in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
the ‘War on Terror’. States access this data gathered by corporations either by obliging them 
to comply with their demands (through using legislative means) or by offering incentives for 
these entities to do so voluntarily. Although this is not abnormal behaviour from states in their 
regulatory character, until the 2000s such approaches had not been seen overtly on the 
Internet. The latter method of informally incentivising corporations to act in ways the 
governments want also places such action firmly outside the scope of any administrative law 
checks on power. Birnhack and Elkin-Koren have termed this collaboration between states 
and large online corporations ‘the Invisible Handshake’ since the average citizen is not 
usually aware of the extent of this cooperation between the two axes of power, which is often 
fairly clandestine and ‘beyond the reach of judicial review’.92 Cohen has also remarked on 
these ‘architectures of control’ emerging where state and private interests - already deeply 
and inevitably intertwined - emerge.
93
 
 
 
d) Conglomeration and concentration 
 
Aside from the increasing interest of the state in surveillance of Internet users’ activity and its 
reassertion of power over that sphere, the Internet in the 2000s started maturing as a locus of 
economy activity, particularly after the dotcom bubble burst in 2000, and began to exhibit, in 
certain places anyway, the kind of conglomeration and concentration that did not seem 
possible according to the cyberlibertarians’ rhetoric from earlier in the Internet’s public life.  
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Yet among all the 1990s hype, there were dissenting voices.
94
 One dissent relevant to the 
discussion in this thesis was Graham, who argued that resources were still important for 
success on the Internet regarding the creation and marketing of high-quality content, with the 
consequence of more, not less, concentration than ‘old media’ due to economies of scope and 
scale – essentially, due to the existence of network effects.95 The Internet has both seen the 
rise of enormous new conglomerate corporations, often out of small ‘start-up’ origins, such as 
Google, Facebook and Amazon, as well as the ascendancy of some pre-Internet corporations 
such as Apple and Microsoft which adjusted well to the new circumstances.  
 
Furthermore, as regards the content available online, it seems that legacy content providers 
such newspapers or large corporations holding copyright of popular music, TV shows and 
films, which at the beginning of the 21
st
 century had become highly concentrated themselves 
due to economies of scale, still hold influential places in cyberspace. While there might be a 
much greater availability of content compared to broadcast media on the Internet, ‘premium’ 
content is still popular and the capacity to make such content is not in the hands of all – 
indeed, resources still matter.
96
 In addition, as Wu recognises, the Internet, although itself 
founded on open principles, has run over the telecoms network, an industry prone to 
monopoly and oligopoly (as will be seen in Chapter 3 on dominance and Internet provision).97  
 
Moreover, the greater availability and diversity of content (and other services) online has also 
given rise to the importance of ‘gatekeepers’ of this information, which ‘structure access to 
increasingly populated and complex markets’ for users.98 So despite the plethora of content 
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and services available online, these corporate gatekeepers (and they are almost all for-profit 
corporations, as will be seen in the following chapters) ensure that the ‘traditional 
mechanisms for ensuring the viability of cultural commodities in a capitalist market – of 
oligopolies, bottlenecks and manufactured scarcity – are as relevant to the new digital 
economy as they were to the one it has allegedly replaced.’99  
 
These gatekeepers, also termed ‘intermediaries’ as they mediate the relationship between 
users of the Internet by channelling data and information flows that pass through their ‘gates’, 
are useful also for the state, as mentioned in the previous section. They can be used as 
surveillance apparatus with no need for the state to build a separate infrastructure, and fulfil a 
key role in actively policing user activity for purposes including but going beyond national 
security – such as defamation and copyright. Regulation that governments impose on these 
entities for these surveillance and policing purposes also may contribute to market 
concentration given they increase barriers for potential new entrants into that particular 
market – which also has the effect of making them easier for governments to regulate given 
smaller numbers of companies able to operate in a particular market.
100
 
 
In addition, Wu notes a tendency to centralisation and ‘closed’ design in previous 
communications technologies to the Internet, after starting out with similar decentralised and 
‘open’ ethos, with the warning that the Internet may also go this way. Some drivers towards 
more closed ecosystems include desires for increased quality and safety of products and 
services. Apple’s mobile devices (explored in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis) present a 
good example here of a system designed taking into account these values, eschewing the 
more chaotic openness of the original Internet yet at the expense of individual freedom. 
Furthermore, the move to the cloud, discussed in Chapter 6, can be seen as 'another round of 
“enclosure” which is prejudicial for users and rolls back on the increased autonomy, control 
and freedom over their digital wanderings that they have experienced with the Internet thus 
far’.101 
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Thus, despite the origins of the Internet in a publicly-funded project and the cyberlibertarian 
claims from the 1990s regarding the Internet’s enhancement of economic and political 
freedom for users, the reality is that the Internet has become a heavily commodified space 
which has seen the emergence of certain, almost all for-profit actors performing a 
‘gatekeeping’ function over data flows – both for their own economic benefit as well as for 
the state’s surveillance capabilities. 
 
 
2.2 Consumers and the commons 
 
Yet alongside this march towards commodification of the Internet and the various points of 
centralisation of power in the form of gatekeepers, it remains the case that individuals using 
the Internet interact with it in a different fashion to the way in which they interacted with 
previous media and communications technologies. Benkler has documented this 
phenomenon, and argues for a reconceptualisation of the labelling of such individuals: 
‘[t]echnology now makes possible the attainment of decentralization and democratization by 
enabling small groups of constituents and individuals to become users— participants in the 
production of their information environment—rather than by lightly regulating concentrated 
commercial mass media to make them better serve individuals conceived as passive 
consumers’.102 Internet users, according to Benkler, are ‘an ambiguous category from the 
perspective of an information environment composed of (a small number of professional) 
producers and (a large number of passive) consumers’ since they can occupy both the role of 
producer and consumer as regards information. The progression from this binary producer-
consumer dichotomy to the concept of user in the Internet environment has come about due to 
‘the radical reduction in the cost of processors and the flat, distributed design of the Internet’ 
entailing that ‘relatively cheap end points in a network – computers – can produce quite 
sophisticated communications, access the Internet, and disseminate them more or less 
everywhere’. 
 
This section examines the dynamics of the emergence of “users” for the Internet ecosystem, 
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in terms of assessing their role in constructing alternatives to information production and 
consumption based on state or for-profit models, and thus in furthering their own autonomy 
online. 
 
 
a) Web 2.0 and commons-based peer production 
 
Those in the free software movement have existed as both consumer and producers of their 
works for some time, with the fruits of their works have subsisting in a non-commodified 
knowledge commons where rights of attribution are retained yet exclusive economic rights 
normally given by intellectual property protections are ceded. However, for ‘normal’ Internet 
users without much in the way of technical knowledge, the turning point for their transition to 
‘prosumers’ came with the advent of Web 2.0. Sometimes described as the ‘second 
generation’ of the World Wide Web, Web 2.0 involved both the running of software 
programmes online on the Web rather than offline on a computer desktop, and increased and 
easier access for Internet users to publishing information online (and often the two 
combined). While there is no authoritative definition of Web 2.0, Batelle and O’Reilly 
defined it as the ‘Web as Platform’ where software applications were built on the Web rather 
than on the computer desktop, and this facilitated users’ generation of content to create value 
for the platform owners. 103  These Web-based applications allowing information sharing, 
interoperability, user-centred design and collaboration, catalysed the phenomenon of mass 
user collaboration on the Internet, especially content generated by users, which opened up to 
a wider category of people the possibility of creating, participating and disseminating their 
creations to a vast global audience. From the advent of Web 2.0, users now did not need to be 
equipped with any programming knowledge to share information in a public fashion on 
webpages. 
 
The development of Web 2.0 gave rise to new categories of online initiative. Firstly, there are 
platforms such as Facebook or YouTube, which are privately-owned and profit-making. 
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These have an enabling function for users, who can share information such as news about 
themselves and photos. Secondly, there are open source projects, such as Open Office, over 
which no traditional intellectual property right is exerted. The collaboration on such projects 
encompasses individuals as well as corporations, such as Sun Systems in the specific case of 
Open Office. Although no right is asserted over the software, not all participants in the 
initiative are equal, and the corporations involved often invest significant sums of money in 
them (with the motivation usually being that they are able to make profit through [proprietary] 
associated products and services eg user manuals, support etc).
104
 Thirdly, there are peer 
collaborative projects such as Wikipedia, where individual users work together for no fee to 
create the end-product. These are also copyleft initiatives, over which no traditional 
intellectual property right is asserted, but could be termed more egalitarian endeavours than 
those where there are corporations involved. 
 
The third category of Web 2.0 initiative has also been documented by Benkler,
 
who coins the 
term 'commons-based peer production' to describe it.
105
 This phenomenon encompasses 
individuals an on a decentralised basis collaborating together to produce information 
and cultural outputs over which no traditional intellectual property right is asserted and 
so the product is free to access and use. Furthermore, this kind of production is usually not 
explicitly exclusionary regarding who is entitled to participate in its creation, and is non-
hierarchical inasmuch as individuals participating in the project are all on the same level and 
there is no official manager or owner dictating what must happen. Thus the process is free to 
join, and the product of the process is free to use and access (ie no payment or permission is 
necessary). In addition, the cooperation among the individuals participating is not dependent 
on 'either market signals or managerial commands' and so, according to Benkler, elements 
of hierarchy are not present. 
 
Benkler recognises that the market and non-market, and the proprietary and non-proprietary 
co-exist in reality, and that one significant benefit of these alternative platforms is that they 
decrease the extent to which individuals can be manipulated by the owners of the facilities on 
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which they depend for communication. Thus, the non-market and non-proprietary enhance an 
individual's freedom and autonomy.  
 
Benkler’s characterisation of Web 2.0 as giving rise to the prosumers and their participation in 
alternative projects to those that are either state- or corporate-run at least in the immaterial 
production of information, ideas and knowledge represents a phenomenon that is outside the 
usual private-public power binary upon which, it is submitted, the current legal and regulatory 
system is based, since the system has been formulated in an epoch prior to this decentralised, 
non-proprietary and non-hierarchical information production and thus contains certain 
assumptions about the state of the world which no longer necessarily hold true.106 A lack of 
acknowledgement of these changes is, it is submitted, one reason behind the ‘gaps’ in the 
current legal and regulatory system when it comes to addressing concentrations of private 
economic power for the benefit of Internet users’ autonomy. 
 
Yet while the Internet has opened up these possibilities for users to collaborate on such 
projects, true, non-hierarchical, non-market commons-based peer production initiatives 
remain few and far between. Benkler seems overly-optimistic in his proclamations of 
individuals freed from the constraints of the industrial information society. In fact, these 
initiatives aside from a few successful exceptions such as Wikipedia (which also now has a 
large managerial class and so may not be entirely non-hierarchical) have not been strong and 
numerous enough to counter the resurgence of power from corporate and state quarters.  
 
Commons-based peer production itself depends on arrangements in the 'physical' world, 
which itself continues mostly to be based on property rights rather than commoning 
arrangements.107 Furthermore, many of the web-based platforms, including the most popular 
among users such as Facebook, Google's services and Twitter, are free for users to use in 
terms of no financial cost, but are actually for-profit corporations which make money by 
monetising the content that these users create using their platforms and services. In addition, 
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in participating in these corporately-owned web-based platforms and services, users and their 
behaviour generating a large amount of data which is stored, analysed and sold on to third 
parties (especially advertisers) by the platform owner or service operator, with this process 
constituting Fuchs’ ‘economic surveillance’. 108  Finally, even within purported commons-
based peer production, hierarchies form, 109  and there is often some kind of corporate 
involvement as mentioned above, which detracts from the truly ‘peer’ element of the 
production. 
 
Accordingly, it is impossible to divorce cyberspace from the capitalist reality in which it is 
grounded – and so commons-based peer production may not enhance user autonomy as much 
as Benkler suggests given in practice it does not exist as an island apart from these other 
socio-economic forces. 
 
 
b) Regulation and peer to peer alternatives 
 
Thus, while it is true that the Internet in theory gives rise to the possibility for truly commons-
based peer production, the reality is that the pre-Internet world and offline activities are still 
relevant in the face of technodeterminism.  
 
Indeed, Benkler himself acknowledges the imperfect nature of the Internet ecosystem, and 
believes that government regulation is warranted, in a way which enables a wide distribution 
of the capacity to produce and disseminate information. He sees the new task of regulatory 
policy to be 'identifying resources necessary for the production and exchange of information 
and fashioning regulatory policies that make access to and use of these resources equally and 
ubiquitously available to all users of the network'.110 
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However, given the state’s evident interest in the surveillance of users, and the constitutional 
convenience of this surveillance being carried out by private entities (particular in the US 
where they also enjoy the constitutional right to free speech in the First Amendment), as well 
as the corporatism that Western states seem to display towards accumulations of capital, then 
Internet users may also need to look elsewhere for alternatives. 
 
While true non-hierarchical, non-market ‘commons-based peer production’ may not be a 
dominant mode of production and is still dependent on capitalist relations, ‘its logic radically 
contradicts that of capital’ – especially the capitalist division of labour - and thus should still 
be looked to as an alternative to the status quo.111  In building this alternative, Bauwens 
acknowledges different schools of thought around the commons, including those approaches 
which are compatible with capitalism, but instead of opposing those approaches per se, 
advocates ‘efforts to make the commons more autonomous from profit-maximizing entities 
and the system as a whole’.112 In making the commons more autonomous from the current 
(neoliberal capitalist) system, it is submitted that this has the follow-on effect of making 
individuals more autonomous from both state and corporate power, and so is an approach to 
be encouraged within this thesis, both through applications of the existing law and regulation 
which would facilitate this approach, as well as the proposal of true peer to peer solutions to 
problems of corporate dominance over online information flows, given the autonomy gains 
for individuals such design encompasses over either state or corporate intervention. 
 
This goes beyond the ‘infrastructure as a commons’ argument advanced by Frischmann, who 
advocates commons management (although not ownership) for the Internet and 
communications networks. As mentioned early, this commons management is a resource 
management principle which entails that the resource is available to all within a community 
on a non-discriminatory basis. Individuals’ autonomy, however, can (it is submitted) be better 
served by infrastructure which is not only managed on a commons basis but also owned and 
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controlled by the peers themselves on a fragmented, decentralised basis.113 Mesh networks 
and community clouds are technical solutions offered, respectively, in Chapters 3 and 6 which 
can operate both under commons management and under commons ownership and control.114 
 
 
2.3 Applying competition law to the Internet 
 
Certainly, the problems of private power on the Internet can at least in part be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of competition law as a way of solving them. The following chapters in this thesis 
will identify the precise problems which have manifested and how current EU competition 
law has been, or might be, employed to solve them, successfully or unsuccessfully, along with 
other relevant laws and regulation. This section, however, looks at the more general 
application of competition law to the online space in light of the preceding sections of this 
chapter, along with the particular circumstances it faces in these kinds of markets, as well as 
an examination of the ability of competition law to take into account values relevant to the 
Internet context other than solely economic efficiency – such as user autonomy or subsets 
thereof ie free expression, privacy and data protection. 
 
 
a) Characteristics of online markets 
 
Internet markets exhibit some idiosyncratic features which place them outside of mainstream 
competition analysis (although are not necessarily fatal to an adapted or more thorough 
competition analysis).  
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Firstly, Internet markets are characterised by high rates of innovation. These high rates of 
innovation may result in dominant positions not being a cause for concern, since there will 
soon in any event be a new disruptive technology which overthrows the dominant incumbent 
in a Schumpeterian manner, ending in its creative destruction. Thus dominant position may 
only be short-term. It is widely acknowledged that innovation in general is not taken account 
of well by neoclassical economic theory, and it may just be that the problem is exacerbated in 
highly innovative markets such as these.
115
 Furthermore, the high rate of innovation can 
complicate exercises in competition law procedure such as market definition and market 
power. Due to this high rate of innovation, as well as the complexity of many online products 
and services, ‘non-experts’ (such as lawyers, judges and regulators) may find it difficult to 
determine whether substitution is possible among the highly complex technological products 
and services. The consequence of this is that the traditional means of defining markets and 
assessing market power may result in markets that are too narrow, and market power which is 
overestimated.
116  
However, this does not seem to be entirely fatal for traditional competition 
analysis: so long as it adapts somewhat to the difficulty in understanding the products and 
services at hand then it can still survive. A way this can happen may be to include technology 
experts in regulatory teams conducting competition law assessments. Also, one more socio-
legal consequence that the high rate of innovation can have for competition law is that given 
the time taken to conduct competition investigations, they may ultimately be rendered 
obsolete by the time they conclude, or at least their remedies may be ineffective or too little 
too late. This can be seen in the antitrust litigation involving Microsoft in the US: Microsoft 
was found to have engaged in anticompetitive conduct in bundling its Internet Explorer 
browser with its Windows operating system, yet by the time the litigation had ended, 
Microsoft’s browser competitors had already exited the market. 
 
Secondly, in many Internet markets operate with a zero monetary price to be paid by users for 
the service or product – Anderson’s ‘radical price’ of free.117 This can be challenging to 
traditional competition analysis which is primarily based upon a price being charged for 
goods and services, and uses tests such as SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory 
                                                             
115
 Tim Wu, ‘Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination’ (2003) 2 Journal of Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law 141, 149  
116
 Christopher Pleatsikas and David Teece, ‘The analysis of market definition and market power in the context 
of rapid innovation’ (2001) 19(5) International Journal of Industrial Organization 665 
117
 Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price (Hyperion 2009) 
 69 
  
Increase in Price) in order to define markets, calculate market shares as well as characterising 
anticompetitive conduct, such as price-fixing or the various pricing practices which constitute 
an abuse of dominance (eg predatory pricing, rebates and margin squeezing). However, zero 
price will also not torpedo a competition analysis – while price is a key element to these 
activities, anticompetitive conduct can also encompass affecting the quality of products and 
reducing output and innovation – although measuring the extent to which innovation or 
quality has been negatively affected by anticompetitive conduct may be more difficult to 
measure than whether prices are at an anticompetitive level. Indeed, even when a price is 
being charged for the product or service, in high technology markets it may well be that price 
changes are not the focus of competitive efforts and instead performance (quality, service, 
reliability) is where competition takes place.118 In any event, a price of zero is often indicative 
of there being a ‘companion’ product or service, or the free product or service being one part 
of a two- or multi-sided market, where the companion product or other side of the market 
subsidises the ‘free’ product or service.119 Thus competition analysis should consider the free 
product or service with its companion and/or the other ‘side’ of the market as is appropriate in 
the situation at hand. Instances of free products or services that have been before competition 
authorities include the Microsoft litigation,120 the investigations into Google’s search and 
advertising business (which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4) and the Oracle 
Sun Systems merger which involved Sun’s MySQL free software database with its money-
making companion products including additional functionality, licences to embed the 
database and technical support.121 
 
Thirdly, and following the previous paragraph, a combination of network effects and two- or 
multi-sided markets characterise many Internet markets. Network efforts effects mean that the 
value of the Internet as a medium, and various services on it, increases as more as more 
people use it. Elkin-Koren and Salzberger consider that these may have a competition-
limiting effect by increasing the cost of entry since ‘[t]hey provide a significant advantage to 
first comers, who may establish their products as the standard for future goods’.122 Two- or 
multi-sided markets encompass scenarios in which an entity provides a ‘meeting places’ for 
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two (or more) groups of customers and facilitates the interaction of these groups, thus 
minimising transaction costs.
123
 These platforms often exhibit network effects inasmuch as 
the large the group of customers on one side of the platform is, the more attractive that may 
be to customers on the other side of the platform, and vice versa. The two- or multi-sided 
nature of platforms may or may not be important for competition analysis depending on the 
case at hand, but certainly an appreciation of how the platform operates and the 
characteristics of both sides is necessary before proceeding to any next step in analysis lest 
the full picture be missed. 
 
 
b) Consumers as users in competition analysis 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the basis for competition law sanctioning an excess of 
market power or ‘dominance’ when it has been 'abused' (since this power or dominance in 
itself is not illegal per se)124 is that consumer welfare is harmed by such abuses, ie consumers 
as a result pay more for products or services, or buy goods or services of a lesser quality and 
less innovative.  
 
The idea of ‘consumer welfare’ even within the confines of mainstream competition law is a 
problematic concept. A precise definition of 'consumer welfare' is difficult to come by, and at 
first blush it also makes the assumption that consumers are an amorphous mass with the same 
needs and interests, which does not reflect the diversity of consumers in reality. It is true that 
the conception of ‘consumer’ in EU law is inclusive of ‘customers’ and so encompasses 
intermediate customers as well as final consumers even if in practice ‘customer welfare’ does 
not always coincide with ‘consumer welfare. 125  Attempts have been made to distinguish 
between different kinds of consumers, such as ‘marginal’ (ie consumers which value the 
product in a way which is approximate to its current price, and so very sensitive to price 
fluctuations) compared to ‘infra-marginal’ consumers (ie those whose value of the product is 
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a lot higher than its original price and so are relatively insensitive to price fluctuations) or 
even ‘ignorant’ and ‘knowledgeable’, 126  but consumers as a whole are even more 
heterogeneous than these attempts suggest. Furthermore, although as mentioned in the 
Introduction, the objective of competition law is now generally accepted to be the maximising 
of consumer welfare through competitive markets, there is a gaping lack of empirical 
evidence to suggest that competition or competition law actually achieves a greater measure 
of consumer welfare however defined.127 
 
In addition to this critique is the possible paradigm shift that the Internet brings to the very 
idea of passive consumers of a commodity. The nature of digitised information and the more 
active and autonomous character of Internet users as compared to their previous position as 
passive consumers of media should, it is submitted, force some kind of re-conceptualisation 
of the supposed beneficiaries of competition law, even if true commons-based peer 
production is not as widespread as Benkler suggests. Nevertheless, from the perspective of 
competition law, Internet users are a different category of actor than mere consumers, around 
whom competition law is constructed. Consumers and users/producers may well have 
overlapping but also different needs and desires, and so the concept of ‘consumer welfare’ 
that is used in competition analysis may not capture this. The user does not only care about 
characteristics of products such as price and quality, but also whether the product comprises 
more capacity for the user to produce as well as consume. Furthermore, what happens to what 
the user produces is of high importance – whether it is enclosed as the intellectual property of 
the web platform used by the user, whether it is shared in a commons or whether it remains 
under the user's individual control.  
 
Indeed, as mentioned Benkler advocates the Internet being regulated in a way which enables a 
wide distribution of the capacity to produce and disseminate information.128 While some of 
this may be captured by the competition regime, user autonomy is not identical to consumer 
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welfare. Indeed, competition law takes a paternalistic attitude towards consumers, who are 
characterised as largely passive and without the capacity for production (although the same 
individual which is a consumer may well have a productive role due to her employment, 
although if a worker she will not own the products of her labour). It is true that consumers are 
considered not to be entirely passive in competition analysis inasmuch as their ability to 
switch to competitors’ products and services is considered, as well as the barriers they face to 
exit, however it is submitted that this kind of activity encompasses a very small area of 
autonomy for individuals and does not go far enough to conceptualise them as having the 
ability to create as well as consume. Competition law’s regard paid to individuals’ ability to 
choose and switch to the alternative products and services from competitors may well be 
considered one of Illich’s radical monopolies inasmuch as this may constitute one type of 
product which competition law does not envisage consumers making themselves. In contrast, 
the idea of user used in this thesis is a more empowered individual, with the capacity for 
consumption and production, as well as ownership and control over that production.  
 
Since the consumer welfare standard currently in use will only look at values from a 
consumer point of view, a standard such as user autonomy will go beyond this and look at 
values from both the consumer’s and the user’s point of view, as well as showing concern for 
the extent of control the user will be able to assert, and the interference from other entities, 
such as the state and vestiges of private power. Thus, the extent to which competition law 
with its objective of maximising consumer welfare is a reflection of the maximisation of user 
autonomy is the crux of the issue of whether competition law is still an appropriate legal 
regime in this environment. 
 
Given the changed benefits to consumer welfare, and the introduction of user autonomy as a 
real and important value to individuals operating online, if market-based analysis is to be 
applied to the Internet, Elkin-Koren and Salzberger advocate that as a result of initiatives such 
as commons-based peer production and open source, markets on the Internet should be 
evaluated ‘not only like any other market by the criteria of efficiency, but also as a public 
sphere, commons or mechanism for private and collective actions’.129 Some notion then of the 
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issues beyond the purely economic at play in instances of corporate dominance, concentration 
or the proposal of mergers may be desirable to take into account in order to regulate Internet 
markets and activities well and for the benefit of consumers' welfare and users’ autonomy.  
 
Examples of where the traditional view of consumer welfare and user autonomy diverge can 
be found within the case studies of this thesis. One instance is the tentative conclusion of the 
European Commission’s investigation into Google’s search practices whereby some changes 
may be made to the results page (which may enhance consumer welfare) but users will 
remain none the wiser about the inner machinations of Google and its search algorithm (and 
so their autonomy will not be fully advanced).  
 
 
c) ‘Non-economic’ values in competition 
 
Taking into account ‘other’ ‘non-economic’ values in competition analysis may be easier said 
than done. This issue has been raised in practice by the recent intervention of the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), who generated the beginnings of a public debate on the 
role of data in competition analyses of online markets in the EU.130 It is true that data plays a 
role of pivotal importance in the Internet ecosystem. It is an input and output of computer 
processing, and flows of data are what the network carries. Thus, control over the data inputs, 
outputs and flows has competition consequences as well as those for free expression and 
privacy.  
 
The EDPS considered that the collection and control of very large amounts of personal data 
are a source of market power for large players in European Internet markets, and may even 
constitute ‘essential facilities’ in certain circumstances, such that a refusal of access to such 
data may constitute an abuse of dominance. However, this is not a new issue as such – access 
to a dominant competitor’s data, protected by intellectual property, has been addressed 
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already in certain cases such as Magill and IMS Health.131The EDPS also considered that it 
may be necessary to incorporate violations of the right to data protection into the concept of 
consumer harm in the context of competition enforcement, such as when a dominant entity is 
restricting users’ freedom of choice and control over their personal data, such as when they 
are offered a product for zero monetary price yet ‘pay’ with the collection of their data and 
data about their behaviour.132  
 
This suggestion of incorporating other values such as data protection – and, for the purposes 
of this thesis, the idea of user autonomy - into competition analysis, and ‘consumer welfare’ 
in particular, is not novel. Indeed, the sole use of the ‘economic’ approach including vis-à-vis 
consumer welfare has been critiqued as omitting other valuable societal goals because they 
are 'too difficult' to quantify.133  Stucke, for instance, believes that competition policy can go 
beyond promoting economic efficiency, and in fact disperse economic and political power 
and promote individual freedom (which would seem to be something analogous to user 
autonomy, depending on its interpretation), and argues for a 'blended approach' to competition 
goals.134  Yet Stucke does not explain very adequately what this would mean across the board 
of competition investigations and issues, and seems just to be a different interpretation of 
economic policy objectives in the scope of competition law, such as protecting small and 
medium businesses. 
 
Furthermore, competition law has not always been underpinned by the neoclassical economic 
thought leading to this ‘economic’ or quantitative analysis. Even within the history of 
competition law, accumulations of private power has been put under suspicion for reasons 
beyond what the final product or service looks like and costs. For instance, ordoliberalism 
was a German economic movement which believed that it was the state's role to ensure that 
the (otherwise) free market fulfils its theoretical potential, and competition as opposed to 
mere exchange was pivotal in achieving this. If the state does not act in this way, then 
ordoliberals believed that not only would the market economy suffer and not produce optimal 
                                                             
131
 Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann and Others v Commission [1995] ECR I-743; Case C-
418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR I-5039 
132
 EDPS (n 130) 32 
133
 Christopher Townley, ‘Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU?: public policy and its discontents’ (2011) 9 
European Competition Law Review 441 
134
 Maurice Stucke, ‘Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals’ (2012) 53 Boston College Law Review 551, 590 
 75 
  
results, but that private corporate power was also to be checked due to its potential to 
undermine the (democratic) political process and government, since they believed that 
economic power could translate into political power. They saw the threat to individual liberty 
as not only emanating from the government, but also from powerful economic institutions. 
Competition law here had then a different role from the current mainstream conception, 
which is not aimed at achieving optimal consumer welfare or efficiency, but instead at 
preserving individual freedom against threats from private power, and competition in itself is 
crucial, an end in itself rather than a mere means to an end.135  
 
Foucault himself drew parallels between the ordoliberals and the Frankfurt School of critical 
theory, since both were influenced by Max Weber and both tackled the ‘irrational rationality 
of capitalist society’, but they differed in how they treated the problem. The Frankfurt School 
tried to define the new social rationality that could cancel out the economic irrationality, 
whereas the ordoliberals concentrated on the redefinition of the economic rationality that 
would enable the cancelling out of the social irrationality of capitalism.136  The Frankfurt 
School is regarded as Marxist or neo-Marxist, and its members were critical of both 
capitalism and Soviet socialism, with their alternative being a further path to social 
development (ie that which would cancel out the economic irrationality of capitalism). The 
ordoliberals were not anti-capitalists critical of all sorts of private power, but something more 
along the lines of critics of unchecked private power and proponents of a social market 
economy,137 with a 'strong state' that would be effective in its ability to discharge effectively 
its duties and responsibilities regarding inter alia the economy such as providing order and 
facilitating competition.138 For ordoliberals, thus, competition is not something that occurs 
naturally in markets, but a process that must be created and maintained by the state.  
 
In addition to ordoliberalism, the development of antitrust law in the US especially prior to 
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World War II, and in particular President Franklin D Roosevelt's antimonopoly message in 
1938, pointed to a distrust of the accumulation of private power beyond merely economic 
reasons, since this could become stronger than the democratic state itself (this situation was 
termed 'Fascism'), and the danger was identified in contemporary American society as the 
concentrated economic power which had arisen since the Great Depression and included 
cartels.139 Presidential predecessor and distant cousin Theodore Roosevelt was also strongly 
in favour of the control and break up of monopolies, which formed part of his ‘Square Deal’ 
programme in the early years of the 20th century. 
 
The ordoliberal view of competition law and its place in the social order (as well as the 
similar view from Roosevelt) would seem to give it more of a ‘political’/politicised role than 
that of the current, neoliberal conception of competition law (as explained in the previous 
introductory chapter). Private economic power would be checked for not only being 
damaging to the economy but also to the political system and the freedom of individuals. In 
practice, this could mean that competition law would intervene in the market on more 
occasions than it does now, and for reasons that were not strictly economic, or on the basis of 
other, non-quantitative evidence. However, critics could point to such tests being less 
predictable and more arbitrary than those which are currently used, giving less legal certainty 
to market players. Yet, as Endicott notes, law is necessarily vague – because it necessarily 
uses abstract terms, and here such abstract terms may be these qualitative values that 
competition law should tackle.140 
 
In any event, as mentioned in the Introduction, in Europe (and the US for that matter) 
neoliberalism - not ordoliberalism or anti-corporatism - is the dominant tendency in 
competition law and policy, and so the critique of private economic power within the 
competition discourse for being problematic for democracy and individual (‘political’) 
freedom as well as for what consumers pay and the quality of products and services is no 
longer prominent, nor incorporated into the current More Economic Approach. 
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In the likely event of no major changes being made to competition law’s methodology in the 
near future, the current version of competition law is not so well-equipped to take into 
account more qualitative factors, as a regime which operates using mainly quantitative data – 
to establish relevant markets, market shares and other phenomena. Measuring the extent to 
which user autonomy or some subset of that such as data protection or personal freedom, is 
promoted or harmed would seem to be a more qualitative than quantitative exercise, and 
generally one that will not be measured in financial terms. For non-economic objectives it 
may be more expedient to use law and policy aside from competition law to achieve them, 
since using competition law to do so can be costly and ineffective.141 Competition law has a 
particular ideology and aims,142 which may well not be sufficiently conceptually supple to 
bend to these situations.  
 
Competition law may be looked to in situations where there is an accumulation of private 
economic power that threatens individuals’ ‘political’ as well as ‘economic’ freedom merely 
because it is the one regime available in the circumstances, but not because it is a 
wonderfully appropriate part of the law for dealing with such situations. It is true that there 
are sometimes ‘non-economic’ effects of anticompetitive behaviour on the Internet (as well as 
in other markets) – such as impinging on users’ free expression and privacy rights. For this 
reason, there may be calls to include a consideration of them in the competition law analysis 
such as that of the EDPS for competition authorities to consider data protection as a value. 
This call has been echoed on the other side of the Atlantic from Federal Trade Commissioner 
Julie Brill, that privacy may be considered in competition analyses.143 Competition law may 
go some way to alleviating these non-economic effects of anticompetitive conduct as well as 
the economic ones, yet in other cases governmental (ex ante) regulation may be more 
appropriate to secure users' capacity to produce and disseminate information rather than an 
attempted difficult incorporation of other values, such as ‘data protection’, ‘freedom’ or even 
‘user autonomy’ into a competition law analysis. 
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Nevertheless, regardless of judicial and administrative bodies’ wishes, in both Europe and the 
US they are under duties to apply the law in ways which are not incompatible with 
fundamental rights (Europe)144 and the Constitution (the US).145 Indeed, fundamental rights 
and the Constitution have primacy over other laws in their respective legal systems.146 This 
would seem to entail that the judiciary or administrative body cannot ignore these rights when 
investigating or adjudicating competition cases, or at very least should not produce an 
outcome which is incompatible with these rights. Since rights are not solely economically-
based, then this would inevitably involve dealing with non-economic values. However taking 
account of rights may prove institutionally difficult given the ‘explicitly technocratic remit’ of 
many EU telecoms regulators (some of which also have competition investigatory powers) 
and even for those with no legislative impediment to taking account of human rights, their 
organisational culture may preclude the consideration of rights in practice – or at least take 
those responsible out of their professional comfort zone.147  
 
Indeed, there are some indications of what this kind of approach in competition law would 
look like from the ‘constitutionalisation’ phenomenon in some EU Member States’ domestic 
private law – namely the UK, Netherlands and Germany.148 This has involved the application 
of fundamental rights in certain disputes between private parties in contract and tort, such as 
in situations where there are several possible interpretations of these laws, the court should 
follow the interpretation which best upholds the parties’ fundamental rights.  To the extent 
that the promotion of user autonomy would include the promotion of rights such as free 
expression, privacy, freedom of assembly etc then it may be advanced through similar means 
in competition law. By analogy, if there are several possible applications of competition law 
to a particular scenario, then the competition authority should proceed with the application 
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which best upholds data protection, or free expression, or autonomy.  
 
While this method could be incorporated into competition analyses without, it is submitted, 
too much legislative upheaval (although possibly some practical issues that could be solved 
by closer coordination between eg data protection authorities and competition authorities), as 
will be seen in the following chapters, the problem may be in the fact that competition law 
does not apply to a given circumstance in the first place: either there is no finding of 
dominance, or even if there is dominance, there is not a recognised abuse – even if those 
circumstances harm user autonomy, free expression, privacy, data protection etc. 
 
Thus, a finding of anticompetitive abuse – which absent a merger situation necessitates either 
a dominant position or evidence of collusion – is still a necessary prerequisite for triggering a 
competition investigation and analysis, regardless of what other values may be incorporated 
into that analysis.  For this reason, it may remain that this is not the most effective way of 
securing data protection, or any other desirable (non-economic) value, regardless of any move 
to ‘constitutionalise’ competition law. In any event, Feretti notes that ‘the pursuit or 
consideration for other non-economic goals under competition law is at odds with neo-
liberalism’,149 and so likely to give rise to much regulatory tension if competition bodies find 
themselves under press to apply non-economic values that may be encompassed by human 
rights. 
 
 
2.4 Regulation 
 
The dominance of the More Economic Approach in contemporary EU competition law, 
underpinned by quantitative analyses of consumer welfare and premised on neoclassical 
economics, entails that reform to encompass the non-economic aspects of user autonomy 
would not be simple, and indeed, as already mentioned, a discussion of the possible paths 
competition law reform could take is outside the scope of this thesis. Aside from the possible 
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constitutionalisation of competition law through applications and interpretations in 
accordance with the protection of fundamental rights, any further move towards the 
incorporation of ‘non-economic’ values, such as those promoting user autonomy, individual 
freedom and/or democracy, into the current competition law analysis of consumer welfare is 
likely to be difficult if not impossible in practice.   
 
There are different existing approaches to Internet regulation which can broadly be grouped 
into three categories: ‘traditional’ state-led regulation; industry self-regulation; and 
multistakeholder co-regulation. 150  As will be seen, however, these different regulatory 
approaches remain inadequate to address the problems of private economic power over online 
information flows in the interests of user autonomy. 
 
Industry self-regulation is the process ‘whereby an industry-level (as opposed to 
governmental or firm-level) organization sets rules and standards (codes of practice) relating 
to the conduct of firms in the industry’ either on a ‘voluntary’ basis (ie independent of direct 
government involvement) or with some degree of government mandate (either or both of rule-
making and enforcement are left to the particular sector).151 While self-regulation can be more 
‘efficient’ than state-led regulation, it has been heavily critiqued for the unlikelihood that 
market participants will actually act in the best interests of society overall rather than their 
own business interests. As Braithwaite puts it, ‘[s]elf-regulation is frequently an attempt to 
deceive the public into believing in the responsibility of an irresponsible industry [and 
s]ometimes … a strategy to give the government an excuse for not doing its job’.152  
 
However, state-led regulation may be seen as more democratically legitimate inasmuch as the 
public interest may be better represented by the state rather than just the self-interest of 
business, and the regulators may be democratically accountable to the legislature or even 
directly to the electorate. In theory, thus, ex ante state-led regulation of private economic 
                                                             
150
 Brown and Marsden (n 42) 2 
151
 Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, ‘Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective’ (1997) 19(4) 
Law and Policy 364-365 
152
 John Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation for Australia’ in Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite, Business 
Regulation and Australia’s Future (Australian Institute of Criminology 1993) 93 
 81 
  
power may be seen as  another means of promoting user autonomy in Internet markets, and 
may be preferred to a reform of competition law and leaving chance to ‘the market’. 
However, state-led regulation also has its weaknesses, and in the EU its application to 
concentrations of private economic power, particularly in the communications sector, has 
been influenced by neoliberalism, as mentioned in the previous chapter - and is also very 
much entwined with contemporary competition law, in theory applying only where ‘market 
failures’ are produced. Indeed, there are many arguments advanced against regulation where 
there are no ‘market failures’ and even counsel to forbear from regulation even where there 
are market failures, because of, for instance, the adverse impact regulation may have on 
innovation particularly in high tech markets. 
 
One systemic problem of state-led regulation is the possibility of ‘regulatory capture’ – that 
the regulator does not regulate in some notion of the ‘public interest’ but is subject to 
‘capture’ by the economically powerful and so its regulatory output reflects those interests.153 
While it is true that regulatory theory has moved beyond a ‘pure interest-group driven 
analysis’ to take account of institutional design for instance,154  regulatory capture is still 
attempted (and can be successful) in practice, including in the EU.155 Indeed, Brown and 
Marsden note ‘widespread’ capture of regulators and legislators in the field of copyright law, 
especially as applied to the Internet – as well as other ‘government failures’ in regulating the 
Internet such as the ‘overregulation’ of censoring content.   
 
These identified problems detract from the likelihood of ex ante state-led regulation being 
successful in advancing Internet users’ autonomy in the face of accumulations of private 
economic power which are likely to lobby to ensure that such regulation is not enacted, 
imposing further obligations on them and curtailing lucrative business practices. A further 
illustration pertinent to the discussion in this thesis is the proposed reforms to EU data 
protection law (discussed in more detail later), a prime example of the lobbying capacity and 
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rent-seeking mobilisation by large Internet corporations against measures which would 
protect users’ interests. 
 
Furthermore, even where ex ante state-led regulation may be enacted which would go some 
way at least to enhancing users’ autonomy, the time taken to arrive at this stage may be so 
long that the regulation becomes too little, too late. This is precisely the case with net 
neutrality regulation currently under discussion in the EU (which will be explored in more 
detail in the following chapter). Net neutrality was first raised as a possible policy issue in the 
early 2000s, yet it has taken more than 10 years to arrive at the point where ex ante regulation 
might be imposed on ISPs. Business practices and technology have moved on considerably in 
the last 10 years while the proposed regulation does not address them fully. It is submitted 
that the ‘light touch’ model of economic regulation has created a situation in which there is 
extreme caution on the part of European organs aside from the Parliament to introduce such 
ex ante regulation vis-à-vis concentrations of private economic power, and so in practice it 
may not be a very efficacious route to protecting and promoting user autonomy. 
 
Yet there is still a third approach to online regulation, the multistakeholder co-regulatory 
model. Co-regulation can be conceptualised as a ‘third way’ which is neither state-led 
regulation nor industry self-regulation, and which explicitly involves consumers as part of the 
institutional setting for regulation, for which it claims more legitimacy as compared to these 
other forms of regulation.156 In practice, co-regulation can take various forms, but what they 
have in common is ‘the fact that the regulatory system is made up of a complex interaction of 
a general framework of legislation and a self-regulatory body’.157  
 
Multistakeholder co-regulation, as Brown and Marsden’s third approach to Internet 
regulation, encompasses states, industry as well as other stakeholders, typically from the 
‘technical community’ and civil society.  While this may aid the legitimacy of the regulatory 
process, the presence of these participants in the regulatory process may also be critiqued – 
particularly those from civil society not being representative of the citizenry more generally 
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and thus raising questions of effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy, or civil society 
groups only being included as a window-dressing exercise, a criticism which has been 
levelled at the multistakeholder process in ICANN.158 Furthermore, the multistakeholder fora 
currently in existence tend to emphasise ‘governance’ rather than ‘regulation’ or ‘legislation’ 
as such and form more of a ‘conversation’ around the issues under consideration rather than 
the formation of enforceable norms, with a notable example of this being the annual Internet 
Governance Forum whose impact (or lack thereof) can be called into question.159 The extent 
to which these multistakeholder processes may represent user autonomy is limited in two 
dimensions: the deficiencies in representation these stakeholders encompass; and the lack of 
enforceable norms these processes may produce in practice – or that the enforceable norms 
which are produced may reflect government and business interests more than civil society’s. 
 
As a result of the deficiencies in these regulatory approaches, this thesis considers that user 
autonomy, when faced with concentrations of private economic power performing 
gatekeeping functions over online information flows, may  best be pursued and advanced 
outside of legal and regulatory structures. The alternative methods suggested in this thesis are 
‘code-based’ ie infrastructure, software, online intermediaries and other tools. Unlike Lessig, 
‘code’ in this sense is not considered in a technodeterministic fashion, which arguably has its 
own roots in neoliberal/neoclassical ideas of economic rationality.160 Instead, the technical 
solutions suggested are designed with a particular view of society and technology in mind, 
one which adheres to the idea of user autonomy in this thesis, by preserving privacy, enabling 
expression and resisting both corporate and state control. The code-based solutions suggested, 
as will be seen, are embodiments of users’ own autonomy through peer production on a 
commons-basis as well as are designed to promote their own autonomy – particularly through 
the use of peer to peer design.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
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This chapter has explained in more detail the conditions for competition and consumer in 
cyberspace, ranging from a historical account of the rise of private corporate power and its 
concentration in Internet markets, to a consideration of the remaining autonomy-enhancing 
aspects of the Internet, finishing with an examination of whether and how ‘non-economic’ 
values relevant to the Internet experience such as user autonomy might be incorporated into 
competition analyses, and the shortcomings of turning to existing approaches to regulation. 
 
From the discussion, it is clear that the Internet is a commodified space where points of 
centralisation and concentration can be observed. Dialectically, it is also clear that the Internet 
has enhanced the autonomy of its users, at least vis-à-vis previous technologies, and 
represents a more radical potential in its enabling of peer to peer contact and production than 
commodification entails. Thus, while for-profit corporations play a gatekeeping function over 
online information flows, the potential of peer production gives hope for a more user-
autonomy-friendly Internet – an idea which will be borne in mind throughout the following 
chapters. 
 
As for competition law, given the general neoliberal forbearance in introducing ex ante 
regulation of economic power online, it is one legal regime that prima facie applies to these 
concentrations. However, competition’s current neoclassical economical orientation is not 
well placed to take into account other values, such as user autonomy – while the application 
of competition law may go some way to promoting these values, it would seem unable to do 
so on every occasion, even if these are desirable objectives which are hampered by 
manifestations of dominance, either in the neoclassical sense or in the ‘radical monopoly’ 
sense. Ex ante regulation also suffers from the systemic flaws of regulators’ susceptibility to 
regulatory capture as well as the time taken for regulation promoting user autonomy, the 
involvement of industry in the case of self-regulation and the deficiencies of co-regulation, to 
come into force and so cannot be relied upon to provide a strong alternative to the operation 
of competition law to preserve and promote user autonomy. 
 
Thus, against this backdrop, the following chapters will examine instances of the corporate 
dominance of information online in the form of gatekeeping and look at the adequacy of the 
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current European legal and regulatory system in dealing with them, with a consideration of 
the extent to which competition law can facilitate user autonomy through consumer welfare, 
the prospects for regulation, and the application of fundamental rights and data protection. If 
this is too much of a tall order for the system, and so the tools for enhancing user autonomy 
must be found elsewhere, then the possibility of users turning to self-help methods – 
principally with a peer to peer design - outside of law and regulation will be examined. 
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CHAPTER 3: DOMINANCE AND INTERNET PROVISION 
 
Internet connectivity for users in the EU (and US) is usually bought from a retail provider, 
either an Internet Service Provider (ISP - usually a telecommunications or cable provider) for 
‘fixed’ access via a personal computer or laptop, or mobile operator for use via a tablet or 
smartphone - although with the development of mobile broadband services, the distinction 
between mobile and fixed Internet access continues to blur. Some of these entities also own 
the physical infrastructure such as copper telephone lines, fibre optic cables and mobile 
telephony equipment over which the data is transmitted while others must lease capacity from 
wholesale providers which are either wholesale fixed-line broadband providers (in Europe 
these are often the telecoms incumbent) or mobile network operators. These providers in the 
EU since telecoms liberalisation commenced a few decades ago have transitioned from being 
state-owned monopolies to the incumbents being privatised and subject to competition, 
especially at the user-facing retail level.  
 
Internet providers, whether fixed or mobile, occupy a position of control over information 
flows going to and from their customers, the users. The Internet was originally set up as a 
‘dumb’ network using ‘end to end connectivity’ in its design, which did not interfere with the 
packets of information passing over the network, with the ‘intelligence’ being built into the 
starting- or end-point of the data ie the device on which the information originated or for 
which it was destined. However, developments such as deep packet inspection (DPI), which 
allows network operators to monitor in real time the content of the data packets passing over 
their infrastructure, and content delivery networks which allow large content providers to 
bypass the once-hierarchical Internet backbone networks when sending their content to users, 
have ushered in profound changes to how data flows over the Internet, with evident 
consequences for these users and their autonomy. 
 
This chapter will examine Internet access providers, their markets and will have a particular 
focus on the net neutrality debate, which concerns the extent to which Internet access 
providers should be able to ‘manage’ traffic travelling through their networks. The net 
neutrality debate implicates issues of competition particularly for vertically integrated 
Internet access providers which also have content-producing/-distributing subsidiaries but 
also has other potential consequences for users’ ability to impart and receive information 
online, the invasions of their privacy and lack of data protection that are incidental to the use 
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of DPI in particular, and the concentration of Internet content in large players which can 
afford to use content delivery networks and/or make deals with Internet access providers, to 
the potential detriment of smaller/non-commercial content providers. In this chapter, the 
technical and market developments leading up to the net neutrality debate will be discussed, 
followed by an outlining of the issues brought up by this state of affairs for online information 
flows and users’ autonomy. Net neutrality is borne of competition issues but has implications 
beyond competition for users’ rights and free information flows, which will be outlined. 
While some commentators have considered that existing competition and sector-specific 
telecoms regulation, particularly in the EU, would be sufficient to address net neutrality 
concerns, others have argued that only new ex ante regulation will solve the problems, and 
indeed there have been proposals in the EU and US for such regulation, which will be 
detailed in this chapter. Both the existing situation and the proposed regulation will be 
considered to determine whether they address the problems identified in a way which best 
promotes and protects Internet users’ autonomy.  
 
Net neutrality constitutes a rare instance of further ex ante regulation being considered to 
address problems of private economic power online with an adverse effect on users’ 
autonomy, and indeed is the only case study in this thesis where further ex ante regulation has 
been seriously considered by policy-makers. While in theory this might be a development to 
be welcomed, in practice the time taken to arrive at this point may render the regulatory 
measures ineffective or at least only partially effective, as will be explored further in this 
chapter. Here it is argued that the experience with the further regulation of Internet provision 
in particular to address net neutrality concerns demonstrates the shortcomings of regulation as 
discussed in the previous chapter, and suggests systemic problems in turning to regulation as 
a means of protecting users’ autonomy. Accordingly, at the end of this chapter alternatives to 
law and regulation are suggested in the form of technical solutions. 
 
 
3.1 Technical and market developments in Internet access provision 
 
The technical and market developments observed in Internet access provision over the last ten 
or more years implicate various problems of competition, openness, free expression and data 
privacy which will be discussed in greater detail in the following section. These developments 
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themselves are the subject of this section, which also explains how ‘the Internet’ as users 
experience it works in the US and EU. 
 
As mentioned above, Internet users buy access to the rest of the network from a provider, 
which is usually a telecommunications company (whether mobile or fixed line or both) but 
can also be a cable TV operator, and Internet access via fibre optic cables has been growing in 
prevalence. In the EU, Internet access via DSL (ie fixed line telecoms) is the most popular 
technology, although in certain Member States, cable Internet has retail market shares of 
around 40%.161 The situation in the US differs inasmuch as cable has been the main form of 
Internet access, followed by DSL, and while fibre optic access remains a small part of the 
market, its share is growing.162 
 
While users may wish to access content and programs from other Internet customers of the 
same provider, they are also highly likely to wish to access data from the customers of other 
providers, including in other countries beyond their own. In order to access that data, Internet 
access providers make agreements with each other, negotiated in private, to send and receive 
data from their customers, and the customers of the other providers with which they have 
agreements. This results in individual users experiencing ‘universal connectivity’ to all parts 
of the Internet. 
 
The following subsections will detail developments in the topography of the Internet based on 
advances in technology and how the market has incorporated them, in order to provide a 
better understanding of how data flows across the Internet from its originator to its recipient, 
and the role of network providers in facilitating these flows. 
 
 
a) The Internet as hierarchy 
 
Formerly, the web of connection among Internet providers took a hierarchical form, with the 
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largest networks interconnecting with each other in the form of ‘peering’ arrangements,163 
while they charged smaller networks for data transit. The large networks which were capable 
of peering with each other became known as the ‘Internet backbone’. This more or less 
represented the topography of the Internet at the time of two major mergers concerning 
Internet backbone providers in the late 1990s which raised concerns over competition in the 
Internet backbone and how smaller networks interconnected with it. These concerns in 
particular involved the ‘bottleneck’ position that these ‘Tier 1’ backbone providers occupied 
with the associated competition concerns regarding how they could influence the transmission 
of data and accordingly the prices paid by smaller networks which were not large enough to 
peer with them. 
 
The first merger concerned MCI and WorldCom, two American telecoms companies which 
were both active in various telecoms markets, especially the market for long distance 
telecoms in the US in which they both had particularly strong positions. The proposed merger 
was scrutinised by both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department 
of Justice (DoJ) in the US and the European Commission, since WorldCom had subsidiaries 
in various EU countries and was constructing fibre links in various EU capital cities.164 The 
FCC approved the merger subject to the divestiture of MCI's Internet business, since without 
the divestiture, the merger of the two companies would have combined the two leading 
providers of the US-wide Internet backbone service.165 The European Commission considered 
the merger in detail, and came to the conclusion that MCI should divest its Internet businesses 
and services relating to Internet access as an operating entity, since post-merger the 
companies would have a combined share of over 50% of the market for top-level Internet 
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connectivity, creating a new network ‘of such absolute and relative size that the combined 
entity could behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and customers’ 
and as a result could raise rivals’ costs and/or price selectively to attract customers from 
competing networks’.166  
 
In its analysis, the European Commission implicitly accepted that the Internet was arranged in 
a hierarchy, with top tier Internet backbone providers at the top of the pile since it defined a 
separate market for these backbone providers with comprehensive networks whose services 
were substitutable. ‘Secondary’ ISPs or ‘resellers’, with smaller networks, were not 
considered to be active in this market, nor were they considered to provide a competitive 
constraint on the prices charged by top-level networks for their Internet connectivity services. 
In defining the geographical reach of the market for top-level Internet connectivity as global, 
the Commission also accepted the hierarchical nature of the Internet by considering that ISPs 
anywhere in the world were dependent on the terms on which they could obtain transit from 
the top-level providers, either through direct agreements or indirectly via resellers. 
 
The second merger involved the entity emerging from the previous one, MCI WorldCom, and 
Sprint, but it was opposed by both the US and European authorities. WorldCom subsequent to 
its merger with MCI operated the largest Internet backbone network in the US and the world, 
and Sprint operated the second largest network. The US DoJ considered that this merger 
would substantially lessen competition in the market for Internet backbone provision in the 
US by eliminating the second largest player in that market and would give the combined 
entity the incentive and ability to charge higher prices and/or provide a lower quality of 
service for customers, as well as giving the entity the incentive and ability to impair the 
ability of its rivals to compete by inter alia raising its rivals costs and/or degrading the quality 
of its interconnections with its rivals.167 The DoJ was concerned that the size of the merged 
entity compared to the other top-tier or Tier 1 providers would reduce the incentives for 
efficient interconnection arrangements with these rivals to peer traffic with them, and so 
weaken the bargaining position of other networks as well as diminishing the incentives of the 
merged entity to charge reasonable prices for transit.168 Furthermore, the DoJ considered that 
the merged entity would be able to control and inhibit the successful entry of new entrants 
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and/or the expansion of its existing rivals into the Internet backbone market by refusing to 
interconnect with them or limiting these connections.169 The DoJ considered that the merger 
would violate the antitrust laws by reducing competition in many telecoms markets. The DoJ 
formally opposed the merger in the form of a lawsuit, which led to the merger being 
eventually abandoned by the parties.  
 
Meanwhile, in Europe the Commission declared that the merger was anticompetitive for 
similar reasons to the DoJ and so did not allow it to go ahead.170 The Commission considered 
that the merger would result in the creation of a single entity with a dominant position of 
more than 35-45% in the market for top-level universal Internet connectivity (the same 
relevant market it had previously defined in the MCI WorldCom merger above, although this 
time it considered as players only those entities which peered with each other privately and 
not also through public network access points),171 and that the parties’ proposal to divest 
Sprint’s Internet business was insufficient to address satisfactorily the competition concerns 
arising from the merger. The Commission’s investigation into that market prior to its decision 
found that the merger would have resulted in the creation of such a large and powerful entity 
that its competitors and customers would have been dependent on it to obtain universal 
Internet connectivity and this would have allowed the merged entity to behave independently 
of these competitors and customers, including in Europe given the global scope of the 
market.172 It would be able to control the prices its competitors and consumers paid due to its 
capacity to discipline the market by threatening to degrade selectively its competitors’ 
Internet connectivity offerings and through its influence over any technical developments in 
this area.173 Furthermore, the Commission found that the merger would generate a significant 
barrier to entry into the market for top-level Internet provision since a new network would 
have to have a sufficient customer base and sufficient geographical reach in order to peer 
settlement-free to obtain universal connectivity, and as the top level networks grow, it became 
increasingly more difficult for new entrants to match their size and reach.174 Regarding the 
proposed divestiture, the Commission considered that such an action would not re-establish 
competition in the market for top-level Internet connectivity.  
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As a result of these regulatory positions, the merger between MCI WorldCom and Sprint was 
abandoned. 
 
Implicit in the merger authorities’ analysis here again is the idea of the Internet as a hierarchy. 
Whether the Internet was hierarchical formed the major difference in opinion between the 
European Commission, and MCI WorldCom and Sprint: the Commission believed this was 
indeed the case given the existence of peering between top level providers as the only way 
that they achieved connectivity while smaller providers had to purchase transit from these 
top-level networks to achieve the same global connectivity. This hierarchical nature of the 
Internet was a view shared by some commentators such as D’Iganzio and Giovannetti.175  
 
Although there were some dissenting voices such as Economides in the aftermath of these 
decisions regarding the hierarchical nature of the Internet backbone being based on top tier 
networks that peer with each other being at the top of that hierarchy, 176  technical and 
commercial developments in the years since those merger decisions have altered this 
characterisation of the network of networks and the hierarchical arrangement and terminology 
is no longer an accurate picture of the Internet,177 if it ever was in the first place.178 
 
 
b) A more complex network topography 
 
In the interim, certain developments have changed the Internet’s topography from a hierarchy 
to a more complex picture of relations among the interconnected networks which make up the 
Internet. This has salient consequences for online information flows in terms of identifying 
where bottlenecks, and thus gatekeepers, now lie, which would seem no longer to be with the 
backbone providers (as feared in the context of the mergers discussed in the previous section), 
but instead with retail access providers as they have a valuable commodity, namely their 
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customers, whom content and services providers want to reach. Accordingly, this has been 
driven by the transition to broadband Internet from slower dial-up access, and the new real-
time services that could be delivered over it such as Voice over IP (VoIP) and video streaming 
as well as the emergence of certain Web 2.0 user-generated content aggregators which wish to 
access users. All of this has contributed to three principal developments which have changed 
the network topology from the previous hierarchical model. 
 
Firstly, ‘multihoming’ has become more prevalent, which entails smaller ISPs (which would 
not be able to provide ‘universal connectivity’ themselves and so under the hierarchical model 
would have to pay the top tier providers for data transit) entering into agreements which allow 
them to use more than one backbone provider. In this way, the ISP can control how traffic will 
be routed over these networks, such as by sending the traffic over the route that costs the least 
or is the quickest at that point in time. Furthermore, many large websites/online content or 
service providers also ‘multihome’ by using more than one ISP in order to transmit their 
websites/content/services, as well as deploying their own content delivery networks discussed 
below. In addition to these multiple agreements with backbone providers, smaller ISPs have 
also been observed to interconnect and ‘peer’ with each other rather than relying solely on 
buying transit from top tier providers, particularly in Europe.179 
 
Secondly, the rise of ‘real-time entertainment’ such as video on demand or VoIP services 
being delivered over IP networks (ie the Internet) and the corresponding desire to ensure a 
certain quality of service for customers in terms of the timing of data packets arriving at their 
destination and the avoidance of losing packets has been a driver of the development of 
content distribution networks (CDNs). Implicit in this development too are the emergence of 
consolidated large online content or service providers in the US and EU, such as Google, 
Yahoo, Facebook, and Amazon.180 These desires have generated incentives for major online 
content providers to seek to gain access to users by deploying their own CDNs at both top tier 
and lower tier networks, and accordingly content deployment networks have become 
important players at Internet exchanges.181 These networks may or may not own their own 
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network infrastructure: if they do not have infrastructure, they typically operate virtually by 
means of servers deployed within ISPs which host cached content, and in doing so introduce 
an additional layer of ‘intelligent’ routing by selecting the server that will respond to an end 
user’s request for content from that provider, such as selecting a server which is 
geographically close or which will send data over the least congested route. 182  One 
consequence of the deployment of CDNs is that content providers which are large, rich and 
popular enough can ensure the speedy provision of their data to users through deploying their 
networks via agreements with ISPs, while less-visited sites use slower, traditional Internet 
hosting for the delivery of their content.183 Another consequence is that certain providers of 
smaller lower tier networks have a stronger bargaining position for peering or even paid 
peering arrangements because of the desire of content providers to connect more directly to 
users,184 which they would not have had when the Internet was hierarchically arranged. 
 
The growth of this kind of prioritised traffic has increased the prevalence of peering among 
ISPs and agreements between CDNs and ISPs, thus diminishing the strictly hierarchical 
structure of the network that was defined in the merger decision discussed above.185 As a 
result, concerns about dominance can no longer be limited to network providers at the top of 
the hierarchy ie the top tier networks, and in fact it is the ‘access networks’ at the edge which 
should be the focus since a lack of competition in that market can lead to unfair 
interconnection practices as well as more ‘traditional’ abuses such as impacting upon 
consumer pricing or harmful discrimination. 186  Furthermore, aside from the competition 
concerns, these networks also perform a ‘gatekeeper’ function between their customers and 
the rest of the Internet, and so are in a position to censor or otherwise manipulate the 
information they send and receive. 
 
Finally, the creation of deep packet inspection (DPI) has also signalled a significant change 
for online data flows. DPI is a technology deployed at the level of Internet provision to 
determine the content of the data packets that are travelling through the network at a point in 
the network which is not an end-point (eg user’s computer terminal), and based on that 
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information, the network operator can manipulate the route of that packet accordingly (speed 
it up, slow it down, remove it, introduce other packets). This represents a major development 
from predecessor technologies since DPI permits the possibility to analyse and discriminate 
Internet traffic in real time using one piece of equipment.187 DPI has various uses, some of 
which may not be objectionable for Internet users: indeed, it might be highly desirable for 
users to have data comprising real-time footage of a live performance or sports event, or a 
voice over IP call, to be prioritised over the sending of emails. However, in practice DPI is 
being used for more contested purposes, by governments including those of liberal 
democracies to monitor and censor information their citizens are sending and receiving 
online, and for private entities to target advertising to Internet users according to their web-
browsing habits, to detect suspected copyright infringements and for the broad purpose of 
‘network management’ by ISPs in the ‘last mile’ of the network between the ISP and its 
customer (the user).188 Further controversial applications of DPI in behavioural advertising 
such as the Phorm fiasco in the UK and its NebuAd counterpart in the US have resulted in 
some backtracking from the use of DPI, with it being ‘driven out of the market by political 
pressure’ in these instances.189 Indeed, Asghari and others noted a decrease in the use of DPI 
by ISPs and found that high levels of privacy protection in a certain country reduced the use 
of DPI while the presence of mandatory Internet filtering (whether for social or political 
content) in a country increased the likelihood of DPI being present.190  
 
It is these latter two developments, of content delivery networks and deep packet inspection 
used for traffic prioritisation, and their impact on online information flows, which have given 
rise to the ‘net neutrality’ debate. The focus of the debate has tended to be on the proposed 
regulation of packet prioritisation via DPI rather than the deployment of CDNs, even though 
both techniques have the same effect of ISPs prioritising certain content by delivering it 
quicker than online content whose owner has not paid extra for these services. 191  Both 
techniques contribute to the situation of certain information flowing across the Internet being 
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favoured and certain information being disfavoured or even blocked entirely, thus affecting 
free information flows online. 
 
The next section will explain what is meant by ‘net neutrality’ before going on to detail these 
issues that the prioritisation of certain Internet data brings up for optimal online information 
flows and user autonomy. This will be followed by a consideration of how existing law and 
regulation in this area applies to network management practices, with an assessment made of 
how adequate this law and regulation is to address the concerns identified previously. 
 
 
3.2 Net neutrality explained 
 
Net neutrality, although a contested term, can be said to be a principle proposed for user 
access to the Internet, which would prevent ISPs from discriminating between different kinds 
of Internet traffic, regardless of the amount of bandwidth the traffic takes up, and from 
restricting content, sites or platforms (at least those which are legal). 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, due to the Internet being set up using “end-to-
end connectivity” as part of its design, and the network not traditionally interfering with the 
packets of information passing through the network regardless of the kind or category of 
information, in this way all information sent (and received) was ‘equal’. This is described as 
being a position of ‘net neutrality’, which was the ‘default’ for the Internet prior to the 
development of DPI (and CDNs). 
 
Nevertheless, this type of neutrality has had its complexities: IP protocols are neutral among 
data applications, with a preference for applications which are not sensitive to delay or signal 
distortion (such as email); however, with the development of time-sensitive applications such 
as VoIP and video streaming, ‘it is difficult to regard the IP suite as truly neutral as among all 
applications’.192 The reason for implicitly favouring data applications is that IP has no Quality 
of Service guarantee mechanism, and instead adopts the best efforts approach ie delivering 
the data packets as quickly as possible over the network.  
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However, this can still be said to be ‘neutral’ inasmuch as different applications and types of 
information are treated in the same ‘agnostic’ way by network operators, even if ‘better’ 
treatment for some may have been desirable from the user’s perspective. Perhaps a better 
criticism of this functioning of the Internet is that it may also be firmly in the interests of 
users to depart from this position of ‘net neutrality’ for certain applications and types of 
information, such as video streaming and VoIP, since for these applications, it is important 
that there is no time delay otherwise what the user views or hears is distorted. Yet, this kind of 
departure from net neutrality does not seem to coincide with the kinds of departure from net 
neutrality that are being implemented by ISPs, and also assumes that there is a ‘natural’ 
scarcity of bandwidth such that time-sensitive applications and content will experience delay. 
 
Non-net neutral behaviour can take various shapes, with differing consequences: 
 Firstly, an ISP could refuse to carry content from a certain provider unless the 
provider pays extra, effectively threatening to block access to that content by its users.  
 Alternatively, it could still carry the content but slow it down or interfere negatively 
with the quality of service that that content receives, while not blocking it entirely.  
 Another scenario would be a content provider and ISP voluntarily (ie without coercion 
or the threats of blocking) coming to an agreement that would prioritise content from 
that provider over other types of Internet traffic, with the effect being that either other 
content is delivered more slowly than before, or that other content outside of this 
agreement is not delivered more slowly than before, but is delivered more slowly in 
comparison to the prioritised content. 
 A further scenario would be an ISP blocking or degrading a particular class of data in 
the same way, eg all data coming from VoIP services or peer to peer filesharing 
services. 
 Yet another scenario would be an ISP which is vertically integrated with a content or 
application provider favouring that content by eg speeding it up. 
 Finally, in the context of volumetric pricing (by which users pay ISPs for Internet 
access at a pre-determined speed and have a maximum download quota, with either 
lower speeds and/or additional charges on a per MB basis if this quota is exceeded), 
non-net neutral conduct may be considered to be access to certain information, content 
or applications online which does not ‘count’ towards this quota, thus making this 
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data more attractive to users. This has been an issue in Australia for some time,
193
 and 
is emerging elsewhere, particularly the African continent with the Facebook-backed 
Internet.org project.
194
 
 
 
3.3 Problems arising from network management practices 
 
The practices of the actors involved in the provision of Internet access to users (whether as 
consumers or producers of information) and engaging in non-net neutral conduct implicates 
various issues for users’ autonomy.  
 
In the following subsections, the effects of such network management practices and the 
concerns they raise for online information flows will be discussed, encompassing 
competition, information gatekeeping and privacy and confidentiality. 
 
 
a) Competition concerns 
 
Internet provision can be conceptualised as a two- or multi-sided market, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.195 Users are on each side of the market, but on one side they are uploading data 
and on the other side they are downloading data (although in practice they are often doing 
both simultaneously), with the ISP providing a conduit through which these information 
flows, regardless of their direction, travel, thus acting as a gatekeeper over these flows. One 
competition concern with net neutrality is that that ISPs could leverage this power that they 
have in controlling what data their customers can access by threatening to block or otherwise 
interfere with the data packets coming from certain content providers unless they pay for this 
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special access. Users may suffer harm inasmuch as their choices are impeded by the ISP – 
they may have to pay more to access it, or it may not be accessible at all. 
 
These concerns would be raised in particular for ISPs which already have a dominant position 
in the market/significant market power (SMP), since they would have an interest in 
determining what information is accessible to their customers for their own business 
purposes. Such network management practices may encompass refusing passage to certain 
kinds of information coming from certain sources, or favouring the content or application 
provided by a vertically integrated subsidiary by giving it quicker or otherwise better passage 
to its Internet access customers.
196
 
 
If there is a competitive market then in theory a consumer with an ISP that is in some way 
manipulating what she is sending and receiving will switch to another which is not doing so, 
assuming there is consumer demand for this.197 However, if the market is not competitive, if 
all ISPs see this conduct as advantageous for them and/or if it is difficult to switch ISPs, then 
there is a problem. 
 
Competition concerns regarding a lack of net neutrality regulation have been more prominent 
in the US than Europe,198 given that the European broadband market is considered to be 
more competitive than the American one. The American regulatory approach has led to a 
duopoly of integrated broadband access providers (Comcast and AT&T)
 
 whereas in Europe 
an approach has been taken which has led to more competitive wholesale and retail 
broadband markets and ownership of the local path not being a barrier to entry in the retail 
market. From the user perspective, it is the retail service that is of immediate concern, since a 
lack of competition there and the possibility of ISPs at this level manipulating information 
would be felt most. However, what goes on at the wholesale level can also have an effect on 
the user experience as well as how much users pay. 
 
However, ISPs’ non-net neutral conduct has been justified according to the rationales of 
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competition, to promote investment and consumer welfare: on the one hand, they claim that 
they need to act in this way to deal with congestion on the network and/or as a way of raising 
funds for further investment in infrastructure so as to prevent congestion; and, on the other, 
that a lack of net neutrality regulation will give them the freedom to develop innovative 
products and services which will be of ultimate benefit to users.199  Yet innovation is an 
argument which has cut both ways, with net neutrality proponents also arguing that regulation 
is actually necessary in order to promote innovation.200 
 
As mentioned above, Internet provision is a two-sided market where ISPs provide the 
‘platform’ permitting the interaction of the two sides of the market, namely those providing 
Internet content and those receiving Internet content, though it should be borne in mind that it 
can be the same person or entity performing both of those activities. However, often what is 
happening is that even in their ‘producer’ mode, users are generating content which is being 
uploaded to content platforms controlled by corporate online service providers, such as 
YouTube or Facebook, and so there is an asymmetry in the flow (as can be seen from the 
identities of the top 20 websites in the US and EU). Nevertheless, both individual users and 
content and service providers each pay for their own Internet access, which comprises both 
their uploading and downloading of data.  
 
The default position of net neutrality entails that content providers do not need to pay 
individual ISPs an additional amount, including ISPs they do not use for their own 
connection, to access those ISPs’ customers in order to deliver them content. However, as 
seen above, certain content providers wish to have a privileged access to a certain ISPs’ 
customers and so are willing to pay for this quicker and/or better quality connection, either 
via their data packets being speeded up by the ISP or via a CDN, or both. Nevertheless, these 
‘non-neutral’ pricing practices have been justified as being necessary for ISPs to invest in the 
network infrastructure and develop new and innovative products and services, as mentioned 
above. 
 
In addition, there is increasing vertical integration and consolidation in Internet markets, 
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between Internet access providers and providers of online content and applications, either in 
the form of mergers or in the form of existing players entering new markets. An example of 
the former is the merger currently proposed between Comcast and Time Warner Cable in the 
US, which if approved would see the first and second largest cable Internet providers 
combine and also be part of the same corporate grouping as content provider NBC. As 
regards the latter situation, Google, which originated as an online content and services 
provider using the application layer of the Internet, has rolled out a fibre optic network in 
certain US locations. These trends exacerbate competition concerns since they provide even 
more incentives to players to prioritise content and services from their own subsidiaries and 
discriminate against competitors providing similar offerings. 
 
 
b) Free expression 
 
Net neutrality and the debate around it are born of technical developments and changed 
business practices in the Internet sphere, but also of an increasing recognition of ISPs as 
performing the function of an information gatekeeper. This recognition has taken the shape of 
ISPs being ordered by governments such as in the UK to block illegal content such as child 
abuse images, information related to terrorism and content which (allegedly) infringes 
copyright. While these are not net neutrality issues per se, ISPs’ wish to operate non-net 
neutral networks for their own business purposes may see them engaged in a greater private 
enforcement role in these other areas, which they may not find so desirable due to the 
regulatory burdens that may be imposed.201   
 
In any event, the net neutrality debate has been primarily framed as an ‘economic’ one, with 
its solution being competitive markets for Internet provision, content, services and 
applications.202 This does not paint the full picture of what is at stake.203 The control that ISPs 
exert over their customers on the one hand and other players such as content providers which 
wish to access those customers does not only have ‘economic’ consequences: it also has a 
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profound impact on what users can send and receive over their Internet connections, and thus 
is ‘explicitly normative and political’ – affecting users’ autonomy online.204 
 
Specifically, one danger lies in ISPs blocking or filtering content which is otherwise legal for 
purposes which would not be termed anticompetitive. This could include blocking content 
which is harmful to the ISP’s ‘brand’ without being illegal, or deemed controversial in some 
way. Indeed, even in developed Western jurisdictions with guarantees of free expression, 
instances of these scenarios have actually occurred in practice.
205
  
 
Outright blocking of otherwise legal content and services would constitute an egregious 
impediment to the free flow of information online, and accordingly the freedom to send and 
receive information, which is usually conceptualised as falling under legal protections of free 
expression, such as Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, as 
will be discussed in greater detail below, the right to free expression in the EU and US has 
usually been conceived of as a right enforceable against nation-states rather than private 
entities such as most ISPs.
206
 This leaves at least an uncertainty, and at most a lacuna, in the 
law when users’ rights to free expression are infringed by private corporations. 
 
Even network management practices which do not amount to the outright blocking of online 
content or services are of concern for optimal online information flows and users’ free 
expression. The prioritisation of certain content or services especially via agreements between 
ISPs and online content/service providers poses particular problems, since unless these can be 
termed anticompetitive in some way, then they will not otherwise be regulated unless there 
are some net neutrality rules in place. However, these arrangements, depending on their 
precise form, could disadvantage other content and services not included in such an 
agreement either by slowing it down or by creating a different kind of Internet access where it 
is cheaper (or otherwise more attractive) for users to be restricted to only accessing this 
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prioritised content. An example of this comes from 2012, when Comcast in the US was 
accused of engaging in non-net neutral behaviour by the CEO of Netflix, an online media-on-
demand service, who stated that when using the video-on-demand services of competitors, 
Comcast counted this usage against its Internet data cap, but use of Comcast's own video-on-
demand service did not count towards the cap, thus making Comcast’s service more attractive 
to users.207 The Facebook-backed Internet.org initiative would seem to operate in a similar 
way, with some content being offered for zero price but users would have to pay to access 
other content not included. Thus, deep pocketed entities (which will usually be for-profit 
corporations) will entrench their powerful positions, making it more difficult for alternatives 
to sustain themselves or to be set up in the first place.  
 
While some of these practices might engender competition concerns, they also raise the 
spectres of media pluralism and the digital divide. Media pluralism in particular may be 
considered to be an ‘old media’ phenomenon, based on limited spectrum for broadcast media 
and a large amount of resources being required for all media to operate in print or via 
broadcast, with these impediment to pluralism being removed to a large extent with the 
arrival of the Internet (as well as low-cost digital cameras etc), which for content creation and 
dissemination requires much less resources and spectrum is no longer such an issue – 
although capacity constraints have emerged as one of the justification for implementing non-
net neutral traffic management practices. Whether based on technical restrictions (ie limited 
bandwidth – but the extent to which capacity is actually a problem is contested – and an 
alternative to network management could be investment from the government or private 
entities in more network capacity) or commercial advantage, limitations in what users can 
receive, especially if what they can receive are the products and services of large 
corporations, signals a return for media pluralism as a topic of concern.208 
 
Prioritisation of content poses concerns for the digital divide ie the socio-economic inequality 
relating to the Internet and ICTs, inasmuch as smaller content or service provider will be 
priced out of the ‘fast lanes’, and users may be enticed with free or low-cost offers of 
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restricted Internet access to content and service providers which have paid a premium for 
their services to be offered in this way, with ‘full’ Internet access costing more, which may be 
too much for some.209 
 
 
c) Privacy and confidentiality 
 
Users' privacy is an issue raised indirectly in the context of the net neutrality debate since the 
use of DPI technology in particular allows ISPs to monitor data about users' behaviour on the 
Internet, including sensitive data.210 DPI permits the content of data packets travelling across 
the Internet to be known by network operators, compromising users’ privacy and the 
confidentiality of their communications.  
 
Indeed, as mentioned in brief above, various controversies surrounding DPI involved the 
perceived invasion of privacy that its use entailed. Prominent in the EU was the use of DPI in 
behavioural advertising by Phorm, a US-based targeted advertising company which entered in 
secret subscriber trials with British Telecom, the UK’s largest ISP.211 DPI was used to take a 
copy of the ISP’s customers’ web browsing habits in order to target advertising towards them. 
However users were unaware that these trials were being conducted and their specific consent 
to these trials was not sought, seemingly in breach of the EU Data Protection Directive 
(transposed in the UK in the form of the Data Protection Act 1998) and possibly also in 
breach of other laws including the E-Privacy Directive and the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 vis-à-vis its provisions on interception.212 The coming to light of these 
practices in early 2008 provoked public outcry, followed by a ruling from the UK’s data 
protection authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office, that Phorm’s service would only 
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be legal if it was run on an opt-in basis for users.213 While its service was not ruled prima 
facie to be illegal, it seems that the Phorm subsequently exited the UK market, as mentioned 
above. 
 
Even if privacy is an incidental concern raised by network management practices in the 
context of the net neutrality debate, the particular use of DPI encompasses an arguably 
unnecessary monitoring of data including personal information, contributing to a state of data 
proliferation rather than minimisation which would better uphold users’ privacy and the 
protection of their data. Furthermore, as can be seen with the Phorm example, the privacy-
infringing aspects have led to a great deal of public outcry and uncertainty around the legality 
of certain uses of DPI vis-à-vis privacy laws – contributing to Asghari and others’ observation 
that ISPs used DPI less in country with high levels of privacy protection.214  
 
 
3.4 Existing competition law and sector-specific regulation of Internet 
provision 
 
Internet access providers to users in the US and EU operate in markets which are subject to ex 
ante regulation and ex post competition law. This regulation and competition law will be set 
up in the following subsections to determine the extent to which they are adequate in 
addressing the concerns raised in the context of the net neutrality debate which have been 
identified above. 
 
 
a) Competition and regulation in the EU 
 
As mentioned earlier, Internet access to users, whether over fixed lines or mobile networks, is 
mainly provided in the jurisdictions under consideration by telecommunications companies, 
which have mostly been private entities in the EU since the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector from the 1980s. Internet access is also provided by cable, fibre and 
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satellite, but DSL via telecoms lines remains most popular.  
 
The EU’s telecoms regulatory framework, since the Commission’s 1987 Telecoms Green 
Paper,215 has promoted intra-platform competition in the form of stimulating competition at 
the retail, consumer-facing level for fixed line telecoms, rather than inter-platform 
competition between different technologies such as cable and copper wires which has been a 
feature of the US regulatory landscape. EU telecoms regulation with its law and neoclassical 
economics basis has also pursued a ‘technology neutral’ policy, not overly concerning itself 
with the type of technology used to deliver services, but more the extent to which markets are 
competitive. If a market is not competitive, then ex ante regulation will be applied, with the 
idea of this regulation no longer being needed once competition has been achieved, and 
market-based solutions will suffice. Indeed, neoliberal ideology giving rise to this approach 
has been a ‘deeply pervasive’ force in driving European telecoms regulation over the last few 
decades.216  
 
 
(i) Regulation in telecoms networks 
 
Users in the EU buying fixed line access to the Internet do so via the services of retail ISPs, 
which are either the subsidiaries of the entity which owns the telecoms infrastructure 
(pipes/cables/wires) or are entities which lease this capacity from the telecoms infrastructure 
provider on a wholesale basis. The entities which own the telecoms infrastructure in European 
countries are the successors to the formerly state-owned monopoly telecoms operators, but 
from the 1980s onwards these have almost all been privatised. Nevertheless, some public or 
partially public operators remain,217 and the privatised incumbents such as British Telecom 
(BT), and Telefonica still occupy a major position in (fixed) telecoms markets (including that 
of Internet provision) of their respective countries, in both up- and downstream markets (ie 
retail and wholesale Internet access).  
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The 2002 reform of EU telecoms regulation  mandated the process of ‘local loop unbundling’ 
as part of the process of privatisation and liberalisation of telecommunications markets in the 
EU.218 This allowed multiple operators to use connections from the telephone exchange to the 
customer’s premises (this physical wire connection is known as a ‘local loop’ or the ‘last 
mile’), with these connections’ physical infrastructure being owned by such incumbent, with 
the aim of creating competitive retail markets for telecoms services. 
 
The 2002 reform included a regulation to mandate incumbent operators with significant 
market power (broadly equivalent to a dominant position) to meet reasonable requests for 
unbundled access to the local loop.219 The local loop or last mile can be used by competitors 
to the infrastructure owner in retail markets to provide telecoms and data services, including 
Internet access, while the infrastructure owner is also usually active in these markets with its 
downstream business or subsidiaries, with the notable example of British Telecom which has 
been ‘functionally separating’ its retail and wholesale businesses after being instructed to do 
so by Ofcom in 2005.220 
 
The suite of instruments adopted in 2002 were amended in 2009 by two further Directives 
and a Regulation.221  
 
The result of this regulatory framework has been that national regulatory bodies are required 
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to impose ex ante regulatory obligations on entities in the electronic communications sector 
which have significant market power in relevant markets. The Commission has published 
Recommendations on the relevant product and service markets to be regulated in 2002,222 
with an updated version in 2007,223 and then again in 2014.  
 
The 2002 Recommendation included six retail telecoms markets, but only one of these (the 
market for access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential and non-
residential customers) was still included in the 2007 Recommendation. Wholesale broadband 
markets have been included in these Recommendations as being markets for which national 
telecoms regulators should use ex ante regulation to address competition problems, due to 
high barriers to entry in this market, the market structure not tending towards effective 
competition and (ex post) competition law alone being insufficient to address market 
failure.224 However, user-facing retail broadband markets have not been not included in this 
list of markets which required ex ante regulation, and so competition therein is deemed to be 
in a healthier state. Also, it seems that this market definition excludes broadband provided 
over cable networks and so in principle this form of broadband provision is not subject to the 
ex ante obligations. 225  Furthermore, the 2014 Recommendation does not include the 
remaining retail telephony market for access at a fixed location, and rearranged the market for 
wholesale broadband access into three new markets: wholesale local access provided at a 
fixed location (Market 3a); wholesale central access provided at a fixed location for mass-
market products (Market 3b); and wholesale high-quality access provided at a fixed location. 
 
As regards mobile telephony markets, the Commission considered in 2007 that significant 
market power also existed over voice call termination on individual mobile networks, and so 
this constituted other market susceptible to ex ante regulation. This market has been retained 
in the 2014 Recommendation. 
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In any event, there are various provisions from the Telecoms Package relevant to the current 
discussion on the regulation of Internet provision in Europe and the net neutrality debate in 
particular. 
 
Firstly, national regulatory authorities must promote competition in the provision of 
electronic communications networks (which would include Internet providers) by ensuring 
that users  ‘derive the maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality, and by ensuring 
that there is no distortion or restriction of competition, including in the transmission of 
content, as well as promoting the interests of citizens by encouraging the provision of clear 
information, particularly about tariffs and conditions for using communications services and 
by encouraging the ability of users to access and distribute information or run applications 
and services of their choice’.226 While this kind of promotion of competition for Internet 
provisions would be in line with addressing some concerns over a lack of net neutrality, such 
as seeking to ensure competitive content markets and transparency for users regarding what 
the service they have purchased entails, it still has been insufficient to guarantee net neutrality 
in practice in Europe, as will be seen below. 
 
There are also specific instructions in the Access Directive of the Telecoms Package to 
national regulatory bodies when dealing with an operator with significant market power.227 
This is relevant for Internet provision since, as already mentioned, the European Commission 
considers wholesale broadband markets to have operators with SMP existing in them, 
although not retail level markets. A designation of SMP enables national regulatory 
authorities to impose certain ex ante regulatory obligations on undertakings found to have 
SMP, including concerning transparency and non-discrimination in relation to interconnection 
or access, accounting separation, access to and use of specific network facilities, and price 
control and cost accounting obligation.228 The Access Directive also contains an obligation 
for the operators of public communications networks to negotiate access and interconnection 
with each other,229 and national regulatory authorities are also empowered to impose access 
and interconnection obligations even where there is not a SMP designation on undertakings 
controlling access to users ‘to the extent that is necessary to ensure end-to-end 
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connectivity’.230 
 
Finally, the Universal Services Directive details various transparency obligations incumbent 
on communications providers. These comprise the provision of information on the services 
being contained in contracts made with users including whether there are any conditions 
limiting access and the use of services and applications (so long as these conditions are 
legally permitted), the minimum service quality levels offered, any procedures put in place to 
measure and 'shape' traffic and how these procedures could affect service quality.231 National 
regulatory authorities also have the power to set minimum quality of service requirements in 
order to prevent the degradation of service and the hindering or slowing down of traffic over 
networks.232  
 
While some of this existing telecoms regulation in the EU might go some way to protecting 
net neutrality interests of users, it does not protect against all the prejudicial effects of non-net 
neutral conduct by ISPs as detailed at the beginning of this chapter. The regulation is highly 
economics-oriented, its more weighty obligations do not apply to most ISPs, and in any event 
some of the provisions that might protect against the adverse effects of non-net neutral 
conduct are optional for national regulatory authorities and seem not to have been enforced in 
practice. 
 
Firstly, significant market power has only been found to exist in DSL wholesale broadband 
markets, and not in retail broadband markets. Given that most of the regulatory obligations 
are triggered by this designation, only ISPs with SMP in the wholesale markets will be 
encumbered, and only for the wholesale part of their conduct. As a result, competition law is 
currently the main regime which governs retail ISPs’ conduct in this area, with the exception 
of the Netherlands and Slovenia where national legislation on this issue has been enacted 
(which will be discussed below).233 Indeed, as Sluijs points out, Member States which have 
pursued the cementing of a net neutrality principle so far have done so via legislative means 
rather than via the NRA, and, by implication, circumventing the existing European regulatory 
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framework.234 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Commission would add more markets to 
those in which it finds SMP since it has stated its aim as progressively reducing this ex ante 
regulation in line with its neoliberal deregulatory approach, with the view that competition in 
the markets will develop and electronic communications will ultimately be governed only by 
competition law.235 
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above the current Telecoms Package does contain an 
interconnection regime which would go some way to preventing an Internet access provider 
from blocking or possibly severely degrading their users’ access to content.236 It would seem 
to apply to Internet providers which both owned the underlying infrastructure and those 
which did not, and also would apply irrespective of whether an entity has significant market 
power (and independently of any interconnection obligations under the SMP regime). In the 
discussion on the Access Directive, national regulatory authorities can impose obligations on 
such ‘undertakings that control access to end-users’ including an obligation to interconnect 
their networks in order to ensure end-to-end connectivity. 237  Part of this end-to-end 
connectivity would seem to implicate ‘network operators [which] restrict unreasonably end-
user choice for access to Internet portals and services’.238 If these interconnection obligations 
are imposed in a particular Member State on all providers, this may entail that they are not 
permitted to block their users from receiving certain content. This interconnection obligation 
could also be applied to Internet access providers which are excessively degrading certain 
content in a way which is analogous to blocking and inhibiting end-to-end connectivity. It is 
unclear what an ‘unreasonable restriction’ of end-user choice might mean, and it seems 
unlikely that non-net neutral conduct which does not involve the outright blocking of certain 
Internet content and services would even be covered by these provisions. Furthermore, it 
seems that in practice national regulators have chosen not to implement them.  
 
Thus current ex ante regulation in the EU is largely ineffective in addressing net neutrality 
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problems since the SMP regime does not apply to the majority of ISPs (including all retail 
ISPs) and optional interconnection obligations have not been implemented. While exiting ex 
ante regulation has the potential to solve some of the net neutrality concerns, the likelihood of 
the Commission designating the retail broadband market as one exhibiting deficiencies of 
competition is remote, as is the likelihood of all national regulators implementing the 
interconnection obligations. Though there have been some moves in some EU Member States 
to introduce more legislation or regulation addressing net neutrality, this emerging patchwork 
approach (as well as the Europe-wide net neutrality violations observed by BEREC) may 
have encouraged action at the supranational level, discussed below.  
 
 
(ii) Competition in fixed line Internet markets 
 
Although telecommunications are a specifically regulated sector in Europe, the CJEU 
recognised in 1985 that the competition rules also applied to undertakings in that sector.239 
Moreover, the ‘first generation’ directives adopted at the beginning of the liberalisation 
process provided that the sector-specific regulation operated without prejudice to the 
application of competition rules.240 The CJEU’s decision in Deustche Telekom established that 
even where a sector specific regulatory structure exists and has been enforced by a regulator, 
competition law can still operate to deal with a complaint regarding alleged anticompetitive 
conduct on a similar matter.241 
 
Despite the attempts to introduce competition and weaken the market power of the 
incumbents in the markets for broadband Internet provision and other telecoms services, there 
have still been significant issues in the domestic markets of certain European Member States 
involving abuses of dominance in the forms of ‘margin squeeze’,242 predatory pricing243 and 
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the hindering of access to the network244 by the incumbent vertically integrated telecoms 
providers.  
 
While these cases show significant market power is still wielded by the owners of the local 
loop and this does have an effect on the final prices and choice that Internet users in Europe 
experience, these more ‘classical’ cases of anticompetitive conduct do not go to the heart of 
the issue of net neutrality. European competition authorities have not been particularly active 
in investigating ISPs’ network management practices such as blocking, prioritising or 
degrading access to certain content and applications, while, they have been more alert to more 
straightforward anticompetitive behaviour in broadband Internet markets, such as the margin 
squeeze cases. Indeed, to date there has been no case brought before the European 
Commission or Courts on the basis of Art 102 TFEU which implicates at least the overt 
competition aspect of net neutrality.  
 
Yet part of the explanation as to why network management practices have not been 
investigated by competition authorities may well be due to this conduct not necessarily 
constituting a violation of European competition law. Certain network management practices, 
if carried out by a provider with a dominant position in the relevant market, might be judged 
abusive under Art 102 TFEU. If the provider does not have a dominant position, then this 
conduct is unlikely to be anticompetitive. 
 
Retail broadband markets in the EU are generally competitive, evidenced by the fact that the 
Commission did not consider this a market which required ex ante regulation to address 
competition issues, though the extent to which they are competitive, at least based on the 
market power of incumbents, depends on the Member State in question.245 In some Member 
States (especially smaller countries), the market share of the telecoms incumbent in the retail 
broadband market can be around 50%,246 which may be considered a dominant position in the 
EU. Nevertheless, retail broadband access markets in the EU are more competitive than their 
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counterparts in the US, and the likelihood of a retail ISP having a dominant position in a 
European market is ‘severely reduced’.247  
 
If there is no one firm which could be considered to have a dominant position, it is possible 
that a group of firms acting together in a way which approximates that of a single dominant 
firm could have a ‘collective’ dominant position. If they have been agreeing with each other 
explicitly to act in a certain way, then this would be assessed under Art 101 TFEU, but if their 
coordination has been ‘implicit’ or ‘tacit’ and together they would hold a combined market 
share approximating a dominant position then if they are acting abusively this conduct may 
be assessed under Art 102 TFEU. However, collective dominance seems to require the firms 
involved behaving in a parallel manner to each other on the market. This often involves 
pricing patterns but in the context of network management collective restrictions in the 
‘quality’ of the service would be more relevant, such as all firms which are collectively 
dominant discriminating, blocking or degrading certain Internet content in the same way. The 
European Commission has adopted merger decisions on the basis that the characteristics of 
the market in question (mobile telephony) might lead to tacit collusion,
248
 but de Streel 
considers that few electronic communications markets will fulfil the conditions for collective 
dominance.
249
 While this remains a possibility, in practice it does not seem that European 
Internet access markets provide practical examples of collective dominant positions, and even 
then they may have an ‘objective justification’ regarding network congestion to justify their 
conduct.  
 
Anticompetitive conduct in the form of an abuse of dominance in the context of network 
management is most likely to be found in a dominant retail Internet access provider which is 
vertically integrated with Internet content or applications subsidiaries and is favouring its own 
content over that of competitors by slowing their content down or blocking it entirely. 
However, as mentioned, given that European retail broadband markets tend to be reasonably 
competitive, users may also provide a competitive constraint with their ability to switch to 
another provider - although this depends on how easy switching is. Users are often locked 
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into long contracts with their ISPs (usually of at least 12 months but sometimes up to 24 or 36 
months and sometimes with automatic extensions if the consumer does not opt out)250 which 
may function as an impediment to switching and may weaken the power of consumers as 
competitive constraints.  
 
In practice, dominant positions are more likely to be found in another market, namely that of 
wholesale broadband access (which is subject to ex ante regulation under the SMP regime 
described above). These entities are often vertically integrated with a retail broadband access 
subsidiary and may also be vertically integrated with a content provider subsidiary as well. 
Such a firm may try to favour this content by attempting to leverage its dominant position in 
the wholesale broadband market into the Internet content market by discriminating in favour 
of its subsidiary, which could constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The complication 
here, however, is that the ‘interim’ market over which the leveraging takes place is the retail 
broadband market, on which the vertically integrated provider may not have a dominant 
position - and if there is no dominant position here, then there may not be a finding of abuse 
of dominance.  However, the scenario is conceivable that all users had an interest in receiving 
certain attractive content or services from another user (such as an IPTV provider – either 
connected to or independent of the vertically integrated player) and the vertically integrated 
ISP managed to use its wholesale network to deliver that data more quickly or with a better 
quality of service to its retail ISP customers than to the customers of competitors at the retail 
level which access its wholesale network. In this way, the vertically integrated ISP may be 
leveraging its dominant position from wholesale into retail Internet access markets.  
 
It is this market for wholesale broadband access that the European Commission had recently 
been investigating for suspected anticompetitive conduct in the form of abuses of dominance 
by Orange, Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica in their negotiation of wholesale Internet 
connections with parties such as large online content providers and Internet backbone 
providers for international access and interconnection. 251  However in late 2014, the 
Commission closed the case, stating that the telecoms operators’ conduct did not appear to 
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breach EU competition law due to excluding competitors from the Internet transit market or 
Internet content markets (by providing an unfair advantage to the operators’ own content 
services), although it would continue to monitor the sector closely. 252  This closed 
investigation follows a 2012 decision by the French competition regulator that Orange (then 
France Telecom) could obtain payments from Cogent Communications Group (a major 
backbone provider that also provides services to Google), for additional trans-Atlantic 
capacity without it being an abuse of dominance, since it did not refuse Cogent access to its 
customers and did not seek to charge for existing capacity which had been provided free of 
charge.253  
 
A vertically integrated broadband access provider (ie combining wholesale and retail 
broadband functions) which does not have a subsidiary content provider might still wish to 
offer a better quality of service to an unaffiliated content provider for an extra fee. If the 
provider has a dominant position on the retail market, then this could be conceptualised as the 
dominant entity trying to exclude its retail broadband competitors by raising their costs by 
leading them to give similar treatment to content providers or lose their market share. Thus, it 
may be found to be an abuse of dominance due to discriminatory practices. 254  Another 
relevant dominant position may, however, be found over the content itself – for instance if it 
is ‘premium content’ such as major sports events or Hollywood blockbuster movies, and there 
the scenario may be that the vertically integrated entity is abusing its dominance over this 
content by delivering it more quickly and attractively via its retail ISP.255 
 
A retail-only broadband provider in Europe, even with a vertically integrated content 
subsidiary, is unlikely to have a dominant position in the relevant market, ie retail broadband 
access to users. Even if it is favouring its subsidiary’s content, this will not be an abuse of 
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dominance unless it is actually dominant in the retail broadband market. A retail-only 
broadband provider which is not vertically integrated with a subsidiary content provider but 
which is discriminating in favour of a certain content provider (eg because the two parties 
have a special agreement whereby the content provider pays for this special service) is 
unlikely to be abusive as it is unlikely too to have a dominant position in any market. 
 
If an ISP is blocking its users from accessing certain content entirely and this cannot be 
conceptualised as a form of discrimination (eg blocking certain competing content in order to 
favour a subsidiary’s content) then this could be construed as an abusive refusal to supply. 
Absent discrimination, the theory of harm would be that the ISP is blocking this content from 
its users and so the content provider is being excluded from the content market thus depriving 
users of choice. In order for this to constitute an abuse of dominance, firstly the relevant 
market must be defined and the ISP must be found to have a dominant position in that market. 
If the relevant market is that of retail broadband, then yet again it would be unlikely (but not 
impossible) that the ISP would have a dominant position.  
 
If it does not have a dominant position on that market, then another possibility might be that 
each ISP has its own content ‘termination’ market between its users and the rest of the 
Internet, similar to termination markets for voice calls (which have been found to exist in 
Europe and regulated according to the SMP regime as mentioned above, with price caps 
imposed) with each ISP being dominant in its own market. In some ways the two situations 
are similar, since both voice calls and Internet content must be routed through the provider’s 
access network in order to reach the user who is a customer of the provider, but there is an 
important difference between the two, namely that the user is insensitive to the prices 
imposed at the wholesale level for the termination of voice calls while for Internet content, 
each time an user makes a request for certain content, if it is blocked or has a degraded 
quality, this is immediately obvious to that user, thus providing some kind of restraint on the 
conduct of the ISP.256 Unlike the voice call provider, this entails on the wholesale market the 
ISP cannot behave independently of its competitors and customers. 
 
                                                             
256
 Winston Maxwell, ‘Net neutrality and European competition law’ (Lexology, 28 January 2011) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8e217437-7d78-44be-800f-d312261543e4>  accessed 30 
August 2014 
 119 
  
If a dominant position can be found, in either market, then there are other criteria that must be 
fulfilled as well if the refusal to deal is to be termed abusive conduct. Firstly, the ISP’s 
network must be ‘indispensable’ for competing in the downstream market (ie Internet content) 
ie it is an ‘essential facility’. Particularly if the relevant market is that for retail broadband 
access, it is highly unlikely that access to a particular ISP’s customers would be found to be 
‘indispensable’ for competing in the Internet content market given the presence of other retail 
broadband access providers competing in this market through which the content provider 
could access users (even if they may have to switch provider). Furthermore, even if the 
market is defined very narrowly as a termination market, Chirico and others posit that it 
would still not fulfil this requirement of indispensability since the case law, especially 
Bronner,257 has not found there to be an essential facility where there are other possible 
distribution methods for the content provider, even if they are not contained within the same 
termination market.258 
 
In any event, in this scenario of a retail broadband provider blocking certain content (but this 
not amounting to discrimination), the further essential facility requirement of refusal to grant 
access leading to elimination of effective competition in the downstream market for Internet 
content may also not be fulfilled since unless the ISP blocking the content has a content 
subsidiary or is otherwise active in that market, its blocking of that content may not exclude 
or eliminate competition on the content market. 
 
Another network management scenario would be Internet access providers entering into 
agreements with certain content providers in order to provide them a certain quality of 
service, whether in terms of speed or reliability of the connection, to the Internet access 
provider’s users. This market may also be two-sided inasmuch as the Internet access provider 
may also charge users different prices depending on the quality of service offered for certain 
content. The way in which this could be done technically could involve various kinds of 
technologies, but DPI would be one option, as would content delivery networks. A side-effect 
of permitting this conduct may be that other content for which an extra quality of service is 
not paid may experience degradation. Such degradation by an Internet access provider may 
constitute an abuse of dominance if that provider is indeed dominant, since this degradation 
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of service may be so severe that the content provider affected is unable to compete. 
Nevertheless, the access provider may argue that it has an objective justification to degrade in 
the form of a legitimate business reason (so long as this kind of conduct is not illegal), and the 
content provider is free to pay more in order to acquire a better quality of service.259 Also, the 
Internet access provider may try to argue that charging for a premium quality of service is 
necessary to ensure sufficient funds for investment in improving the network infrastructure, 
and that this justifies the conduct (although currently there is no way of ensuring that the 
extra revenue generated from such services is actually spent on these improvements).260 If an 
Internet access provider does not have a dominant position and is degrading traffic from 
content providers which have not paid extra for an improved quality of service, then if its 
competitors are behaving in a similar way this conduct may constitute either anticompetitive 
price fixing contrary to Art 101, or perhaps an abuse of a collective dominant position. 
 
In sum, the operation of competition law regarding network management practices pivots on 
whether the Internet access provider has a dominant position in the relevant market. In the 
absence of this dominant position, its network management conduct is unlikely to be 
anticompetitive, unless collusion with competitors or collective dominance can be shown – or 
the content or services to which it is giving priority over its network form a dominant position 
in their own market. It seems that the scenario in which anticompetitive conduct is most 
likely to be found is when there is a provider with a dominant position in the Internet 
wholesale market. While it is possible a provider may have a dominant position in a retail 
market, this is less likely as these markets are generally considered competitive in the EU. 
While in theory EU competition law could operate to address non-net neutral conduct by 
dominant entities, it is unlikely to apply to non-net neutral conduct by non-dominant ISPs, 
and indeed to date it is possibly only the Commission’s investigation into Orange, Deutsche 
Telekom and Telefonica where any non-net neutral conduct by ISPs is being investigated as a 
possible infringement of competition, and this is not at the retail level. Thus it would seem 
that many network management practices by retail ISPs are likely to be permissible and that 
while non-net neutral conduct by wholesale ISPs may not be permissible in theory, in practice 
it may not be investigated. 
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b) Competition and regulation in the US 
 
Telecoms regulation and policy in the US has also been profoundly influenced by 
neoliberalism in the last few decades, 261  although it differs in important ways from the 
European trajectory. Firstly, telecommunications from their inception in the US have been 
private, corporate entities (as opposed to the state-owned companies which operated in 
Europe). Furthermore, platform competition has been the policy pursued with regard to fixed-
line broadband Internet provision, between cable Internet (provided by Time Warner, 
Comcast and Cox Communications) and DSL (provided by AT&T). As mentioned above, an 
effective ‘duopoly’ is considered to exist between Comcast and AT&T for fixed-line 
broadband provision in many geographical areas of the US, and the overall situation is 
considered to be less competitive than in Europe.262  
 
 
(i) Regulation in communications networks 
 
Communications in the US are regulated by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC). The FCC decided in 1999 that it would not impose any regulation on cable provision 
of the Internet at that time, and subsequently classified cable modem services (ie Internet 
provision via cable TV) as 'information services' in 2002. The FCC in 2005 extended the 
same classification to telephone company Internet access services (ie DSL, or wireline 
broadband Internet access).  
 
Telecommunications services in the US have traditionally been subjected to ‘common carrier’ 
obligations which have their origins in special duties the English common law imposed on 
certain professions to service anyone who sought service, on just and reasonable terms and 
without discrimination, 263  and in the telecoms context this has resulted in a duty to 
interconnect with other carriers engaged in similar enterprises. 264  The common carrier 
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obligations for telecoms services can be found in Title II of the Telecommunications Act and 
oblige all carriers to interconnect pursuant to reasonable terms and conditions, and not to 
discriminate. 
 
However, initially the FCC did not subject computer data processing service providers to 
common carrier regulation,265 and thus these services did not have to abide by the provisions 
of Title II of the Telecommunications Act. The classification of Internet provision as an 
information service thus follows this lineage. Yet, the non-application common carrier 
application to Internet provision has been termed as a ‘radical departure from the deregulatory 
policies for other transportation and telecommunications network infrastructures’ given 
common carrier policies’ previous successes in facilitating widespread availability, 
affordability and reliability, and one motivated by neoliberal ideology rather than a basis of 
real-world evidence.266 
 
Nevertheless, classification as an information service does not entail that there is no 
regulation at all of that service. Instead, the FCC can regulate the service under its ancillary 
authority in Title I of the Telecommunications Act (ie if the assertion of jurisdiction is 
‘reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various responsibilities’). It is 
unclear as to the exact extent of the authority the FCC has under Title I to regulate Internet 
provision, and this has proved controversial in practice regarding the FCC’s attempts to 
introduce net neutrality rules, which will be discussed in greater detail below.  
 
One major point of divergence between the European and American regulatory approaches 
outlined here is the more technology and service neutral approach taken in the EU Telecoms 
Package compared to the technology-based definitions enshrined in US telecoms law.267 This 
provides more flexibility for the European regulatory scheme to deal with new technologies 
or new uses of technologies in the definition of markets, especially in the context of 
convergence blurring regulatory categories.268 It is submitted that this conceptual suppleness 
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in the European regulatory scheme has led to the regulation of Internet provision/ISPs by the 
EU and/or national telecoms regulators not being particularly controversial in itself, unlike 
the situation in the US, whose technology-specific regulatory framework coupled with a 
pervasive ideology of regulatory forbearance has contributed to it being difficult in practice 
for the FCC to regulate Internet provision under its Title II common carrier authority. 
 
 
(ii) Operation of competition law 
 
The relationship between competition and sector-specific telecoms regulation is more 
complex in the US compared to the position in the EU.  
 
This very relationship between the sector-specific regulation of the Telecommunications Act 
and the antitrust regime of the Sherman Act was the issue at hand in Verizon v Trinko, in 
which the Supreme Court held that while the Telecommunications Act did not stop the 
operation of the Sherman Act in this area, it also did not create new claims that went beyond 
these existing standards.269  Justice Scalia, delivering the court’s opinion, considered that 
Verizon's alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of services to rivals constituting a 
breach of common carrier duties under the Telecommunications Act was not a recognised 
antitrust claim under the existing refusal-to-deal jurisprudence of the Court. Although the 
Telecommunications Act did not preclude claims that satisfied existing antitrust standards, it 
also did not create   new claims that went beyond those existing standards. On the facts, the 
Court considered that Verizon’s alleged insufficient assistance to competitors was not a 
recognised antitrust claim according to the Court’s precedents. 
  
The case has come to be considered as delineating the boundary between regulation and the 
operation of antitrust, that they serve as substitutes rather than complements.270 The decision 
suggests that antitrust’s role is subsidiary in regulated sectors and operates where no sector 
specific remedies are available.271 This may differ from the approach in the EU, where, as 
seen above, sector-specific regulation is considered to operate without prejudice to 
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competition law, and novel categories of abuses of dominance have been found in the margin 
squeeze cases, even though this is an area where there is ex ante regulation to address 
significant market power. This differing in approach between the EU and the US may be 
explained by the fact that sector-specific telecoms regulation is ‘extremely intrusive’ in the 
US, compared to the EU where national telecoms regulators enjoy more discretion to decide 
whether to act, and the European Commission may wish to act on the basis of competition 
rules in circumstances in which the national regulator has failed to act on the basis of sector 
specific regulation.272 
 
Thus, at least when concerning potential non-net neutral conduct by dominant entities or 
entities which are already subject to ex ante regulation, the European institutions may have 
more room to manoeuvre when it comes to applying competition law to a certain factual 
situation. As non-net neutral conduct may not be recognised as an existing standard in US 
antitrust jurisprudence and would seem not to be included in the current application of 
telecoms regulation to ISPs, then the decision in Verizon v Trinko suggests that a claim 
brought in antitrust concerning non-net neutral conduct would fail.  
 
 
3.5 Net neutrality regulation 
 
a) US 
 
Initial regulatory action specifically on the topic of network management by ISPs was 
sparked in 2005 by Madison River Communications, a local telephone carrier that had been 
blocking VoIP services.  
 
The previous year, the FCC Chairman at the time, Michael Powell, had set out a set of non-
discrimination ‘Network Freedom’ principles: 
1. Freedom to access content 
2. Freedom to use applications 
3. Freedom to attach personal devices 
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4. Freedom to obtain service plan information273  
 
In light of these principles, the FCC opened an investigation into Madison River’s VoIP 
blocking practices. The FCC and Madison River came to a negotiated settlement whereby 
Madison River agreed to cease hampering their customers’ VoIP use and made a $15000 
payment to the US Treasury, while the FCC closed its inquiry.,274  
 
This was followed in 2007 by Comcast blocking access to peer-to-peer (P2P) data transfers 
for its users.. P2P networks have a distributed network architecture in which individual nodes 
of the network both supply and consume resources, and tasks (such as data storage or 
processing power) are shared among multiple interconnected peers which each make some of 
their resources available to other network participants without the need for centralised 
coordination. The P2P networks that Comcast targeted were BitTorrent, eDonkey and 
Gnutella, services with a reputation for facilitating illegal file sharing (ie the unauthorised 
sharing of copyrighted content and applications), but which are also used for perfectly 
legitimate and legal sharing and provide particularly effective ways of storing and sharing 
large files since they can be distributed across the network. Nevertheless, P2P traffic can take 
up a lot of bandwidth due to ongoing file transfers and network coordination packets being 
sent and received. 
 
It transpired that Comcast was not preventing its customers from downloading files from 
BitTorrent but it seemed that it was blocking or delaying uploads of complete files from its 
customers. It appeared that Comcast was interfering with traffic in this way because of 
concerns around network congestion but also because of the idea that much of what was 
being shared via these networks was illegal inasmuch as it was infringing copyrights. 
However it does not seem that any distinction was made in practice between legitimate and 
illegitimate file-sharing when Comcast was engaging in this conduct.  
 
In response, the FCC ordered Comcast to ‘end discriminatory network management 
practices’ since it had 'unduly interfered with Internet users' right to access the lawful 
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Internet content and to use the applications of their choice'.275 The FCC also considered that 
Comcast had an 'anticompetitive motive' in blocking access to P2P applications, since they 
'provide Internet users with the opportunity to view high-quality view that they might 
otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable television', with this posing 'a potential competitive 
threat to Comcast's video-on-demand service'. The FCC determined that it had the power to 
make this regulation under its Title I jurisdiction; however, Comcast disputed this and 
appealed the decision to the Federal Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeal in 2010 held that 
the FCC did not have the authority to take such regulatory action concerning Comcast’s 
network management practices under Title I ancillary authority. 276  The FCC’s Title I 
authority is more limited than Title II authority: had the FCC classified Internet services 
under Title II authority then it may have had the legal basis to issue such orders to Comcast, 
but as it was, Title I authority was an insufficient basis to enforce ‘open Internet’ principles. 
 
Subsequent to this decision, the FCC issued a regulatory order containing various obligations 
to be imposed on broadband Internet providers.277 The main principles of the order are: 
 transparency: fixed and mobile providers have to disclose the network management 
practices, performances characteristics and terms and conditions;  
 no blocking: by fixed broadband providers of lawful content, applications, services or 
non-harmful devices; and by mobile broadband providers of lawful websites or 
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services; 
 no unreasonable discrimination by fixed broadband providers in transmitting lawful 
network traffic; 
 reasonable network management: which is appropriate and tailored to achieving a 
legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network 
architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service; such legitimate 
purposes include ensuring network security and integrity, addressing traffic that is 
unwanted by end users (parental controls, security), and reducing or mitigating the 
effects of congestions on the network 
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Yet, Verizon challenged the FCC’s authority to make these rules. In early 2014, the Federal 
Court of Appeals found that the FCC did not have the authority to impose the above 
obligations in their entirety due to the fact broadband services were classified under Title I of 
the Telecommunications Act and so could not be regulated as common carriers.
278
 The Court 
upheld the transparency obligation imposed by the FCC but ‘vacated’ the other obligations 
on no blocking and no unreasonable discrimination, although did find that the FCC had 
‘affirmative authority’ under section 708 of the Telecommunications Act to enact measures 
encouraging the deployment of broadband infrastructure, leaving the FCC with the prospect 
of introducing revised rules. 
 
In response to this decision against it, the FCC decided not to mount an appeal, and instead 
made a new proposal of net neutrality rules in May 2014, which at the time of writing are 
under public consultation.
279
 These new proposed rules would maintain the transparency 
obligation which was not invalidated by the Court, and add a non-blocking obligation, which 
for fixed line ISPs would forbid them from blocking ‘lawful content, applications, services or 
non-harmful devices’ and for mobile providers would prohibit them from blocking ‘lawful 
websites’. There is also a prohibition on ISPs engaging in ‘commercially unreasonable 
practices’ – with both this rule and the anti-blocking rule being subject to an exception for 
‘reasonable network management’. These rules are weaker than their predecessors, 
particularly in not including at all a non-discrimination obligation, and in the very vague 
language around what ‘commercially unreasonable practices’ precisely would be.280 It would 
seem that, for instance, ISPs charging large companies for preferential treatment would not 
be prima facie disallowed.
281
 
 
Nevertheless, in the midst of the litigation and rule-making proposals, the FCC has found 
more subtle ways of enforcing its position on network management, namely as a condition of 
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approving mergers. In its approval of the SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCI mergers in 2005, the 
FCC made enforceable a clause which would entail the merged entities adhering to its 2005 
Internet policy statement for a two year period.
282
 This Internet policy statement consisted of 
four principles that were not enforceable per se but would be incorporated into the FCC’s 
policymaking, and can be seen as a predecessor to the Open Internet Order from 2010. The 
principles were: that consumers be entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their 
choice; consumers be entitled to run applications and services of their choice (subject to 
needs of law enforcement); consumers be entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that 
do not harm the network; and consumers be entitled to competition among network providers, 
application and service providers and content providers – all subject to ‘reasonable network 
management’.283 
 
Thus, much of the problem for the FCC in enforcing net neutrality rules has been the initial 
decisions to class Internet services under Title I authority rather than Title II authority. While 
the FCC has been quite ‘activist’ in its attempts to introduce ex ante net neutrality rules, and 
has managed to do so more effectively via conditions on mergers (although of course this 
option is only limited to the situation of a merger arising, and so is unlikely to prove a means 
of ensuring net neutrality obligations incumbent on all ISPs), there has also been a great deal 
of lobbying by ISPs to ensure that they are not subject to enforceable net neutrality rules 
and/or their services are not classified under Title II authority.284  
 
In any event, the current rules that the FCC has proposed can be contrasted with their 
counterparts proposed by the European Parliament discussed in more detail below. Mobile 
providers are subject to much less stringent requirements in the FCC’s rules (they must only 
allow ‘lawful websites’) which would seem to allow them to block, for instance, rivals’ apps 
which may contain competing products and services to those offered by the mobile provider. 
Unless the mobile provider has a dominant position, such blocking will not be prohibited by 
antitrust rules either. More strikingly, the FCC’s rules do not include a ‘non-discrimination’ 
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obligation on ISPs (unlike the draft regulation), and does not prevent the establishment of 
‘specialised services’ so long as they do not constitute ‘commercially unreasonable practices’.  
 
Thus it seems that the FCC may permit the creation of a ‘two-tier’ system, whereby certain 
content providers will be able to pay for priority access to users, with those which are less 
able to afford to pay, such as non-profit, non-market initiatives being relegated to a lower 
status. As a result, the Internet in the US may end up resembling something more akin to 
television, where large organisations (public service broadcasters and corporate broadcasters) 
decide what users see, with a possibly resurfacing of an updated version of Herman and 
Chomsky’s propaganda model, mentioned at the beginning of this thesis. 285  Given the 
Internet's previous record on facilitating free expression of individuals, which was restricted 
to a much greater extent in the traditional one-way broadcasting world, it would be a great 
loss if the Internet in the US was to mimic its predecessor, with its associated disadvantages 
for free expression.  
 
Furthermore, if American users are charged more to access non-favoured content, then this 
could exacerbate existing “digital divides” in society. Indeed, corporate control over what 
information users create, disseminate and receive could also entail access to content or 
programmes which are not commercially lucrative is restricted only to those willing to pay 
more to the ISP to access it, or not available at all.  
 
Yet the net neutrality saga in the US is far from near a conclusion. In November 2014, 
President Barack Obama called on the FCC to introduce the following net neutrality rules:  
 No blocking. If a consumer requests access to a website or service, and the 
content is legal, your ISP should not be permitted to block it. That way, every 
player — not just those commercially affiliated with an ISP — gets a fair shot at 
your business. 
 No throttling. Nor should ISPs be able to intentionally slow down some content 
or speed up others — through a process often called “throttling” — based on the 
type of service or your ISP’s preferences. 
 Increased transparency. The connection between consumers and ISPs — the so-
called “last mile” — is not the only place some sites might get special treatment. 
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So, I am also asking the FCC to make full use of the transparency authorities the 
court recently upheld, and if necessary to apply net neutrality rules to points of 
interconnection between the ISP and the rest of the Internet. 
 No paid prioritization. Simply put: No service should be stuck in a “slow lane” 
because it does not pay a fee. That kind of gatekeeping would undermine the level 
playing field essential to the Internet’s growth. So, as I have before, I am asking 
for an explicit ban on paid prioritization and any other restriction that has a similar 
effect.286 
 
Whether the independent FCC will follow President Obama’s suggestions remains to be seen 
at the time of writing, Furthermore, even if it does, the prospect of more litigation from ISPs 
regarding the net neutrality rules is highly likely. 
 
 
b) EU 
 
In the European Union, the debate around whether specific regulation was necessary for net 
neutrality gained momentum and has resulted in a proposal on the matter which is part of a 
new Telecoms Package which was recently voted on by the European Parliament and is at the 
time of writing being considered by the Council of the EU.  
 
This proposal for a draft regulation comprises something of a volte face for the European 
Commission, which previously had considered the existing Telecoms Package to be sufficient 
to address net neutrality concerns by providing European consumers with more information 
about Internet services and more competitive retail broadband markets as well as giving 
national regulatory authorities the power to set minimum quality of service standards in their 
territory.
287  However, it does follow European Parliament resolutions supporting net 
neutrality, such as that of the Parliament’s Industry Committee in 2011 which urged the 
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Commission to take a more active approach towards net neutrality.
288
 It also follows data 
from the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), which 
found that there was widespread interference with P2P networks and VoIP on fixed and 
mobile networks in the EU.289 According to BEREC, the most frequently reported restrictions 
on traffic were the blocking or slowing down of P2P traffic on both fixed and mobile 
networks, and the blocking of VoIP traffic which mostly took place on mobile networks,290 
which has also been an issue in the US as well.291 
 
The proposed draft regulation’s provisions on net neutrality seem to create two classes of 
services: ‘internet access services’ which are subject to a net neutrality principle but can have 
a data volume cap or data speed cap; and ‘specialised services with an enhanced quality of 
service’ which would seem to result from special agreements between ISPs and online 
providers of content applications and services (‘OSPs’) including a defined quality of service 
or dedicated capacity.
292
  
 
The net neutrality principle behind ‘internet access services’ is that users should be free to 
access and distribute (lawful) information and content, run applications and use services of 
their choice when using the internet access service.
293
 Also, ISPs should not block, slow 
down, degrade or discriminate against specific content, applications or services (or specific 
classes of these) except if reasonable traffic management measures are needed, and this 
management should be transparent, non-discriminatory, proportionate and necessary.
294
 The 
circumstances in which this traffic management is permitted are: 
 To implement a legislative provision or court order, or prevent or impede serious 
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crime; 
 Preserve the integrity and security of the network, services provided via the network 
and end-users’ terminals; 
 Prevent the transmission of unsolicited communications to end-users who have given 
their prior consent to such restrictive measures; 
 Minimise the effects of temporary or exceptional network congestion provided that 
equivalent types of traffic are treated equally. 
 
National regulatory authorities are also empowered to set minimum quality of service 
requirements for internet access services.
295
 There are also transparency obligations for ISPs 
to provide details about the services they offer.
296
 
 
The European Parliament adopted various amendments to the original text of the proposal on 
net neutrality. Firstly, it adopted a strong definition of net neutrality to which ‘internet access 
services’ are subject: all Internet traffic should be treated equally, without discrimination, 
restriction or interference and independent of its sender, receiver or type. Secondly, the 
Parliament adopted another amendment which narrowed the definition of ‘specialised 
services’ from the original proposal: they must be provided on ‘logistically distinct capacity’ 
must not be ‘marketed or usable as a substitute for internet access service’, and can only be 
offered if ISPs have enough network capacity to do so without interfering with the quality or 
availability of normal ‘internet access services’. ISPs must also not discriminate between 
‘functionally equivalent services or applications’. This would seem to entail that ISPs cannot 
suddenly decide that services currently offered over the Internet is no longer a normal Internet 
service, or offer these ‘specialised services’ if doing so would affect normal Internet 
provision. 
 
Some individual EU Member States have proceeded with law and regulation on network 
management at the domestic level, arguably leading to a fragmented approach in the internal 
market,
297
 which may also have triggered the European Commission’s actions in a 
harmonisation attempt. The Netherlands in May 2012 became the first country in Europe to 
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mandate a net neutrality principle in the form of a law which prevents ISPs from interfering 
with applications and services on the Internet, except if necessary, and what is necessary has 
been narrowly defined as when there is congestion, preserving the integrity and security of 
the network, service or terminal of the user, restricting the transmission of unsolicited 
communication to the user when the user has given consent for the ISP to do this, and to give 
effect to a legislative provision or court order.298 In 2012 Slovenia also became the second 
Member State to legislate on net neutrality, prohibiting ISPs from restricting, delaying or 
slowing down Internet traffic at the level of individual services or applications except in the 
case of urgent technical measures to ensure the smooth operation of the network (eg to avoid 
traffic congestion), to preserve the integrity and security of networks and services, for 
limiting unsolicited communications or in accordance with a court decision.299 
 
France has also been active on the subject of net neutrality. It currently does not have 
enforceable laws on the matter but in September 2010, the communications regulator ARCEP 
published its ten proposals on net neutrality.300
 
According to the proposals, ISPs which offer 
'Internet access' should give users the possibility to send and receive the content of their 
choice, the possibility to use services or applications of their choice, the possibility to connect 
the equipment and use the programmes of their choice (provided these do not harm the 
network), and there should be a sufficient and transparent quality of service. Also, the general 
rule should be non-differentiating of the methods of treatment of each individual data flow by 
the type of content, service, application, terminal or by the IP address of the sender of the 
receiver, with any deviations from this to be limited – deviations which are too significant are 
forbidden from being termed by the ISP an offer of 'Internet access'. These too-big deviations 
are to be termed 'managed services', which ISPs are permitted to offer so long as they do not 
degrade the quality of Internet access below a sufficient level. ISPs must also be transparent 
with users about the services and applications accessible via the Internet connection, their 
quality of service and any limitations and traffic management practices. Furthermore, ISPs 
which give online service providers Internet access must do so in an objective and non-
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discriminatory fashion, allowing all reasonable interconnection requests aimed at making the 
OSP's services or applications accessible to Internet users. 
 
The nascent French approach echoes in the European Commission’s draft regulation, with 
each permitting a ‘two-tier’ model, of general ‘Internet access’ with the possibility to offer 
‘specialised’ or ‘managed’ services as well, although the amendments adopted by the 
Parliament are more restrictive than the French approach, given their increased limitations on 
when specialised or managed services can be offered. 
 
The net neutrality provisions of the draft regulation currently under discussion in the EU 
would address some of the gaps left by the existing regulation and competition law vis-à-vis 
Internet providers’ network management. For instance, it would ensure that providers of 
‘internet access services’ are not to block, slow down, degrade or discriminate against specific 
content, applications or services, and this would apply regardless of whether the provider had 
a dominant position or not, and a minimum quality of service could be set by the national 
regulator. 
 
The original proposal from the Commission regarding ‘specialised services’ would appear to 
have created a non-net neutrality regime to exist alongside ‘internet access services’ subjected 
to these net neutrality obligations, since they would have allowed the prioritisation of certain 
content, so long as it did not result in a recurring or continuous impairment of the general 
quality of internet access services. However, the Parliament’s amendments have limited 
further the circumstances in which specialised services can be provided, and it would seem 
that they would now only be permissible if they do not affect internet access services, are not 
considered to be a substitute for them, nor can existing services provided by the Internet be 
moved onto specialised service provision by ISPs. Yet, it is not clear that the Council of the 
EU will approve these amendments given the widely varying views of the ministers from the 
28 Member States on the subject.301 Also it is likely that the telecommunications industry will 
continue to attempt to influence the debate and policy-makers, as they had been doing up 
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until, and after, the European Parliament vote, arguing that these measures are an undue 
burden on their businesses which may affect European competitiveness and result in 
restrictions of user choice.302 Yet similar arguments are advanced in favour of net neutrality 
rules, that net neutrality rules would secure users’ choice of content and services, and may 
even make the EU more competitive vis-à-vis the US, with Neelie Kroes arguing that they 
would aid small businesses such as start-ups.303  
 
In any event, the European Parliament’s approach seems highly user-centric, even at potential 
costs to business, and its willingness to impose further obligations on ISPs certainly cannot be 
termed a neoliberal move. The amendments would provide a strong net neutrality principle 
and more restricted circumstances in which specialised services can operate compared to the 
initial Commission proposal, which may have resulted in a two-tiered Internet exacerbating 
existing digital divides. Yet, it remains to be seen what happens at the Council level, and thus 
what shape any finalised net neutrality regulation might take – indeed it may well be less 
strongly pro-user than it is now. Moreover, the proposed regulation as it stands, while it may 
be of benefit to European Internet users, may also be seen as a step ‘too little, too late’. The 
extent to which it addresses content delivery networks is unclear – even though their use can 
have a similar effect to non-net neutral conduct by ISPs in prioritising certain traffic using 
deep packet inspection, their implementation may not be covered by the proposals. This 
demonstrates some of the failing of regulation as an option for promoting user autonomy 
online – while net neutrality has been raised as an issue more than ten years ago, it has taken 
many years for the EU to arrive at this point where ex ante regulation is being considered, 
meanwhile technology has moved on. In addition, the regulation is unlikely to promote large 
structural change in how the Internet is provided in the EU – corporate for-profit ISPs are 
likely to endure the attempt to impose further regulation, and albeit users will have more 
consumer rights against them, they are still likely to form a ‘radical monopoly’ over Internet 
provision. 
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3.7 Other areas of law and net neutrality 
 
Although the European Parliament’s amendments to the draft regulation would go a long way 
to enacting a strong net neutrality principle and avoiding a ‘two-tiered’ Internet, the FCC’s 
rules, even if adopted, would fall far short of that situation. In any event, as mentioned above, 
it is not clear that the Parliament’s version of the draft regulation will actually come to pass 
given the likely opposition from some members of the Council of the EU (and the lobbying in 
which the European telecoms industry is likely to engage). Thus, this section looks at how 
other areas of existing laws may comprise alternative means of protecting and promoting net 
neutrality. 
 
 
a) Free expression 
 
The law around freedom of expression may address some issues raised already, and indeed 
has been recognised as playing a fundamental part in the net neutrality debate.304  
 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects free expression, 
which is supplemented by constitutional rights at the national level of some Member States. 
However, Art 10 of the ECHR is an obligation primarily pertaining to contracting States, and 
is usually conceived of as a negative freedom – although there have been cases in which it has 
produced a horizontal effect between private parties.305 While in Europe there remain a few 
ISPs with (partial) state ownership, most are privately-owned and that is the paradigm 
promoted by the EU’s liberalisation policy in telecoms over the last decades. The application 
of Art 10 is evidently clearer in the remaining instances of state ownership, but the right to 
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receive information has been found to have some horizontal, positive effect in the case of 
Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden,306 a dispute between tenants and their landlord 
over a satellite dish the tenants had installed to receive Arabic and Farsi language 
programmes against the terms of the tenancy agreement, which forbade outdoor antennae 
from being installed outside the building. In this case, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) found that the applicants' freedom to receive information via satellite broadcast, 
which formed part of Art 10, had been violated as the State, Sweden, had 'failed in their 
positive obligation to protect that right'. This was because the applicants had no other way to 
receive these programmes at that time (presumably now the existence and widespread use of 
the Internet would have entailed a different decision in this case) and the dish could not be 
placed anywhere else, yet the domestic courts found for the landlord in accordance with 
domestic law and the applicants were evicted from their apartment, which the ECtHR found 
was disproportionate to the protection of the rights of others, and that the domestic courts had 
failed to take into consideration the importance of the applicants’ interest in receiving the 
information. Thus the ECtHR found that there had been a violation of Art 10, and this case 
may be a relevant precedent for other disputes between two private parties being admissible 
before the ECtHR if domestic or EU-level legislation did not provide a remedy. 
 
The ECtHR has also explicitly recognised the right of individuals to send and receive 
information on the Internet in Yildirim v Turkey.307 It found that the Turkish communications 
regulator blocking access to the entire Google Sites platform in response to a Turkish court’s 
judgement regarding one site hosted by Google Sites containing illegal content constituted a 
violation of the applicant’s freedom of expression as it was not sufficiently prescribed by law 
(the relevant Turkish law did not authorise the wholesale blocking of an entire online 
platform such as Google sites and failed to provide sufficient safeguards against abuse), there 
was no evidence that Google had been told it was hosting content found to be illegal by the 
Turkish court and given an opportunity to comply with the judgement, and the regulator (an 
administrative body)  had broad powers conferred on it by the law. 
 
These cases demonstrate in principle that Art 10 may have some horizontal effect in disputes 
between private parties and may also apply to restrictions on Internet access, or, even more 
narrowly, access to a certain online platform. It is possible that these decisions may be applied 
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to instances of network management in non-net neutral ways which restrict an individual’s 
freedom to send or receive information on the Internet, when the management is being done 
by a private ISP. Yet whether such network management practices by ISPs would infringe 
users or content providers’ Art 10 rights seems highly context-specific and it is difficult to 
predict how the ECtHR might rule on such scenarios in light of its precedent. 
 
Certainly, the most egregious network management practices for the right to receive and 
impart information would encompass blocking, and perhaps the degradation of quality of 
service of particular content to an extent equivalent to, or approaching, blocking. Sluijs 
considers that an infringement might only be recognised if all expression is blocked by an 
ISP,308 and this would be consistent with Kurshid Mustapa, when the applicants were in 
practice not permitted to receive any kind of satellite broadcast at all with the effect that 
Iraqi and Kurdish programmes were inaccessible to them. However, the Yildirim decision 
demonstrated that the blocking of some expression ie that on Google sites could be an 
infringement of Art 10. A distinction might be made between ISPs’ network management 
and Yildirim due to the blocking in the latter case taking place due to State direction, while 
the former case will usually be blocking directed by ISPs themselves. Also, it is unclear 
whether a certain class of applications or content or services being blocked (or severely 
degraded) by ISPs might prompt intervention by the ECtHR, such as P2P filesharing 
networks. ISPs might argue that they have a legitimate aim in doing so (ie protecting 
intellectual property rights) but blocking this whole category of applications might 
nevertheless be found to be disproportionate, such as in Yildirim, since P2P networks can 
be used for non-infringing as well as infringing purposes, and indeed this was an approach 
taken by a Spanish court in determining that the creator of various P2P apps was not 
contributing towards copyright infringement.309  
 
Other problematic network management practices such as the prioritisation of certain 
content are also less likely to constitute a breach of the right to receive information given 
the user is still able to receive information, albeit perhaps at a slower speed, so the ECHR 
system may not prove to provide users with any additional rights or protection. However, 
the ECtHR might be willing to intervene if ISPs’ network management practices 
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constituted an interference with media plurality, with the intervention might be in the form 
of calling on the particular nation-state to stimulate plurality.310 Despite a perception that 
the Internet is a highly pluralistic sphere, if the ‘specialised services’ conceptualised in the 
draft regulation become prevalent, then the issue of media plurality may rear its head again 
with ‘deep-pocketed’ content being the most accessible, and content from smaller, 
independent sources becoming less visible and less accessible.  
 
The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers made a Declaration regarding net 
neutrality in 2010.311 This non-binding document affirmed the Committee of Ministers’ 
commitment to net neutrality as a principle, while acknowledging that network 
management practices may be permissible in certain circumstances, relating to quality of 
service, the development of new services, network stability and resilience, and combatting 
cybercrime. However, exceptions to net neutrality ‘must be considered with great 
circumspection and need to be justified by overriding public interests’.  Furthermore, the 
Council of Ministers explicitly links net neutrality to fundamental rights, especially free 
expression and privacy: 
Users and service, application or content providers should be able to gauge the 
impact of network management measures on the enjoyment of fundamental rights 
and freedoms, in particular the rights to freedom of expression and to impart or 
receive information regardless of frontiers, as well as the right to respect for private 
life. Those measures should be proportionate, appropriate and avoid unjustified 
discrimination; they should be subject to periodic review and not be maintained 
longer than strictly necessary. Users and service providers should be adequately 
informed about any network management measures that affect in a significant way 
access to content, applications or services. As regards procedural safeguards, there 
should be adequate avenues, respectful of rule of law requirements, to challenge 
network management decisions and, where appropriate, there should be adequate 
avenues to seek redress. 
 
In late 2014, however, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers discussed a Draft 
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Recommendation which affirmed its commitment to a net neutrality principle but appeared 
to retreat from its strong support of net neutrality in 2010, particularly in seeming to 
recognise the possibility of ISPs providing, via contract, a guaranteed quality of service 
level ‘provided that this does not impair the quality of open Internet access and does not 
constitute a discriminatory or anti-competitive practice’.312 This would seem to depart from 
the European Parliament’s amendments to the draft regulation discussed above which 
stipulated that such services could only be provided on logically distinct capacity and 
could not be marketed or usable as a substitute for internet access services. 
 
While Europe has not seen many deals between large content providers and ISPs so far, this 
may be due to current uncertainty over whether they are legal, regardless of the technology 
used (ISPs discriminating via DPI or agreements creating content delivery networks). The 
draft regulation as it currently stands would seem to apply to ISPs wanting using DPI to 
discriminate between different types of Internet traffic once it is on their networks (which 
would not be permitted – except in the case of specialised services). However the draft 
regulation’s application to content delivery networks is unclear as these direct peering and 
transit agreements concern Internet traffic (ie the content) before it gets onto the ISP’s own 
network, even though in practice they can have similarly ‘non neutral’ effects to prioritisation 
or discrimination of data packets on an ISP’s network using DPI. 313  Indeed, the FCC’s 
approach in suggesting that ‘commercially unreasonable practices’ should be permitted 
would seem to provide a more ‘technology neutral’ approach to the EU’s draft regulation 
despite the vagueness of the term. 
 
These CDN are now beginning to emerge in Europe, and it may be that many more will be 
concluded if the draft regulation as it currently stands is enacted. One example so far is that 
of Netflix, a provider of on-demand media streaming, which entered into an agreement with 
a Norwegian ISP, Telenor, allowing it to place its video storage servers inside the ISP’s 
network.314 This development follows another announcement from Netflix in the US that it 
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would pay Comcast for a direct connection to its network.315 If this does not constitute a 
‘commercially unreasonable practice’ then in terms of free expression, the US situation is 
more straightforward on its legality. As inadequate as it may be for a predominantly 
privatised, ‘multilateral speech environment’ such as the Internet,316 the First Amendment 
essentially rests on a bilateral conception, of individuals’ speech rights being enforced 
against the state, it would seem difficult if not impossible to enforce an individual’s First 
Amendment rights against non-net neutral behaviour by a private ISP.  
 
Indeed, the First Amendment provides strong protection of free expression that also 
encompasses corporations as the recent (and controversial) Citizens United case 
reinforces.317 This would seem to mean that in practice there could be a First Amendment 
challenge to attempts to impose net neutrality rules on ISPs. However, it may be difficult to 
characterise ISPs’ network management as ‘expression’ for the purposes of the First 
Amendment since it is not sufficiently expressive of the ISP itself, and rather is the 
facilitation of the expression of others ie users and content providers, at least in the case of 
‘basic’ or normal Internet access.318 Yet, the provision of managed or specialised services 
may attract First Amendment protection in a way more similar to broadcast media, since it 
involves some kind of selection of the content that the user receives, and in any event even 
with ‘basic’ Internet services, the development of DPI gives rise to the possibility of the ISP 
exercising control over what the user receives, and so overall it would appear that ISPs in the 
US would have some order of First Amendment rights themselves regarding their network 
management practices.  
 
Yemini considers that net neutrality rules in the US could be constitutional ie not violate 
ISPs’ First Amendment rights if they can be conceptualised as following the Supreme Court 
decision in Turner v FCC.319 In this case, rules imposed on cable television providers that 
they must carry certain local commercial and public broadcast channels were upheld as being 
constitutional since they were content-neutral restrictions that imposed an incidental burden 
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on speech, with ‘Congress’s overriding objective in enacting these rules being not to favour 
programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format but rather to prevent cable 
operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of broadcasters and to 
preserve access to free television programming for the (then) 40 percent of Americans 
without cable’,320 thus serving an important state interest. If net neutrality rules could be 
considered to be similarly content neutral and serving an important state interest such as 
securing a free and open Internet where all (legal) content and applications are accessible to 
all, etc, then they would seem to pass the Turner test for being a permissible restriction on 
ISPs’ First Amendment rights. 
 
Appeal to free expression may also work both ways in Europe as well: there is also the issue 
of the extent to which ISPs themselves possess the right and how this might interact with 
attempts to enforce some kind of net neutrality rules. The argument in favour of such a 
finding would be that network management itself constitutes some kind of expression, and 
this may be interfered with by net neutrality rules. As Sluijs notes, the ECtHR has not come 
to a concise definition of ‘expression’ or ‘the freedom to impart and receive information’ for 
the purposes of Art 10, and in the Autronic v Switzerland case,321 the ECtHR found that the 
transmission and reception of satellite signals was protected under Art 10, including for a 
legal person such as a corporation.322 While this would suggest that network management 
prima facie is expression to be protected under Article 10, Art 10 does not provide an 
absolute right, and Art 10(2) lists the circumstances in which it can be limited. In particular, a 
strong argument would be that ISPs’ right to free expression should be limited by the 
‘protection of the… rights of others’, which in this case would be the free expression rights 
of users and content providers, particularly in the case of issues over media pluralism. 
 
Thus it would seem that in the EU the right to free expression under Art 10 ECHR may in 
certain specific circumstances (such as where there is a media plurality issue) go some way to 
protecting net neutrality, it is unlikely to do so on every occasion that net neutrality is 
infringed. The US situation with the First Amendment would not protect users’ expression 
vis-à-vis private, for-profit ISPs at all. 
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b) Privacy 
 
In terms of the privacy concerns raised incidentally through the use of DPI in facilitating non-
net neutral conduct by ISPs, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) delivered his 
own Opinion on this matter.323 He stated that the use of DPI by ISPs to inspect the content of 
communications interferes with the right to the confidentiality of communications, to an 
increasing or decreasing extent depending on the technique used and the facts of the situation. 
However, in principle the EDPS considered that the existing privacy and data protection 
framework in Europe, if properly interpreted, applied and enforced, is appropriate to 
guarantee the right to confidentiality. Nevertheless, he counselled close monitoring of the 
situation, terming 'highly problematic' from a privacy and data protection perspective the 
situation in which 'ISPs engage on a routine basis in traffic management policies offering 
subscriptions based on filtering access to content and applications', and advocating legislative 
measures to address this. Any future legislative measures should give users a 'real choice' 
especially through forcing ISPs to offer non-monitored Internet connections. 
 
However, the option of ‘non-monitored’ Internet connections is not present in the draft 
regulation currently under consideration, so it would seem that no such ‘real choice’ in 
privacy terms is being mandated for Internet users. While the E-Privacy Directive allows ISPs 
to process personal data of users ‘for the purpose of the transmission of a communication’,324 
this is subject to some conditions, including a prohibition on ISPs engaging in ‘listening, 
trapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications’ without 
users’ consent except where they have other obligations to do so such as for national security 
reasons.325 ISPs must also comply with data protection laws, however these laws may not be 
well-enforced. 
 
In the Scarlet v SABAM case, the CJEU decided that ISPs could not be forced to monitor all 
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of their customers’ traffic for possible copyright infringements as this was a disproportionate 
interference with their rights to privacy, data protection and free expression.326 While the 
circumstances in that case also involved ISPs monitoring not for their own benefit, but for the 
benefits of third party intellectual property rightsholders, there may be some precedent 
established if a similar case was brought regarding the privacy aspects of ISPs’ network 
monitoring practices if they were indeed engaging in the total monitoring of their customers’ 
communications. 
 
While a stronger statement in the draft regulation under consideration regarding privacy and 
the confidentiality of communications when it comes to network monitoring by ISPs may 
have been a beneficial ‘spillover’ move to address this ‘spillover’ consequence of non-net 
neutral conduct (or at least facilitated by deep packet inspection), the legal tools in the EU are 
in place to address privacy and data protection aspects. The problem, however, may lie in the 
detection of such practices in the first place, and so these tools can only be applied once there 
is sufficient knowledge that the problem exists. 
 
 
3.8 Technical solutions 
 
Since the EU’s draft regulation concerning net neutrality has not been finalised at the time of 
writing – and its final form is far from clear – it seems that existing areas of European law 
may go some way to addressing net neutrality problems, but they still leave gaps. 
Competition law will only apply in specific circumstances, usually where there is a dominant 
position, but most ISPs will not have this dominant position. The right to free expression may 
also only apply in specific circumstances, to the most severe non-net neutral conduct such as 
blocking and serious degradation of content, or possibly where there are media plurality 
issues, but this would appear to be highly dependent on the particular circumstances of the 
case. While privacy and data protection laws may apply in principle, they may not be well-
enforced vis-à-vis network monitoring by ISPs due to a lack of information about the extent 
to which ISPs are actually engaging in this monitoring.  
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In this situation, attention may be turned to certain technical solutions to some of the 
problems underlying the net neutrality debate as a quicker and, arguably more effective, 
means of ensuring user autonomy and optimal online information flows for users. Some of 
these solutions will be described below. 
 
 
a) Data encryption 
 
The encryption of data that is being sent or requested over the Internet would challenge ISPs’ 
efforts to monitor such data flows and act on the content of that data for non-net neutral 
purposes. Incidentally, data encryption may also facilitate free expression and the protection 
of privacy in the face of attempts at surveillance and censorship for whatever purpose 
(economic, ideological or other). However, data encryption may just facilitate an ‘encryption 
arms race’ between encryption and decryption technologies327  and so not provide a total 
solution to net neutrality issues, especially the efficient delivery of content over the network 
and will not mask the volume of the data being sent or received (and indeed, with encryption 
this volume could actually increase). Encryption also does not ensure that the underlying 
infrastructure is managed, controlled or owned on a commons-basis. 
 
 
b) P2P filesharing 
 
P2P filesharing networks have been effectively demonised as facilitating copyright 
infringement even though they are used for a variety of purposes, some of which infringe 
copyright but others of which are completely legitimate. However, as a result of lobbying by 
the content industry, access to them has been stymied through legislative means, ‘voluntary’ 
ISP self-regulation codes and courts orders on the one hand, and blocking and ‘throttling’ by 
ISPs on the other hand. This is convenient for centralised content providers and ISPs since it 
shuts down what can be an effective and decentralised content distribution system via the 
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Internet which might make content delivery networks and direct peering relationships 
between major online and services providers and ISPs redundant or at least seen as less 
necessary to facilitate the effective delivery and storage of content. Indeed, P2P content 
distribution/streaming networks could ensure that bandwidth is no longer a major obstacle to 
effective services. They can do this by distributing content or fragments of content across the 
participating peers’ computers, with the fragments being streamed in order to the requesting 
user according to the peers closest to the user, and in doing so can economise on 
bandwidth.328 However, due to this lobbying and legal action against P2P networks, corporate 
content providers retain their online distribution monopoly and strengthen the case for online 
traffic prioritisation. Perhaps the Spanish court decision mentioned above which recognised 
the legitimate uses of P2P as well as the illegitimate may signal the beginning of a change in 
attitude towards the permissibility of P2P networks, to the benefit of users and their 
autonomy, as well as rendering content delivery networks less attractive. 
 
 
c) Mesh networks 
 
A further technical solution to net neutrality issues, particularly control and monitoring by the 
ISP itself can be found in mesh networking. Mesh networking consists of each node of the 
network relaying data for the network, and all nodes cooperating in the distribution of data in 
a peer-to-peer fashion. Mesh networks are usually (but not always) wireless and 
decentralised, and their main deployment so far has been in emergency situations to provide 
telecommunications infrastructure. Effectively, such mesh networks are owned and operated 
by their users, and provide an alternative, disruptive commons-based P2P option to using the 
cable and DSL networks provided by ISPs for data that is created by a node of the network 
and destined for another node of the same network. 
 
Mesh networks can potentially advance online user autonomy since they typically have no 
central regulatory authority and can be conceptualised as a sort of private decentralised 
intranet: one must connect to the network in order to monitor its traffic, resisting censorship 
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and surveillance by gatekeepers. 329  Thus, ‘mesh networking represents an alternative 
perspective to traditional governance models based on top-down regulation and centralized 
control’.330  
 
As regards the net neutrality debate, mesh networks represent a potential means of 
sidestepping reliance on the radical monopoly of centralised corporate ISPs for network 
access, and thus their network management practices. While operating mesh networks may 
require more technical expertise than the average Internet user has, investment and education 
could be used to remedy this. 
 
However, the decentralised nature of mesh networks poses problems of control for both the 
nation-state and private sector and so is it not a surprise that mesh networks have not been 
promoted by either beyond emergency situations and for network access in authoritarian 
regimes when ‘Internet kill-switches’ have been used. Arguably mesh networks are in a fairly 
primitive and non-user friendly state given the lack of enthusiasm from the state and 
corporations. 
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the situation of corporate dominance and Internet provision, 
particularly through the lens of the net neutrality debate over the extent to which corporate 
ISPs should be permitted to manage the Internet traffic passing through their networks. This 
debate has widened into a consideration of the role of corporately-run content delivery 
networks which seek to give their content and services faster access to users through the 
alternative model of interconnection agreements. 
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The current legal and regulatory situation in the EU, with reference to the US, has been 
presented, with the neoliberal, light-touch regulatory trends discouraging interference with 
telecoms markets and giving prominence to competition law as a principal tool for addressing 
whatever problems remain.  
 
However, the rise of net neutrality as a subject of debate demonstrates the failings of this 
model from the perspective of users, since it would seem that only entities with market power 
acting in certain non-net neutral ways may warrant regulatory intervention. Furthermore, this 
model does not address the free expression problems created by non-net neutral conduct, nor 
the prospect of advancing digital divides and declining media pluralism in such 
circumstances. In addition, ‘real’ alternatives such as those incorporating P2P design are not 
supported by the current model, so Illich’s ‘radical monopoly’ can be said to exist for the 
most part in Internet provision in the EU and US, aside from a few European ISPs which are 
still (partially) state-owned, and even then there is a top-down, centralised approach to 
Internet provision in these public entities as well. 
 
While the European Parliament’s proposals for net neutrality regulation are to be welcomed in 
terms of concentrating on the harm to Internet users that non-net neutral conduct can entail, 
they may be conceptualised as being ‘too little, too late’, given technology has moved on and 
processes which may not be covered by the regulation, namely content delivery networks, 
have similar consequences to ISPs acting in a discriminatory way vis-à-vis traffic which is 
already on their own networks. 
 
In order to address content delivery networks as well as ISPs’ discrimination, interconnection 
agreements may provide another object for regulation.331 Certainly these agreements could be 
subject to greater transparency as a first step.332 More ‘invasive’ regulation could encompass 
obligations on ISPs, especially large ones, to accept traffic bound for their own customers ie 
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users without payment.333 
 
If bandwidth and quality of service are issues for the delivery of content and services online, 
then there are other options but these are not popular with corporate power since they 
generally involve decentralised peer to peer design. P2P filesharing has been demonised in 
the public narrative as facilitating illegal conduct but this obscures the technical advantages of 
P2P design as well as the user-autonomy-enhancing aspects. P2P solutions such as filesharing 
services and mesh networks represent a potentially radical alternative for the Internet 
infrastructure which would resist the economic or otherwise concentrations of power, and 
thus enhance users’ autonomy.  
  
                                                             
333
 Kevin D Werbach, ‘Only Connect’ (2008) 22(4) Berkeley Technology Law Journal  
 150 
  
  
 151 
  
CHAPTER 4: DOMINANCE AND INTERNET SEARCH 
 
Search is an especially important part of the Internet ecosystem, since it is one very important 
(perhaps the most important) way in which information on the World Wide Web, a major part 
of the Internet’s application layer, is made legible and findable for users. The rise of 
applications or 'apps' (application software) and online app stores for Internet-enabled mobile 
devices may be beginning to challenge search engines as a way of making sense of and 
finding information on the Web, but they do not (yet) encompass the entirety of that 
information, nor do they try to do so, although they are another gateway through which users 
can access information (and indeed, there are also search engine apps – which will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 following this one).  
 
This chapter will look at search engines, their online markets and will have a particular focus 
on US and EU market leader, Google.334 Google is the focus of this chapter since it has 
dominated online search (and its associated market of online advertising) over the last ten 
years in the US and much of the EU, and accordingly has been the subject of antitrust 
investigations into alleged abuses of its dominant position in online search and advertising 
markets in both jurisdictions. Yet the effect of Google’s information monopoly is more than 
just economic, but as will be seen in this chapter, these non-economic concerns are not 
addressed by competition law, nor other areas of the law – leaving a ‘gap’ where user 
autonomy is not adequately protected or promoted.  
 
Here, the market developments leading to Google's dominance will be analysed, following by 
a description of the problems associated with Google's dominance for online data flows and 
users’ autonomy. Then whether Google is indeed behaving abusively and acting in 
contravention of competition law will be considered, followed by the extent to which 
competition law remedies can address the problems of dominance already identified, as well 
as whether residual problems can be addressed by other legal regimes or extra-legally for the 
benefit of users’ autonomy online.  
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4.1 Problems in the market for search 
 
Google’s search engine operates by employing various processes.335 Firstly, it runs a program 
which indexes web pages by ‘crawling’ ie following links from page to page (which website 
owners can opt out of), and then sorts the pages it indexes by their content and other factors. 
Then, when a search term is entered into Google’s search engine, it uses algorithms to deliver 
results from the indexed web pages which are ‘relevant’ to the search term. Google then 
displays the relevant results in the search results page. Precisely how Google’s search 
algorithm works to deliver these relevant results is only partially publicly known. For 
instance, it is known that some of these factors include the type of content, the quality of 
content, how recent the content is, the user’s region, and how many other sites link to that one 
and how important those linking sites are in terms of traffic and prominence. Google has a 
program called PageRank which assigns a ‘score’ to websites on this basis of traffic and 
prominence, which then entails these pages are presented higher in Google’s search results 
page.  
 
Google as a dominant search engine presents various problems for online information flows. 
There are some 'classical' competition problems stemming from dominance, such as the 
potential leveraging and bundling services, as well as some more novel issues, such as how 
competition law can interact with the use of supposedly 'neutral' algorithms and the 
relationship between the user data that is collected, the protection of that data and privacy, 
and competition in the market. However, as will be explored in detail below, an economically 
dominant, private for-profit player such as Google can also use its dominant position in a way 
which has 'non-economic' consequences for users, inasmuch as users do not pay higher prices 
(especially since Google's search is offered free of charge to them, subsidised by advertising 
and data collection and analysis), but do experience issues of biased information filtering and 
infringements of their privacy and data protection which go beyond the economic realm. 
 
 
a) Access to information 
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Search engines have been identified as 'the new virtual gatekeepers of Cyberspace' because of 
their pivotal role in locating and filtering information relevant to users,336 thus exercising 
some major control over access to information. Both users and advertisers, forming each 
‘side’ of the two sided market in which corporate search engines act as the platform can face 
economic and non-economic problems with the way in which search engines operate as 
gatekeepers of information. 
 
The problem of users with search engines is one of access to information: a search engine is a 
portal though which users experience the World Wide Web. If a user does a search and 
information which all things being equal should come up in the results page does not appear, 
and the search engine has had an active role in ensuring that information does not appear, then 
this can be characterised as a censorship of sorts (or editorial control of other sorts). 
Furthermore, even if certain information is not entirely blocked from the results pages, if it 
can be said to be ‘relevant’ (all else being equal) or even very relevant and does not appear on 
the first page or even on the first five pages then it may be effectively unavailable to users 
who generally will not go beyond these first few pages of results,337 and thus being relegated 
to the ‘periphery’ of the Web.338 Assuming there is a competitive market, then according to 
neoclassical economic theory, if a search engine does not provide a user with the results she is 
seeking, she will switch to a competitor which does provide these results. However, if the 
market for search engines is dominated by one entity or a small group of entities, as is the 
case in both the US and EU, then the user may not be able to obtain the results she wants, and 
have her searches restricted either according to the economic interests and/or the ideological 
bearing of the dominant player(s). 
 
The problem that entities wanting either their products or services to appear in an engine's 
search results or wanting to buy advertising space with a search engine so that their products 
or services are featured in the ‘Sponsored Links’ (Google's paid advertising) face is one of 
visibility, that they want their products and services to be as visible as possible to users 
searching for relevant terms using the search engine. However, there are also commercially-
driven reasons why Google might manipulate the results, especially the results of other 
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entities. Google in particular has a host of other services apart from simple search: for 
instance, Google has its own price comparison search engines which compete with other price 
comparison sites not operated by ‘generic’ search engines. Google may want its own sites to 
appear higher in the results than those of their non-vertically integrated competitors. Again, if 
the market is competitive, then these entities wanting to advertise could go to a competing 
search engine or advertising platform; however, if the market is dominated by one or a group 
of players acting together, such as seems to be the case with Google, then the option to use 
another search engine is not such a strong alternative, and so being ‘invisible’ or far down the 
search results rankings in the search engine which is dominant or part of the dominant group 
then the advertiser is left in a position with no other realistic choice. Indeed, this scenario 
makes up part of the competition complaint against Google to the European Commission, 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
b) Expansionist tendencies 
 
Search engines and particularly Google have been seen to have expansionist tendencies, that 
search is just one part of an ecosystem owned by the same company, and often products and 
services interact with each other. So the threat is from vertical integration of Google with 
other upstream or downstream products and services, and the potential for leveraging 
Google's dominant position for search into other markets. In terms of harm, this would 
comprise principally economic prejudice, and to Google's competitors at whatever part of the 
value chain. However, there are also broader concerns about the emergence of an incredibly 
large for-profit entity such as Google, whose core business may be online search and 
advertising but has expanded into numerous other areas, from its latest acquisition of Internet 
of Things company Nest to the building of a fibre optic network in parts of the US and its 
mass digitisation of books, and the influence of this accumulation of power on the politics 
(and political economy) of information and technology, and society more generally. Also, 
thanks to the ‘Invisible Handshake’ between data-gathering corporations such as Google and 
the nation-state, laid bare in Snowden’s NSA revelations, large and pervasive entities such as 
Google are co-opted to monitor their users’ conduct for the State’s benefit, with more 
contextualisation provided by collecting data about users from Google’s myriad products and 
services.  
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This acquisition of other companies in new media and technology markets seems to have 
contributed to Google emerging as a leading player in online search and advertising. While 
EU and US authorities investigated two mergers involving Google, they were eventually 
approved. Furthermore, some of Google’s acquisitions which were not scrutinised were 
subsequently the subject of competition investigations. For example, Google bought 
YouTube, the video-sharing website, in 2006, and the acquisition was approved both by both 
of the US authorities (Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission) 
unconditionally. Google also acquired Android mobile software in 2005, with no scrutiny 
from merger authorities.  
 
In 2011 the Department of Justice approved Google buying ITA, the travel software company, 
although it did attach certain conditions, including that Google continue to license ITA's QPX 
software to other airfare websites on commercially reasonable terms, that Google continue to 
fund research and development of this product at similar levels to what ITA had invested prior 
to the merger, and that Google implement firewall restrictions within the company to prevent 
the unauthorised use of competitively sensitive information and data gathered from ITA's 
customers.339 Absent these conditions, the fear was that Google’s competitors would not have 
had access to ITA’s software which was considered to be the leading producer of airfare 
pricing and shopping software in the US, for use by travel search engines. However, the DoJ 
did not discuss at all the possibility of Google using its general search engine to leverage its 
dominance into the market for travel search, which seems to be the object of the antitrust 
complaint against Google regarding this service. This may be due to this merger being 
considered a conglomerate merger, in which competition authorities tend to forbear from 
applying merger law. 
 
While the US authorities are seen as having a record of being less suspicious of mergers 
which may lead to exclusionary effects than their EU counterparts340 due to inter alia a non-
interventionalist ideology coming from the neoliberal Chicago School and implemented 
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during the Reagan administration,341 the adoption of the ‘more economic approach’ in EU 
merger control can be seen as a move towards similar ‘rigorous’ economics-based merger 
analysis, with the result that in theory conglomerate mergers in the EU will usually not give 
rise to anticompetitive effects (according to this method of analysis) or these effects will be 
offset by ‘efficiency gains’ eg in the form of cost savings.342  
 
Two major mergers involving Google were analysed in both the EU and US before eventually 
being approved. 
 
In the DoubleClick merger, which represented the first merger the European Commission had 
to assess since adopting its Non Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2007 which reflected the 
‘more economic approach’, the Commission acknowledged that both firms were active in the 
“online advertising” industry, which seems to comprise a value chain containing various 
parts: companies that sell advertising space, companies that sell ad-serving services (ie 
making sure the correct ad is sent or ‘served’ to the correct space), and advert exchanges. The 
Commission looked at the potential harm from Google buying DoubleClick ie Google 
controlling the leading supplier of a key input into distribution channels that compete with its 
own ad network and also the combination would form a conglomerate of products that could 
be purchased together.  
 
Despite both parties being active in the online advertising industry, they mainly dealt with 
different kinds of advertisement: Google principally offered advertising space for search 
(text) and contextual (text) adverts, whereas DoubleClick’s ad serving services were mainly 
used for (non-search) display ads. Nevertheless, the Commission left the question of whether 
search and non-search ads constituted different markets open, since it considered that even if 
separate markets were defined, the merger still did not raise competition concerns. However, 
the Commission’s market investigation did define separate markets for display ad serving 
technology (such as that provided by DoubleClick) and text ad serving technology due to 
differences in the features available to users. In any event, the Commission found that 
DoubleClick and Google were not competing on the same markets: DoubleClick was not 
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providing online advertising space and Google was not providing ad serving tools except 
bundled with other advertising services (and this was not substitutable for stand-alone third 
party ad serving tools such as DoubleClick’s).  
 
Regarding the horizontal effects of the merger, from the perspective of actual competition, the 
Commission found that ad serving represented a very small part of the total cost of online 
advertising, DoubleClick was subject to competitive constraints from other providers of third 
party display ad serving tools, and Google’s ‘bundled’ advertising services and non-bundled 
services such as that provided by DoubleClick were not close alternatives. As regards 
potential competition, while both Google and DoubleClick were in the early stages of 
entering other parts of the online advertising value chain (DoubleClick was developing an 
intermediation platform and Google was developing ad serving tools that would have 
competed with DoubleClick), the Commission considered that they would still face 
competitive pressure in these markets from other entities, and it was unlikely that 
anticompetitive foreclosure would arise from the acquisition. In the end, the Commission 
allowed the merger to proceed.  
 
However, the Commission’s decision can be criticised based on survey evidence produced by 
Hahn and Singer, which suggested that Google and DoubleClick did compete with each other, 
since advertisers viewed search and contextual ads on the one hand and graphic display ads 
on the other hand as substitutes, as well as perceiving that Google’s services were a next-best 
alternative to DoubleClick’s, with the implication that the merger would be bad for 
competition and harmful for online advertisers since the combined entity would have an 
incentive to increase the price of DoubleClick’s services compared to when DoubleClick was 
independent.343 
 
Furthermore, the US FTC also cleared the Google DoubleClick merger, yet Commissioner 
Pamela Jones Harbour dissented from the majority view and was concerned about how the 
‘combination of Google and DoubleClick likely will affect the evolution of the entire online 
market – especially in light of existing network effects’, referring specifically to the 
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acquisition of data by Google that the merger would entail.344 In addition, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor criticised the Commission’s analysis of the Google DoubleClick merger 
due to insufficient regard being given to the merger’s effect on combining each company’s 
datasets, with the possibility of providing new services that were not envisaged when the data 
was originally submitted by users, thereby ‘neglecting the longer term impact on the welfare 
of millions of users’. 345  The implications of these statements are that Google’s position 
overall would have been unfairly strengthened by this acquisition of data from DoubleClick’s 
customers, and that there might have been implications for EU data protection law as well 
given data had originally been collected for a certain purpose ie for the use of DoubleClick’s 
services, and that data was now in a position that it could be used by the merged entity for 
new services. In EU data protection law, personal data can only be collected under certain 
circumstances, one of which is consent of the ‘data subject’ for the processing of the data for 
a particular purpose, so if the purpose changes, or new purposes are added, then in theory the 
data subject’s consent should be sought again for these new purposes. However, the European 
Commission’s conduct demonstrated a lack of concern for privacy within the context of 
‘consumer welfare’ – an approach which may have to be modified now in the wake of the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the possible constitutionalisation of competition 
law this may provoke. 
 
The Motorola Mobility merger involved Google's purchase of a smartphone and tablet 
computer developer. This again could be classed as vertical with Google as a provider of 
various online services including search and the Android operating system used on 
smartphones and Motorola Mobility as a supplier of mobile devices and holder of important 
intellectual property rights for these devices.  
 
In terms of harm, in the Commission investigation the issue of the 'conglomerate relationship' 
between Google and Motorola Mobility was raised ie the danger of Google’s acquisition of 
Motorola Mobility and its patents allowing Google to engage in exclusionary conduct, thus 
strengthening its market power in mobile search and search advertising.346  Specifically this 
could be done by Google only licensing the patents it has gained from the merger to other 
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mobile equipment manufacturers on the condition that they install Google’s mobile services 
and potentially also forcing them to set the mobile services as default, or by offering the 
manufacturers more favourable terms for licensing the patents if they install Google’s mobile 
services. This concern was dismissed, not because it was not a real fear, but because Google 
already had this capacity pre-merger to impose its own services on manufacturers and 
network operators through the licensing of its Android operating system, and in fact there are 
already agreements which force manufacturers which want to pre-install Google mobile 
services on the equipment to set Google search as the default search engine and must pre-
install a minimum suite of core Google mobile services (although users could still download 
competing services onto their devices, change the default setting and access most computing 
services through the web browser of their device – this will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter).347  
 
It seems that by the point of this merger, Google had already expanded sufficiently that even 
before the purchase of Motorola Mobility it had the ability to impose its own services on 
network operators and handset manufacturers, and so the effect of this further expansion was 
negligible on the power Google had already amassed. Google's activity in the device market 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, but interestingly Google's use of the Motorola 
Mobility patents formed part of its settlement with the FTC. 
 
These mergers thus demonstrate Google’s expansionist tendencies which have been 
‘conglomerate’ in their character as well as relating to different parts of the search and 
advertising supply chain. They also demonstrate that, in hindsight, merger control has not 
been particularly effective in addressing competition concerns brought about by Google’s 
acquisition of these other companies, given some of the acquired products have been the 
subject of, or related to, allegations of abuse of dominance against Google. Furthermore, 
while conglomerate mergers have increased the size and potency of Google, they are not 
adequately addressed by current theories of merger control prevalent in the US and EU, and 
so give rise to very large entities which have an ability to influence markets but also, in 
Google’s case anyway, areas beyond the market.  
 
Google’s ever-expanding size and portfolio can be conceptualised as exactly the kind of 
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private power accumulation which concerned the ordoliberals. Indeed, Google’s vast (and 
ever growing) concentration of power encompasses political as well as economic.348 This 
influence may pose problems for the democratic process (especially in the US), and 
democratic oversight over such an accumulation of power. 
 
 
c) Bias 
 
Problems with bias in how search engines give their results have been identified in academic 
literature from computer science and politics. Search engines, including Google, like to claim 
that their results are generated in a ‘technical’ or ‘mechanical’ way and so are untainted by 
favouring certain results beyond their ‘relevance’ to the search, but the methods they use to 
determine results are designed in particular ways which have this effect, whether intentionally 
or not, and involve the value judgements of humans regarding how to collect and present the 
data.349 While search engines are usually very secretive about how their ranking algorithms 
work, Google recently announced that it prioritises secure websites in its search results, in a 
rare admission of how its algorithm works (at least in part).350 
 
From a computer science perspective, Vaughan and Thelwell found that search engines are 
biased in favour of sites coming from the US (at least compared to the other countries 
examined in the study), and this was not to do with language (ie the use of English) but 
instead a site's 'visibility', namely the number of other sites that link to it seems to be a source 
of bias: in general, the more sites already indexed by the search engine that link to a site, the 
more of that site will be covered by the search engine.351 'Unequal coverage' of websites by 
search engines for the authors is a result of various 'technical' factors including site link 
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counts, the exponential growth of the Web, the early start the US had in creating websites and 
a possible tendency for sites to link to others in the same country.352 Furthermore, Edelman’s 
study of Google’s search results suggests that Google has ‘hard-coded’ (ie manually adjusted) 
its own links to its other products and services so as to appear at the top of algorithmic search 
results.353 Edelman points out the possibility of algorithms themselves being biased, and goes 
further to express doubt as to whether all Google’s search results are always generated by 
algorithm, despite what Google claims. 
 
Furthermore, Introna and Nissenbaum argue that search engines systematically exclude (both 
by design and accidentally) certain sites and certain types of sites in favour of others and 
systematically make some more prominent at the expense of others, which they argue is a 
political issue.354 They suggest that Internet users are most likely to find 'popular, large, sites 
whose designers have enough technical savvy to succeed in the ranking game, and especially 
those sites whose proprietors are able to pay for various means of improving their site's 
positioning',355 and that smaller, less popular sites with less resources to pay for professional 
help to climb search ranking are less likely to be found and even if they are found, are more 
likely to be listed lower down in the rankings.356  
 
While competitive pressures could limit search bias, it is particularly problematic for ‘online 
information credibility and accessibility’ where there is a dominant search engine leaving 
consumers without meaningful choices.357 Certain manifestations of bias such as the search 
engine favouring its own products in different markets could constitute anticompetitive 
behaviour. However, as will be discussed later in this chapter in greater detail, this conduct in 
practice does not appear to be an abuse of Google’s dominance. In addition, it would seem 
some element of bias is necessary in search engines’ operation, or at least how search engines 
operate and how they produce results involves certain value choices regarding information to 
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include, prioritisation, ‘relevance’ and so on.358 Furthermore, it may be desirable to keep 
certain content out of search results, such as that from ‘spammers, fraudsters and 
malcontents’.359 Yet, this does not entail that the status quo is socially desirable, and the 
problematic effects of bias, while not necessarily anticompetitive, are likely to be exacerbated 
by a concentrated market and a lack of real choice for users. 
 
 
d) Privacy and data protection 
 
Privacy concerns over users' information and search engines have become prominent in 
recent years, especially given the diversification of Google into other areas beyond search and 
advertising (such as Google's social network, ownership of YouTube etc) which allows it to 
collect an even larger about of data about users' searches, preferences etc. This is also 
exacerbated by recent revelations that the data collected by major Internet companies 
including Google can be passed on to government agencies, including those of foreign states 
such as the US NSA without warrants being issued.  
 
At the crux of privacy concerns is Google's collection and use of user data. In the EU there is 
a comprehensive data protection regime which applies to private entities, and has its 
foundation in the Data Protection Directive from 1995 (whose revision is under discussion at 
the time of writing).360 The Directive regulates the processing of personal data in the EU, 
which can only happen under limited circumstances fulfilling the criteria of transparency, 
legitimate purpose and proportionality, and fines can be issued for violations of these rules. 
The protection of personal data is also found as a separate right in the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.361 
 
Google has been the subject of data protection concerns and regulatory action in various EU 
Member States. Google has been fined for not sufficiently identifying its Street View image-
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capturing cars in Italy,362 and for these cars hoovering up data from open wifi networks (such 
as emails, photos and passwords) in Germany.363 However, it was Google’s modification of 
its Privacy Policy in 2012 in which it asserted the right to use personal data collected from 
one of its services in the functioning of its other services thereby merging several pieces of 
user data into one profile, that has given rise to a host of complaints and investigations by 
national data protection authorities in Europe.364 The authorities in Spain and France have 
already issued Google with fines for this conduct, due to the combination of data collected 
through Google’s different services greatly exceeding the reasonable expectations of the 
majority of users, Google hindering users in exercising their rights of access, rectification, 
cancellation and opposition, Google not providing its users with sufficient information 
regarding the conditions and purposes under which their personal data is processed, and 
Google not seeking adequate consent for its activities from these users.365 
 
However, there is criticism of the level of fines that can be imposed on the finding of a data 
protection breach – that they are so low in level and not always enforced that large firms may 
find it more profitable to breach the laws and pay the fines rather than to follow the law in the 
first place.366 Indeed, much higher fines (in line with fines for anti-competitive conduct) have 
been proposed as part of the revision to European data protection law currently under 
discussion.367 
 
The US approach to data protection has generally been one of self-regulation, although 
growing concerns around data protection have led the FTC to respond from a consumer 
protection perspective, such as its settlements with Facebook, Google and Twitter over 
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consumer privacy, its lobbying for legislative intervention regarding 'data brokers' ie entities 
which compile and trade data about consumers and its forceful push of the 'do not track' 
mechanism.368  Nevertheless, at the time of writing the lack of EU-US convergence has been 
thrown into sharp relief during the EU's process of formulating its new Data Protection 
Regulation, which has been subjected to an unprecedented amount of lobbying from the US 
in order that the final text of the regulation does not subject US companies handling EU 
citizens' data to what they see as overly strenuous conditions.369  
 
In particular, the proposals for a new data protection regime would extend the scope of the 
rules to organisations based outside the EU which process the personal data of EU residents 
(which of course would be of particular concern to transnational corporations such as Google 
which is American in its origins and presumably transfers data, including the personal data of 
Europeans between data centres in different parts of the world).370 The proposals would also 
require entities processing personal data to seek explicit consent from the data subject in 
circumstances in which this consent is required, and this consent cannot be assumed.371 
Furthermore, the proposals introduce a ‘right to be forgotten’, which would entail personal 
data being deleted when an individual no longer wants this data to be processed and there are 
no legitimate grounds for retaining it.372 Finally, the proposals also envisage a (limited) right 
to data portability for data subjects, when their personal data is processed electronically and 
in ‘a structured and commonly used format’.373 
 
The lack of similar protection of personal data in the US has raised questions over whether 
antitrust law can be used as a means of protecting privacy. Indeed, it has been argued there 
that antitrust law should take into account privacy concerns in its analysis from a consumer 
perspective, since anticompetitive practices can cause harm to consumers which is not purely 
financial, and the accumulation of market power by firms such as Google exacerbates the 
problem since consumers/users are left without meaningful choices when these firms invade 
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their privacy since there are few or no competitors.374 However, as mentioned before in this 
thesis in the initial two chapters, antitrust law is not well-equipped to deal with non-economic 
harm, inasmuch as such considerations may well be outside the legal authority of the 
competition authorities: for instance the majority opinion of US Federal Trade Commission in 
its scrutiny of the Google DoubleClick merger acknowledged the privacy concerns around 
this acquisition, but stated that the consideration of such concerns in an antitrust review were 
beyond the scope of its authority, and consumer privacy as a ‘non-price attribute’ was not 
harmed in any event by the merger.375  Aside from a lack of legal authority, competition 
authorities may not have the sufficient expertise to deal with such non-economic concerns, 
and in certain jurisdictions it may also be viewed as breaching the separation of powers for 
such an institution to get involved with such ’socio-political’ issues.  
 
Whether privacy and data protection concerns can be taken account of by competition law is 
debatable - and has already been discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 - but it seems evident 
that the current configuration of incentives for Internet companies is detrimental to users’ 
privacy and data protection since it encourages the collection and monetisation of their 
information, alongside the 'trade' of these protections by users for free services. 376 
Furthermore, potential conflict between the two regimes could amount to a dominant entity 
(which is accused of violating competition law) invoking a privacy-tailored regulatory 
conduct defence (ie its obligation to protection consumers’ privacy) to a claim that it is 
leveraging its sole control over a large amount of user data to impede or eliminate 
competition in the market. In sum, user privacy may entail that entities which gather a large 
amount of personal information about users, such as Google, should not share that 
information with competitors lest data protection law be infringed.  
 
Indeed this problematic scenario was mentioned by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
in a recent Preliminary Opinion on the interplay between data protection, competition and 
consumer protection in the context of ‘big data’ mentioned already in Chapter 2. He 
considered that the collection and control of very large amounts of personal data are a source 
of market power for large players in European Internet markets, yet access to these datasets 
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by competitors may be stymied by data protection rules that require data subjects’ consent for 
such a new use (or adherence to other legitimate grounds), and ‘this is a substantial hurdle 
under data protection law’.377 Thus, adherence to data protection law may facilitate what 
would otherwise be anticompetitive conduct over the use and control of users’ personal data. 
 
 
4.2 Search engines and market developments 
 
Search engines initially appeared soon after the creation of the World Wide Web as a means to 
organise and catalogue websites and information. The experience with the initial search 
engines during the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrated a competitive market during this 
period, characterised by first mover advantages which declined over time and whose 
continuance were dependent on innovating to provide a superior product, suggesting low 
barriers to entry and strong competition.378 Indeed, the last two decades have seen the rise and 
fall of many players in the search engine market.379 This suggests that the markets for search 
engines are characterised by Schumpeter's ‘creative destruction’, and that competition is for 
the market rather than within the market.380  
 
Furthermore, search engine markets can be described as 'two-sided'. Two-sided markets are 
markets in which a platform enables interactions between end-users and tries to engage both 
'sides' of the market by charging each set of end-users appropriately.381 For search engines, on 
the one side are Internet users searching for information on the Web, and on the other side are 
advertisers which pay for their adverts to be displayed in search results – the platform is the 
search engines itself which causes these two sides to meet and interact. The largest, 
generalised search engines do not charge users to use the service, and instead their revenue 
comes solely from the advertisers. Some more specialised search engines such as legal search 
engines (eg Westlaw, Lexis Nexis) have different business models and charge users for access 
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to their services; sometimes they have advertising too, but sometimes not. It is also 
conceivable that a search engine could operate without advertisements and without charging 
users, making revenue by selling data about users, their behaviour and their preferences to 
advertising agencies for use in advertising elsewhere. 
 
In addition, the market for search engines has been observed to exhibit network effects which 
potentially encourage concentration.382 The network effects in this two-sided market operate 
such that an increase in users adds value for advertisers since more people will see their 
advertisements, and an increase in advertisers using the platform causes users to experience 
increased value as well since each additional advertiser hands over more funding to the search 
engine to provide free services for users as well as the continuing development and 
refinement of the search engine itself. 
 
Although the search engine market appeared to be competitive in the 1990s and into the early 
2000s, this would no longer seem to be the case. The market appears to be more consolidated 
now than before and there are various reasons for this development from competition to 
Google's dominance (as well as this being a common feature of competition for the market). 
Van Couvering posits that this concentration is due to search provision being capital-
intensive, requiring large investment in hardware, software and connection capacity.383 With 
the huge growth of the Internet as well since the 1990s, perhaps at one time search engines 
could be set up and used without such large capital costs, but in order to serve a large number 
of users worldwide well search engines currently need such investments in their capacity. 
Furthermore, Van Couvering identified the introduction of 'paid-performance ads' ie the paid 
advertising that appears in specific parts of search engine result pages when users search for 
certain terms, which she argues has strengthened the position of search providers since they 
provide this service which targets advertising more precisely to consumers' interests than the 
blanket advertising which was previously used, as well as the fact that search engines control 
the paid-performance advertising networks AdWords (Google) and Overture (Yahoo! - now 
known as Yahoo! Search Marketing).384   
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In this context, Google specifically emerging as a market leader can be attributed its early 
innovation in providing a ‘better’ search service than that which was currently on offer to 
users, through developing a better search algorithm which relied on reputation (measured by 
links from other pages to that page) as well as text matching to provide the most relevant 
results, and building on its increasing experience of search to deliver even more relevant 
advertising through paid results, which ended up having greatly more credibility than 
previous search engines' paid results that may have been advertising an entirely different 
product or service from that for which the search was made.385  
 
This observation as to the development of paid-performance ads and the more precise 
targeting of advertising to users seems implicitly to suggest the growing importance of user 
data collection by search engines, which also presents problems for privacy and data 
protection as mentioned above. The collection of information about users and their behaviour 
is also discussed below as constituting a barrier to entry in the online search and advertising 
markets since this accumulation of data is used to entrench the position of the leading search 
engines, especially Google, which is widely viewed as the dominant firm among search 
engines in Europe and the United States. Although the market for search in the past was 
characterised by low entry barriers and frequent new entrants, the current state of the market 
alongside the pivotal importance of the collection, analysis and sale of user data suggests that 
the entry barriers are now at least higher than they were previously.386 
 
Furthermore, Google has been able to entrench its leading position in the market for search 
also due to offering other ‘free’ services to users such as Gmail (although that contains 
advertisements, so 'free' inasmuch as Google search is free) and Google Docs (which does not 
contain advertisements).387 In this way, users are introduced into the Google 'ecosystem', 
which gives Google more opportunities to target adverts more accurately, and a huge amount 
more data about its users and their preferences which it can use to improve its search function 
and reinforce its commercial strength. 
 
If Google is a dominant monopoly, then the initial legal solution to any problems arising from 
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that situation (such as those identified in the previous section) would be found in competition 
law, since unlike ISPs discussed in the previous chapter, search engines are not subject to any 
sector-specific ex ante regulation. Indeed, Google has been investigated for alleged 
anticompetitive conduct in both the US and EU regarding the functioning of its search and 
advertising business. From here, these complaints leading to the competition investigations 
will be outlined, Google’s dominance will be assessed by examining the relevant market, 
Google’s market share and competitive constraints to determine whether it does indeed have 
this dominant position. Then the complaints against Google which have been at issue in these 
competition investigations regarding the core functioning of the search engine will be 
considered. The extent to which Google’s conduct is actually anticompetitive along with the 
outcomes of the investigations will be assessed, followed by the extent to which these 
outcomes, and other applicable areas of law such as data protection, address the concerns 
with Google’s search engine mentioned in the previous section and thus protect and promote 
user autonomy. 
 
 
4.3 EU investigation into Google 
 
The European Commission opened its investigation into Google in November 2010 for an 
alleged abuse of dominant position contrary to Art 102 TFEU.388 This investigation is the 
largest and most significant competition investigation into Google to date and is still ongoing 
at the time of writing. Currently the Commission and Google appear to have reached a 
settlement in the wake of various previous proposals from Google that were rejected by the 
Commission. This section will examine the complaints against Google, whether Google is 
actually behaving anticompetitively according to EU competition law, and will consider the 
commitments offered by Google to the Commission. 
 
 
a) Complaints against Google  
 
The European Commission’s investigation was launched in 2010 after complaints were 
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received from Google’s competitors – price comparison site Foundem, ejustice.fr (a French 
legal search engine) and German shopping site Ciao (owned by Microsoft), whose services 
are known as ‘vertical search’ – that Google was treating them unfavorably in its search 
results (both ‘organic’ or unpaid results, and the ‘sponsored’ or paid results), and was 
discriminating in favor of its own versions of these services. In 2012, the Commission issued 
a communication inviting Google to offer commitments to remedy the Commission’s 
concerns about anticompetitive behavior. 
 
There appear to be four parts to the Commission’s investigation into Google. Firstly, Google 
is alleged to have engaged in anticompetitive behaviour by lowering the rank of the unpaid 
search results of services which competed with Google (in particular, vertical search services 
providing users with specific online content such as price comparisons), and to have accorded 
preferential placement to the results of its own versions of these services in order to foreclose 
its competitors.389 Secondly, Google is alleged to have lowered the ‘Quality Score’ for the 
sponsored links of such competing vertical search engines (the Quality Score influences the 
likelihood of an ad to be displayed by Google and the ranking of that ad in the search results, 
and is a factor in determining the price paid by advertisers to Google). Thirdly, it is alleged 
that Google imposed exclusivity obligations on its advertising partners which prevented them 
from placing certain types of competing adverts on their own websites with the aim of 
foreclosing competing search engines (it is also alleged that Google imposed this obligation 
on computer and software vendors). Fourthly, there are allegations that Google placed 
restrictions on the use of online advertising campaign data by competing advertising 
platforms (ie other ‘virtual marketplaces’ offering advertising space on the Internet).  
 
The first two categories of complaint will be the focus of this analysis since they relate 
directly to how Google operates its user-facing search engine, as opposed to the latter two 
complaints which concern how Google operates its online advertising services. In addition, 
these latter two complaints have been addressed by commitments from Google that it will 
remove exclusivity requirements in search advertising agreements with publishers and it will 
remove restrictions on the ability for search advertising campaigns to be run on competing 
platforms.390 
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b) Is Google behaving anticompetitively in Europe? 
 
While it seems that in the EU, Google and the Commission will reach an agreement regarding 
Google’s design and display in its search results pages, it is not clear whether Google is 
actually behaving anticompetitively, since such an agreement does not constitute a finding of 
wrongdoing. Here, whether Google has a dominant position in the EU will be assessed, by 
determining the relevant market, Google’s market share, and the competitive constraints it 
experiences, and then the extent to which Google’s conduct fits into a recognised category of 
abuse will be considered. 
 
 
(i) Relevant market and market share 
 
Traditional competition analysis firstly requires that the relevant market is defined, and here 
some guidance as to how market definition should be conducted can be provided from the 
European Commission's two merger decisions involving Google, as well as the current 
investigation.  
 
In the EU, markets are defined based on the substitutability of the product or service at hand 
from the consumer's point of view and geographical area. However, in the new media 
environment, market definition has been recognised as being a more complex endeavour, both 
due to the transnational nature of digitised products and services proving challenging for 
geographic definition, as well as the actual conceptual defining of the products and services at 
hand, along with their substitutability. Furthermore, elements such as 'free pricing' and the 
existence of a two-sided market which are common on the Internet complicate matters even 
more, for instance making the test for defining the market, which in Europe is the small but 
significant non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) more complex, since for consumers they 
do not pay anything for Google's search service, which is instead funded by advertising 
revenue.  
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Google's online search and advertising business can be 
conceptualised as a two-sided market. Users do not pay for this service, although Google does 
gather data about them and their preferences when they make these searches and uses this 
data for its own purposes as well as selling this data on to advertisers. The other side is 
Google's online advertising, whose consumers are the advertisers that pay Google to be 
included in the Paid Ads at the top of the 'organic' results, and they are sold access to Google's 
customers in terms of their 'eyeballs' when they make a search, as well as the information 
about these customers in order to aid their advertising campaigns. 
 
However, some attempts to define this two-sided market have run into problems. For 
instance, in the Kinderstart v Google case,391 which was heard before a US District Court, the 
court threw out the antitrust claims against Google since Kinderstart had not established the 
'search market' as a relevant market. Kinderstart did not claim that Google ‘sold’ its search 
services to users, and it did not cite any authority that indicated that antitrust law is concerned 
with competition in the provision of free services, and so the judge considered that ‘search’ 
was not a relevant market for antitrust purposes.392  Yet, the judge was mistaken here in 
concentrating only on price (ie a monetary price of zero), and not on the other, non-price 
measures of competition such as product attributes, service and innovation. When the product 
is free, a more nuanced approach is necessary: antitrust analysis can consider the free product 
together with its 'companion' products which make money and in practice subsidise the free 
offering.393 Changes to practices around the free product can affect the benefits or costs for 
the companion product and vice versa, and so constitute legitimate subject of competition 
investigation. As a rule, when defining markets with a two-sided character and especially 
where there is a free product, the assumption should be that both sides of the market are 
considered in defining the relevant market, although this presumption is rebuttable on the 
circumstances at hand. 
 
Regarding Google’s search and advertising activity, there are differing views on its 
substitutability: for instance Manne has implicitly criticised a narrow market definition in this 
case, by naming alternatives to search engines from an advertiser's point of view as ranging 
from advertising in print publications, television, using social networking sites for promotion, 
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being linked to by other websites such as those which specialise in rating websites, 
purchasing paid advertising on Google or its competitors.394 However, from the consumer’s 
perspective, she may well not regard the services offered by these other entities 
interchangeable with that provided by Google – in fact, she may well want to search for 
content on the Internet, not even necessarily advertised, commercial content, and so it would 
be other Internet search engines (and not necessarily those specialised vertical search/price 
comparison sites) such as Yahoo and Bing which would count as Google's competitors. For 
advertisers or other companies promoting their products and services through inclusion in 
Google’s organic search results, substitutability (and so correct market definition) will depend 
upon whether they would switch to advertising and promotion through newspapers etc if 
Google raises the prices and/or otherwise changes conditions. Some research suggests that for 
advertisers, there is a degree of substitutability between online and offline advertising, 
although this is most strongly the case with offline direct marketing where customers are 
difficult to reach efficiently via the mass media.395 In any event, in the EU it is demand 
substitutability which is of the utmost importance, according to the Commission.396 
 
Indeed, the issue of market definition especially based on substitutability has come up in the 
merger cases involving Google. In the Commission's scrutiny of the DoubleClick merger, it 
was submitted that the relevant market should encompass the provision of advertising space 
in all types of media and not just online, but the Commission in its decision rejected that 
definition given that there is a general perception that online and offline advertising are 
different markets. Online advertising was being used for specific purposes; was reaching a 
more targeted audience in a more effective way than offline advertising; had a unique 
reporting system which enabled advertisers to check exactly how many users had viewed or 
clicked on the advert; and the specific pricing mechanism applied to online advertising.397 
Instead, the Commission concluded that there was a separate market for the provision of 
online advertising space. In the later Microsoft/Yahoo! decision, the Commission followed its 
analysis in DoubleClick and decided that online advertising was its own separate market from 
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offline advertising.398 These analyses also show that the Commission was happy to consider 
the markets for online advertising separately to their offline counterparts. 
 
As regards the search 'side' of Google's business, it could be argued that the relevant market is 
that for searchable online information, information in general, or advertised information, and 
so on. The first definition of 'searchable online information' may also include social networks 
such as Facebook, although it is submitted that Facebook at the moment anyway is not 
operating in the same market as Google since there is a lack of substitutability from the user's 
perspective: unlike Google, users must create an account with Facebook and log in to access 
its features fully and to see the full amount of information. Furthermore, Facebook’s search 
function is geared towards results from accounts and pages already within the Facebook 
network rather than the whole of the web which is the case for Google.  The relevant market 
here would appear to be that of online search, since users use these to find particular 
information on the World Wide Web, as opposed to any information repository eg libraries or 
even other websites which are searchable such as Facebook. 
 
In the context of Google's search engine operating in a two- or multi-sided market, there are 
at least two approaches that could be taken to their examination in a competition 
investigation, either together as part of a 'business ecosystem', or the market can be focussed 
on one of the products/services such as search and take the complementary product 
(advertising) into consideration when assessing market power. 399  The former approach 
ensures that all competitive constraints are taken into account, while the latter approach 
minimises errors such as false negatives (based on defining the market for the paid product 
while the harm arises in the free product) and false positives (concluding there is market 
power for the paid product but not when the paid and free products are considered together). 
For multi-sided platform businesses (such as Google’s search and advertising), the preferred 
approach is to recognise that competition takes place with other multi-sided platforms, and 
the market consists of these firms as well as firms operating on each side of the platform 
which impose competitive constraints. Indeed, the European Commission took this approach 
in its Microsoft Yahoo! Decision, where it defined the relevant market as 'online search and 
advertising'. It is submitted that this is the appropriate approach here too. 
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The other markets of relevance given the complaints against Google are those for video 
streaming and vertical search (which may be further subdivided into eg travel search). These 
markets are relevant due to the complaints against Google coming from vertical search 
engines and the fact that Google has launched various vertical search engines of its own. 
Another relevant market may actually be that for user data, or some variant such as 
‘monetisation of users’ information to advertisers’.400  However, this may be too broad a 
market definition in practice for competition authorities.401 
 
Regarding the geographical scope of the market, it is submitted that the relevant market 
would be the entirety of the EU. Nevertheless, Europe differs from eg North America in its 
linguistic plurality: there are 23 official languages of the EU, not to mention the many more 
languages spoken in other European countries which are not Member States. This has an 
effect on national markets in Europe: while Google which is primarily Anglophone/Latin 
alphabet-based has a leading share in the European market overall, in some national markets 
this has not always been the case. Although not an EU Member State, in Russia Yandex holds 
the leading market share instead of Google,402 and in the Czech Republic Seznam.cz had the 
dominant market share until early 2011, but was subsequently overtaken by Google, which by 
2013 held a market share of 71%.403 For the purposes of this discussion the relevant market is 
that of the EU as a whole, but this cannot simply be assumed without looking at the dynamics 
of national markets, especially those with languages which do not use the Latin alphabet. 
 
Google is the market leader in the overall EU market(s) for online search and advertising, 
based on either proportion of searches that are conducted through Google (for no monetary 
cost to users) or its proportional share of advertising revenue (which is where Google gets its 
funds).
404
 The company's market share in Europe is around 90 percent,
405
 which would be 
classified as ‘near monopoly’ according to the Commission’s past practice. Google’s online 
search and advertising is also the market leader in the US, but with a lesser market share of 
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around 75 percent, though this is still enough to be considered a dominant position.
406
 
 
 
(ii) Competitive constraints 
 
Google likes to claim that its competitors are only a click away when on the defensive from 
allegations that it operates an abusive monopoly. Google does face competition from other 
general search engines offered by Bing and Yahoo, as well as subject-specific vertical search 
engines and video streaming services. Nevertheless, there are various barriers to entry for new 
potential competitors and barriers to expansion for current competitors, which suggest that 
Google does have market power as well as having a leading market share. 
 
Two or multi-sided markets such as those in which Google operates usually exhibit features 
such as network effects and externalities which contribute to the establishment of market 
power. In Google’s services, advertisers will derive a benefit from there being more users of 
the search engine, since the more users there are, the more their adverts will be seen. Users 
may derive a benefit from there being more advertisers as they may make them more likely to 
be targeted by a more relevant advertisement, but this is probably not to be the case for all 
users, some of whom may prefer not to see any advertisements at all in the search results 
page.  
 
Furthermore, the enormous amount of user data gathered and analysed in the functioning of 
Google’s search service creates significant barriers to entry by giving Google advantages that 
cannot be replicated by potential entrants and it allows Google to move easily into 
neighbouring markets such as vertical search.407 Another consequence of this is that Google’s 
competitors will not be able to match the quality of the search results offered by it, due to the 
fact that Google reinforces its position by its simultaneous presence in multiple parallel 
markets in which it can acquire more user information in addition to that obtained in the 
normal search context. Thus, due to Google's advanced algorithm, portfolio of related 
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products and services and its accumulation of user data across these products and services, it 
would be difficult for a completely new entrant to provide services as advanced as Google's.  
 
A greater threat to Google may come from its established rivals, but in the absence of them 
developing services, particularly search, as effective as Google's which they have not 
managed to do so far, then it is unlikely they will overtake Google. In the context of Internet 
markets characterised by creative destruction and platform competition, it might be an entity 
which is not currently competing with Google in the markets already defined which actually 
may pose the largest threat to Google. In that case, other vertically integrated online 
‘platform’ operators such as Facebook (which itself has a very large repository of very 
personalised information about its users and their preferences) and Apple may actually be 
more of a threat to Google in terms of developing the next paradigm-shifting innovation 
rather than the other search engine providers. Facebook has been in the process of developing 
a new product, Graph Search, which seems to integrate Bing’s general search engine with 
other results based on information in a Facebook user’s social network connections.408 This 
would seem to provide a potential competitive constraint on Google’s search and advertising 
ecosystem, and at some point in the future Facebook and Google may be competing in the 
same market.409  However for the moment Graph Search could either be conceptualised as 
existing in a different market given its strong social network element, and the fact that Bing 
has not been very successful (especially in Europe) in competing with Google (implicitly 
suggesting that Google provides more ‘relevant’ results than Bing) suggests that Google still 
would have market power for the foreseeable future in the online search market. It is 
submitted that Google is highly likely to being monitoring its rivals’ developments closely in 
order to respond to any competition, actual or potential, and ensuring that it is doing its 
utmost to secure its existing dominance. Given in the EU in particular Google’s market share 
has not varied by any great degree over the last few years and is not expected to do so any 
time soon, it is submitted that despite this possible potential competition, Google still has a 
dominant position. 
 
                                                             
408
 Chris Smith, ‘Facebook Graph Search: how the industry rates it’ (The Guardian, 16 January 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2013/jan/16/facebook-graph-search> accessed 1 September 2014 
409
 Thepot (n 401) 208 
 178 
  
It seems that Google faces more competitive constraints in online advertising markets, with 
Facebook gaining market share particularly in mobile advertising markets. 410  However, 
Google’s inclusion of exclusionary terms in contracts with advertisers does suggest that 
despite these constraints, Google still has market power in these markets as it is able to 
operate independently of its competitors. 
 
Thus, while Google experiences competitive constraints from other online platforms such as 
Facebook and may also experience potential constraints in terms of future competition in the 
online search market with the development of Graph Search, Google’s achievement and 
maintenance of a dominant position in the European market for online search (and 
advertising) over a period of time as well as the extent to which Graph Search will actually 
exert a competitive constraint on Google (given its use of Bing which does not have a 
particularly successful track record in taking market share from Google) suggests that Google 
does have a dominant position in the market for online search at least, and possibly also in the 
market(s) for online search and advertising. 
 
 
(iii) Abuse of dominance? 
 
The core claim of the Commission’s investigation is that Google is favouring its own services 
in how it displays search results and how it organised its paid advertising, and acting in a way 
that is prejudicial to the providers of services competing with Google. There is evidence that 
Google is at least engaging in the first practice of prioritising its downstream services over 
those of competitors in the unpaid or 'organic' search results, but then also evidence of 
Google's competitors such as Yahoo and Bing doing exactly the same thing with their 
results,411 although Yahoo and Bing are not dominant entities, and thus do not have the same 
obligations regarding 'fair play'. 
 
The issue of whether Google is acting anticompetitively here is in practice questions whether 
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Google should be allowed to control how it organises its search results, both those for which 
nothing is paid and those for which companies do pay - to have their result placed in the 
special, more prominently placed ad boxes. If Google is acting abusively in the instances 
mentioned above, it would be doing so in a way to foreclose competitors horizontally since it 
is favouring its own upstream or downstream services. 
 
Yet, for any finding of anticompetitive behaviour from Google on this count, evidence must 
be adduced to show that Google is actually downgrading the results of its competitors. 
However, Google has denied that it does this, and claimed that their vertical search 
competitors' results in Google's search are not among the high rankings since they themselves 
copy most of their data from other websites.412 
 
 
Special responsibilities of the dominant entity 
 
In competition law, the dominant entity in a market has a special responsibility not to allow 
its conduct impair genuine undistorted competition, as stated by the CJEU in the Michelin v 
Commission case.413 Similar language was used by the US Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak 
when it stated that '[w]here a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are 
examined through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the 
antitrust laws... can take on exclusionary connotations when practised by a monopolist'.414 
 
This is something of a tautology since all this means is that dominance itself is not to be 
sanctioned, but the dominant entity should not abuse this position of dominance, which it is 
not supposed to do anyway, this very conduct being proscribed by competition law. 
 
Whether Google’s conduct amounts to an abuse will be considered from here on, examining 
the established categories of discrimination, bundling/tying and refusal to deal/essential 
facility. 
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Discrimination 
 
Certain types of discriminatory conduct by dominant entities which do not involve pricing 
have been found to constitute abuses of dominance. Yet these have been in circumstances in 
which the dominant firm favours some third party customers over other third party customers, 
and not when the dominant firm is active both upstream and downstream, as is the case at 
hand with Google.415 There appears to be no general duty for vertically integrated firms such 
as Google not to discriminate against downstream competitors of their subsidiaries, especially 
if the circumstances do not amount to a case of refusal to deal (considered below) or margin 
squeeze, and indeed, this kind of discriminatory conduct may well ‘more often than not… 
[constitute] an expression of competition on the merits’.416 
 
Furthermore, while certain types of discriminatory conduct by dominant entities have been 
found to constitute abuses of dominance, there seems to be no general duty not to 
discriminate against competitors on neighbouring markets, and again it is unclear that 
Google’s conduct is analogous to the cases where such abusive discrimination has been found 
to exist.
417
 
 
 
Refusal to deal/essential facility 
 
If Google’s conduct is not clearly a case that would fall under exclusionary discrimination, it 
might be characterised as a refusal to deal, backed up with appeal to the fact that Google is an 
essential facility ie 'a refusal to grant access to an essential facility or network'.418 Here, the 
theory of abuse would be that Google is foreclosing competition on downstream vertical 
search markets through its terms of access to its general search engine for vertical search 
competitors and their results, which are disfavourable compared to the terms of access 
Google gives its own vertical search service results. Google’s competitors would also have to 
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argue that Google’s general search engine constitutes an essential facility to which they 
require access otherwise they would be unable to run their services, and that by refusing their 
access, Google is harming competition in the vertical search markets and harming consumer 
welfare by reducing consumer choice. 
 
Firstly, a refusal to deal would need to be established by Google’s competitors. According to 
the Commission, there does not need to be 'actual refusal' on behalf of the dominant entity, 
and instead 'constructive refusal' will suffice, which can include 'unduly delaying or otherwise 
degrading the supply of the product or involve the imposition of unreasonable conditions in 
return for the supply'.419 Here, Google is not refusing outright to deal with its vertical search 
competitors: it is including results from their services in its general search results. It could be 
argued that the placing of Google competitors’ results less favourably than Google's own 
results could be characterised as 'undu[e] delaying or otherwise degrading the supply'. 
However, merely placing competitors’ results less prominently on the page than Google’s 
own results may be insufficient to establish an undue delaying or other kind of degradation of 
the ‘supply’ of search results, particularly if the competitors’ search results are still available 
on the first page of Google’s general search results.420 If these results are on page ten of the 
result then the argument would be stronger that Google’s treatment of these results is a 
constructive refusal to deal, especially if they are ‘relevant’ to the search term entered 
(although this ‘relevance’ may be difficult to prove). In any event, it seems that what is 
happening here is that Google is refusing to deal with vertical competitors on the terms they 
want, not refusing to deal with them entirely, and Google’s conduct could only be seen as a 
constructive refusal to deal if, all things being equal the vertical search engines’ results would 
be ‘relevant’ to a particular search term but they are not appearing on the first page of 
Google’s search results.  
  
Nevertheless, even if this can be conceptualised as a constructive refusal to deal, Google 
competitors must also fulfil three other criteria, according to the Commission’s 2009 
Guidelines: 
 The refusal relates to a product or services that is objectively necessary to be able to 
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compete effectively on a downstream market; 
 The refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market; and 
 The refusal to likely to lead to consumer harm.421 
 
Firstly, regarding the objective necessity or indispensability of inclusion in Google’s general 
search results, this goes beyond a ‘mere’ dominant position in an upstream market, and from 
the decision in Bronner, the input to which access is sought must be incapable of being 
duplicated or could only be duplicated with great difficulty.422 This does not appear to be the 
case with Google’s general search. Google does have competitors in online search and 
advertising markets, even if it is the dominant player, so there are alternative ‘inputs’ for 
Google’s vertical search competitors. Furthermore, users can access their sites by tying in 
their web addresses rather than searching through Google, and it is open to them to advertise 
their services elsewhere, for instance offline, with information about their web address. In 
addition, they can create ‘apps’ for use with tablets and smartphones which entail that users 
can find their services without going through Google’s general web search service.  
 
Regarding the refusal to deal leading to the elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market, it seems that in practice Google’s conduct has not eliminated 
competition in the vertical search markets. Google’s competitors have remained in operation 
since the Commission opened the investigation into Google. In British Airways v 
Commission, the relevant standard, however, was whether the conduct was ‘liable’ to 
eliminate such competition.423 This might be judged to be the case for Google, and would 
probably depend upon the actual placing of the rivals’ results ie whether they were still on the 
front page, or on a later page.  
 
In any event, it is unclear what consumer harm is suffered via Google’s conduct. As 
mentioned above, results from vertical search competitors are still being displayed in 
Google’s general search results. Competition still exists in these markets. Consumers still 
have a choice of products and services (a choice at least in the eyes of current EU competition 
law, even if there is no great difference in substance or quality between the offerings). Even if 
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Google’s conduct is liable to eliminate competition, in light of the Commission’s More 
Economic Approach, this may well be insufficient to find the conduct illegal. Thus it seems 
that the conditions for a refusal to deal have not been definitively fulfilled. 
 
It is possible that the 'refusal to deal' may actually concern access to the user data that Google 
has amassed, with the claim that this itself is an ‘indispensable’ for Google's competitors such 
as Microsoft or the vertical search engines to provide their services. Vast accumulations of 
such data have been recognised as a possible essential facility by the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, with a refusal to supply access to it constituting a possible abuse of 
dominance.424 Yet, again it seems to be the case that even if Google has amassed more data 
than its rivals about users, their preferences and their behaviour, in practice these other 
services have not closed down as a result of not having access to this data, the other services 
are quite probably also amassing data about their users (who might be the same as Google's 
users), it is likely that Facebook itself has a large amount of data collected about its users 
(which it may sell to Google's rivals). Thus, it seems that the user data here is also not an 
essential facility. 
 
 
Tying 
 
Another line of argumentation would be that Google is abusing its dominance in the market 
for online search to leverage its dominance into other markets, such as the market for price 
comparison sites and flight/travel search.  
 
It is certainly true that Google 'ties' its services together: with its vast portfolio of Internet 
services, especially its mobile services contain default options that attempt to 'lock' 
consumers in to other of its services, for example, the default setting on Android and Chrome 
is to direct users to other Google services, mainly search.425  Also, in the functioning of its 
online search engine, Google has been accused of trying to leverage its dominant position in 
that market into other markets, such as the various markets for vertical search, by placing its 
own vertical search services as first or most prominent in the search results pages. 
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Google's conduct here is reminiscent of the European Microsoft case, in which Microsoft, 
which held a dominant position in the market for PC client operating systems, was including 
its media player in the operating system on offer to PC manufacturers, in an attempt to 
leverage its dominance from the market for operating systems into the market for media 
players.426 
 
The Commission in its 2009 Guidelines set out various requirements for tying to be abusive: 
the undertaking must be dominant in the tying product market; the tying product and the tied 
product are two distinctive products; and the tying practice is likely to lead to anticompetitive 
foreclosure.427 Here, Google does have a dominant position in the tying product market ie 
general online search (and advertising). The tying and the tied products also appear to be 
distinctive even if closely related – separate markets can be defined for general search 
services and specific vertical search services. The third requirement, however, would seem 
not to be fulfilled, that the tying is likely to lead to anticompetitive foreclosure, since it is still 
possible for users to use another search, competing service through their browser or download 
another search app on mobile devices, as well as scroll down Google's results to use an 
alternative vertical search service to those offered by Google. Furthermore, it is unclear that, 
assuming Google's vertical search results are identified as being from Google, users are in 
some way harmed by these results. 
 
The Microsoft case seemed to add a fourth requirement for tying, which was that the 
dominant entity did not give consumers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied 
product. This potential fourth requirement could prove even more problematic to finding 
Google has abused its dominant position, since users are not usually obliged to use Google's 
vertical search services if they use Google’s general search. Some results from Google’s 
vertical search services may be displayed when a user searches for particular terms using the 
general search engine but they are certainly not required to click on these results for instance 
in order to see the general search results and will also see results from vertical search 
competitors. 
 
Moreover, even if this conduct amounts to tying, Google may argue that it has an ‘objective 
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justification’ for what it is going, that through its newer services and its integration of these 
with its older services it is offering ‘richer, more-responsive and varied forms of information’ 
ie a better, improved, more relevant service to its users, which is a necessary innovation given 
new Internet informational technologies being introduced such as Apple’s voice-recognition 
tool Siri and the convergence of search and social media.428 If what Google has been doing 
can be characterised thus, as providing users with new, innovative products (which could be 
argued to be the case in terms of its integration of Google+ and its search service, although 
this is seemingly not part of the Commission's investigation), then this may result in Google 
having an objective justification for its behaviour. 
 
Indeed, one of the conclusions of the FTC's investigation into Google, discussed in more 
detail below, was that the FTC found evidence that Google adopted design changes to its 
search results page (which displayed its vertical search results more prominently and had the 
effect of pushing the organic search links further down the page) primarily to improve the 
quality of its search product and the overall user experience,429 following precedents such as 
Kodak430 and IBM431. Although Google's vertical search competitors may have lost sales as a 
result of this improvement, this was just a normal part of a fierce competitive process, the 
outcome for users was more directly relevant information for their search queries.  
 
There is no clear equivalent precedent to Kodak and IBM on this matter in EU law, but the 
recent CJEU decision in Post Danmark asserts that a dominant position per se is not a 
violation of competition law, nor does Art 102 TFEU prevent the acquisition on the merits of 
a dominant position or seek to ensure that competitors that are less efficient than the dominant 
undertaking remain on the market, and so not every course of conduct with exclusionary 
effect is detrimental to competition.432 This seems to confirm an effects-based approach to Art 
102 TFEU and the existence of an efficiency defence in EU competition law433. 'Competition 
on the merits', which Post Danmark permits, includes on the basis of quality or innovation, so 
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Google could argue along the same lines as the FTC decision that its 'integration' of results 
from its vertical search engines into its 'generic' search results is an innovation/quality 
improvement that benefits customers, but it would have to bring evidence to prove this. 
However, it is not yet clear how far the decision in Post Danmark will extend, and whether 
such an argument could be made in these different factual circumstances.  
 
Overall, it is unclear whether the conditions for tying have been found regarding Google’s 
general search and its vertical search subsidiaries, particularly with regards to the tying 
leading to anticompetitive foreclosure, the lack of obliging Google’s users to use Google’s 
vertical search services if they use its general search, as well as the availability of objective 
justifications to Google for its conduct ie it is offering new and innovative products to its 
customers. 
 
 
Sui generis abuse 
 
From the previous sections, it seems highly unclear whether Google’s conduct falls into one 
of the established categories for an abuse of dominance, ie discrimination, refusal to supply 
and tying. However, the examples of abuse given in Article 102 are not exhaustive.
434
 Thus it 
is possible that the Commission considers Google’s conduct to be a new kind of abuse of 
dominance. Yet, if the investigation does indeed end with Google’s commitments, the 
Commission’s reasoning will not be made apparent and so there will be little guidance on 
what precisely the Commission considers the abusive conduct to be.
435
 In any event, 
insufficient anticompetitive effects of Google’s conduct may make even this possible sui 
generis abuse not actually an abuse in the end. 
 
Thus, it is far from clear that Google was acting anticompetitively and abusing its dominant 
position in the EU. Indeed, the Commission may have been motivated to settle with Google 
for the reason that if it conducted a full investigation, it may not have come to the conclusion 
that there was anticompetitive conduct, and even if it did, Google could have requested a 
judicial review of that decision from the EU Courts, which might well not have agreed with 
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the Commission’s application of competition law. 
 
 
c) Google’s commitments 
 
The saga between Google and the Commission in practice regarding the first two complaints 
discussed above has been lengthy and drawn out. The Commission has twice rejected offers 
from Google to change its behavior before seeming to accepting Google’s current proposal in 
early 2014, yet bowing to lobbying pressure later that year in appearing to reject the third 
proposal. 
 
Google’s first proposal to the Commission in early 2013 to remedy its behavior appeared to 
include an offer to label its own services in search results in order to distinguish them from its 
competitors' and to provide links to rival services. The Commission rejected these proposals 
in July 2013. Indeed, Foundem called Google’s initial offer to the Commission ‘half-hearted’ 
because it did not address the deeper problem of how Google determined the ‘relevance’ of 
links to search queries, especially when its competitors’ services were involved.436  
 
The second, supposedly confidential, proposal from Google came later in 2013 (whose 
content was leaked on an American consumer rights group).
437
 This version seemed to 
involve Google offering to label its own services when one or other of them was displayed in 
the results page when a user did a generic search for particular terms. The label should be 
‘accessible to users via a clearly visible icon’, should show that this result has been added by 
Google in order to ensure that users would not confuse it with generic search results and 
should indicate to users where they can find alternatives provided by Google’s competitors. 
The results from Google’s own services should be displayed in a separate area to Google’s 
generic search results and Google also offered to display links to three rival services in ‘a 
manner to make users clearly aware of these alternatives’. These rivals’ services would be 
selected from a pool of eligible vertical search competitors according to a complicated 
process set out in the document. Google included screenshots of how these results would be 
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displayed, which included links to competitors being displayed under its own specialized 
search results in a separately boxed part of the screen and taking up roughly half of the space 
on the page that Google’s specialized service results occupied.  
 
In response to Google’s offer, FairSearch (a lobby group comprising many of Google’s 
search rivals) commissioned a survey with the aim of finding the likely impact of these 
proposals on actual Internet users, in particular testing the extent to which users were likely to 
click on any of the three rival links and whether they understood and recognized the different 
parts of Google’s proposed search results page ie the labeling and descriptions.438 The survey 
found that ‘only a modest number’ of users would click on one of the rival links and that 
users were confused about the difference between Google’s vertical search results and the 
other results.
439
 The conclusion was that if Google presented links to its rivals in a relatively 
neutral fashion ie in a comparable way in terms of appearance and placement on the page, 
then this would result in higher click through rates for the competitors’ links. However, the 
Second Commitments offered by Google did not achieve this and so were not ‘likely to 
command materially increased consumer attention or restore competition for [Google’s] 
rivals’.440 
 
The head of a consumer advocacy group, BEUC, also condemned the second commitments 
proposal as ‘not just inadequate to solve consumer detriment, but are in fact self-serving’ 
since they continued to ‘marginalize concerns’ and ‘bizarrely’ suggested a new revenue 
stream for Google, since certain competitors would have to bid in a separate auction to be 
included as one of the rival links displayed.
441
 
 
In the end, the European Commission again rejected Google’s offer. The third and final offer 
made by Google at the time of writing comprises Google: informing users via a label that 
Google’s own specialised services are promoted; Google separating its specialised service 
results from the other search results in order to make clear the difference between them and 
                                                             
438
 David J Franklyn and David A Hyman ‘Review of the likely effects of Google’s proposed Commitments 
dated October 21, 2013 (“Second Commitments”)’ (FairSearch, 9 December 2013) 
<http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/FairSearch-Hyman_Franklyn-Study.pdf> accessed 1 
September 2014 
439
 ibid 2 
440
 ibid 13 
441
 John M Simpson, ‘Consumer Groups on Both Sides of the Atlantic Oppose Google Antitrust Settlement’, 
(Consumer Watchdog, 26 November 2013) <http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-groups-
both-sides-atlantic-oppose-google-antitrust-settlement> accessed 1 September 2014 
 189 
  
‘normal’ results; and Google displaying ‘prominent’ links to three rival specialised search 
services from a pool of ‘eligible competitors’, which will be displayed clearly to users in a 
‘comparable’ way to how Google displays its own services.442 Google will also not charge its 
rivals for inclusion as rival links on occasions on which Google does not charge for inclusion 
in its specialized search results, and here will select them using its ‘normal’ web search 
algorithm. However, for those services for which Google does charge for inclusion, the three 
rivals will be chosen via an auction from a pool of eligible competitors. 
 
The Commission includes screenshots of how Google’s services will change as a result of the 
commitments. When results from Google’s specialised Shopping service are displayed in the 
results page, they are done so at the top of the page in a box headed ‘Google Shopping results’ 
and directly adjacent to the right of this box is one of the same size labeled ‘Alternatives’, 
with a shaded background, displaying results from some of Google’s vertical search rivals. 
Google Shopping is a service for which Google charges for inclusion, and so the rivals whose 
results will be displayed will be selected via the auction mechanism. 
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Source: European Commission 
 
This would go further towards the ‘parity of appearance and placement’ that the FairSearch-
commissioned consumer research found increased consumers’ likelihood of clicking on 
Google’s rivals’ results, although the research also found that the result to the furthest left on 
the screen was the more likely to be clicked on than those to the right.
443
 If this research goes 
some way to reflecting accurately how European Internet users in general behave, then this 
formulation of the results page should see an increase in clicks on rivals’ results but Google’s 
specialised service results will still have the more attractive position. 
 
The other screenshot from the Commission includes results from Google’s Local Search 
service, for which Google does not charge a payment for inclusion and so the rivals whose 
results will be displayed will be selected using Google’s general search algorithm. 
 
 
Source: European Commission 
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Here, the layout is somewhat different, with the rivals’ results placed at the top of the page 
but in a much smaller shaded area than Google’s own specialised search results, which are 
also less clearly labelled. While the rivals’ results might be thought to be in a better position, 
at the top of the page, their reduced size may well make them less attractive for users’ clicks. 
This scenario does not seem to be addressed directly in the FairSearch commission and so it 
is unclear as to how users would react to this in practice. 
 
In contrast to Google’s first two proposals this third one has not been subject to a rigorous 
‘market test’, during which interested third parties can offer their opinions and research, such 
as the FairSearch survey evidence mentioned above. This is significant since it seems that the 
results of the market test of Google’s previous proposals contributed to the Commission’s 
decisions not to accept them. 
 
However, in a highly unusual move for the European Commission, it has retreated from 
accepting Google’s third proposal and seems at the time of writing to be waiting for a fourth 
offer. This retreat seems due to great dissatisfaction expressed by the original complainants 
with the terms of the third proposal, but also the ‘politicisation’ of the case within the EU.444 
Google’s competitors had expressed their unhappiness with the proposed settlement: the 
Initiative for a Competitive Online Marketplace (ICOMP), an umbrella group of competitors, 
said that without another market test of the proposals, the Commission’s head of competition 
Joaquin Almunia ‘risks having the wool pulled over his eyes by Google’. 445  However 
Almunia himself had emphasised that his mission is to protect competition for the benefit of 
European consumers, not competitors, and that this proposal strikes the right balance between 
allowing Google to improve its services and giving users a ‘real choice between different 
options.
446
 Nevertheless, it seems that external pressures have brought about this volte face by 
the Commission. 
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Nevertheless, it may be in Google’s interests to persist and make another offer, which if 
accepted, would entail that Google  escapes an official finding of wrongdoing. Its previous 
conduct will also not officially be termed anticompetitive, which can have value as a 
precedent in future investigations. Perhaps an even greater victory for Google will be if it 
does not have to reveal to the public any more information about how its secretive algorithm 
works, although that might be precisely what its rivals are seeking with their continued 
opposition to its offers thus far. 
 
 
4.4 US investigation into Google 
 
In the US, the Federal Trade Commission launched an antitrust investigation into Google’s 
activities, including search and advertising, which resulted in a settlement with Google in 
early 2013. 
 
In the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also conducted an antitrust investigation into 
Google and came to a very different conclusion to that of the European Commission; it found 
that Google had adopted design changes for its search results page (it displayed its own 
vertical search results more prominently and had the effect of pushing the organic search 
links further down the page) primarily to improve the quality of its search product and the 
overall user experience.
447
 Although Google’s vertical search competitors may have lost sales 
as a result of this improvement, in the FTC’s eyes this was just a normal part of a fierce, 
competitive process, and the outcome for users was that there was more directly relevant 
information for their search queries. So the FTC found that Google had not acted anti-
competitively, and the company was not forced to label its results or otherwise change the 
operation or format of its search results page. However, the FTC’s technical competence in 
determining that these changes were actually improving consumer experience rather than 
attempting to foreclose competitors has been questioned since it is not clear from the decision 
‘what types of expertise or methods the FTC deployed to make such distinctions’.448 
 
Indeed, the FTC may also have found it legally difficult to insist on such changes. Certain 
constitutional rights in the US are also enjoyed by ‘legal persons’ such as corporations as well 
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as ‘natural persons’ (ie real individual people), including the right to freedom of expression 
under the First Amendment, as can be seen in the highly controversial Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United.
449
 Search engines including Google may be considered to be 
‘speakers’ for the purposes of First Amendment protection, given they make ‘editorial 
judgements’ about information akin to a newspaper, with the implication that the government 
is not able to regulate what is presented by Google in its search results nor the way in which it 
is presented.
450
 If the FTC had tried to impose regulations in this way, then Google may claim 
that it would be unconstitutional and thus illegal for them to do so.  
 
Indeed, since this investigation, a federal district court held that Chinese language search 
engine Baidu was permitted to block pro-Chinese democracy websites appearing in its search 
results viewable in the US since this was an ‘editorial decision’ protected by the First 
Amendment.
451
 As discussed above in Chapter 3.7 a) (‘Free expression’), a similar argument 
is unlikely to be salient in the EU – while legal persons as well as natural persons have been 
recognised as bearing fundamental rights by the ECtHR in certain circumstances, free 
expression under Art 10 is not an absolute right and can be limited by the ‘protection of the… 
rights of others’, which in this case would be the free expression rights of users and website 
operators. 
 
 
4.5 Outcome of competition investigations and user concerns 
 
In practice, although it seems at least unclear whether Google has actually abused its 
dominance position, the outcome of the EU investigation in the form of the last round of 
Commitments proposed (and seemingly ultimately rejected by the Commission) seem rather 
weak from the user perspective given the concerns outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
particularly given the Commission’s powers to take actions that can radically change the way 
businesses operate if it makes an official finding of abusive conduct, such as obliging certain 
kinds of business practices vis-à-vis competitors and customers, or even breaking up an entity 
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into smaller constituent parts in extreme circumstances.  
 
The Commitments would have entailed that Google will have to make some changes to the 
layout and content of its results page, but it will not seemingly have to be a lot more 
transparent about its inner machinations, nor will a general obligation of non-discrimination 
be imposed on Google, which were possible remedies during the investigation.
452
  It remains 
to be seen whether Google makes a fourth offer and what the substance of that offer would be, 
but more transparency in particular around how Google’s search algorithm works and an 
obligation of non-discrimination would have positive consequences for user-centric concerns: 
if the Commission ends up taking measures to force Google to reveal more details about its 
algorithm, then this will be important for users as well as Google’s competitors since they 
would have a lot more understanding of the hitherto secret way in which Google operates. 
 
In comparison, the U.S. FTC did not force Google to make any changes to its search results 
page, since it did not find that Google had acted anticompetitively or abused its dominant 
position. Since this conduct was not viewed as anticompetitive, there could be no possibility 
of remedies for anticompetitive behavior having a positive ‘spillover’ effect for user-centric 
concerns. 
 
This outcome from the US may seem rather disappointing given the problems, identified 
above, that a dominant search engine such as Google poses for users. However, competition 
law is not designed to deal with all of these problems, even when they seem to flow from a 
concentrated market, and even when it would seem that more competition may solve or at 
least lessen the problem. 
 
Nevertheless, the Commission’s approach in this case seems, at first blush, to be a departure 
from the neoclassical, neoliberal approach to competition and regulation. The Commission’s 
investigation seems definitely not to be in the interests of the transnational globalised capital 
that Google constitutes. In addition, the Commission’s willingness to intervene and even push 
for changes to Google’s business practices when it is debatable that Google is behaving in an 
anticompetitive way would also not seem to accord with the approach of minimalising 
intervention in markets that neoliberalism promotes. Indeed, it seems that the Commission 
may have gone beyond what is ‘necessary’ or the bare minimum to address competition 
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concerns. While neoliberal thought has been a dominant political current in the U.S. and U.K. 
at least since the 1980s, and has made inroads into the rest of the European Union, it would 
seem that the Commission’s conduct here cannot wholly be attributed to it. 
 
The Commission’s conduct may possibly be due to factors such as European protectionism 
when faced with an American corporation (yet some of Google’s competitors which have 
been making the complaints are also American) or being seen to be a relevant institution to 
the general public and act in the face of what they perceive as a monopoly.
453
 Indeed, a 
coalition of European ‘digital companies’, mainly from France and Germany, seems to have 
succeeded in lobbying the European Commission, and some domestic politicians in these 
countries to urge a reconsideration of the commitments.
454
 
 
Thus the Commission’s conduct may be seen against the backdrop of Marx’s idea of 
competition as the inner nature of capital (mentioned in Chapter 1) – here different forms of 
capital are competing against each other for a favourable intervention by the Commission, 
and what is favourable for one will be disadvantageous for the other. It is clear thus far that 
the Commission has not been overly ‘invasive’ of Google’s business practices, and 
particularly those which hold the most concern for users, and so thus could still be 
conceptualised within the neoliberal paradigm. A possible fourth offer of commitments from 
Google – and possible eventual acceptance by the Commission - will be highly instructive as 
to the extent to which users’ – as opposed to Google’s rivals’ – interests prevail. 
 
 
4.6 Other legal regimes, ex ante regulation and non-legal solutions 
 
Given the less than satisfactory situation for users in light of the competition investigation 
into Google, the possibility that Google may not actually be infringing EU competition law 
and the possibility that Google’s next set of commitments will be enough to placate its rivals 
but insufficient to address all user interests, other areas of law, ex ante regulation or non-legal 
solutions may go some way towards addressing the outstanding issues for users presented by 
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this dominant search engine and its functioning. 
 
 
a) Merger control 
 
Merger control is also part of competition law but operates on an ex ante basis to block 
transactions that would result in anti-competitive outcomes. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Google has accumulated power through various mergers, 
few of which were scrutinised by merger authorities in the US and the EU, with other mergers 
going ahead unconditionally, with the result being that Google bought companies whose 
additional services being integrated with Google's existing business became the object of the 
Commission's investigation into Google for abusing its dominant position. Thus, it could be 
argued that the merger authorities, especially for those transactions, have been too lenient 
with Google and its accumulation of market power, especially by not taking adequate account 
of the possibilities for Google to leverage its power in the market for online search into other 
parallel in which it is active. This was a criticism levelled by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor at the Commission’s decision in Google/DoubleClick, that not only were the 
effects of this merger on the market for Internet search not adequately taken into account, but 
also insufficient regard was paid to the longer term effects of the merger on user data, 
culminating in no reference to ‘consumer welfare not to the users of Google’s search engines, 
even though this potentially implicated every internet user in the EU.’455 
 
In general, though, the practice of the American and European merger authorities especially 
when it comes to vertical or conglomerate mergers has not been particularly strong. The US 
merger authorities specifically have been criticised for being too lenient with vertical mergers, 
leading to these large concentrations in technology and communications markets. 456 
Furthermore, the European Commission's Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines from 2007 have 
been criticised as being ‘quite hospitable’ to non-horizontal concentrations.457 The guidelines 
downplay ‘portfolio effects’ theories in the absence of tying or bundling and do not discuss 
possible theories of harm based on the financial strength of one or more of the parties to the 
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merger.458 ‘Portfolio effects’ are the creation of a stronger player via a conglomerate merger 
due to its wider range of products that will ultimately foreclose competition due to leveraging 
its dominant position in one market into another to gain market share. This theory was once 
popular in antitrust policy in the US but is currently out of favour in the aftermath of the 
Chicago School hegemony, yet it seemed to surface in more recent EU merger policy and 
decisions prior to the adoption of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 459  Thus, the 
Guidelines can be seen as being ‘hospitable’ to non-horizontal concentrations, even if they 
would seem to form such a ‘portfolio’, since such anticompetitive tying may not be likely in 
those particular circumstances and even if so, it may well not be considered to be 
anticompetitive but done to effect ‘efficiencies’ eg economies of scope/scale. 
 
Nevertheless, the increasing size of Google, for instance, due to its takeover of many smaller 
companies in related markets, the increasing amount of data about users it is able to gather 
and its ability to cross-subsidise its large array of products and services creates an ever higher 
entry barrier for its rivals. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it also entails a vast 
(and ever growing) concentration of power in one entity, which encompasses political as well 
as economic. 460  This is precisely the situation which the ordoliberals feared and saw 
competition law as averting, yet current merger policy does not seem to take these concerns 
into account. 
 
Merger authorities may be encouraged to take other, non-economic factors into account in 
making their decisions in order to avert similar events in the future. However, as has already 
been discussed earlier in this thesis, while this may be desirable, it is not always effective 
given the mainly quantitative nature of competition analysis and the difficulty this analysis 
has in bringing in non-quantifiable values (such as a threat to political power). Merger 
authorities could be more alert to entities that are already dominant or super-dominant, 
especially in various markets already, which wish to buy up companies in other sectors. 
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b) Data protection 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the EU has data protection laws which may 
address the harm to users’ privacy that Google’s business practices entail. Data protection 
laws, however, are limited inasmuch as they only apply to ‘personal data’ and not necessarily 
all the data that Google collects about users and their conduct in using its services, and as 
mentioned above, the low level of fines for breaches of data protection law render this regime 
less effective in practice. Furthermore, there may also be difficulties in enforcement given the 
internal business practices of Google and other large Internet corporations are often opaque, 
so it is difficult to know if a breach of the law has occurred as it is difficult to know what 
Google is actually doing vis-à-vis collecting information about users. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, the current configuration of incentives for players such as Google encourages the 
collection and monetisation of as much user data as possible, with existing data protection 
law only addressing some of the ‘excesses’ of such collection and monetisation rather than 
preventing it from happening in the first place. 
 
The new EU Data Protection Regulation may address some of the issues around Google’s 
collection and use of user data which, it is submitted, are exacerbated by Google’s 
dominance, although again it is limited in its application since it would only apply to 
‘personal data’.  
 
The original text of the draft Regulation proposed by the European Commission posits that 
the processing of personal data is only lawful in situations where data subjects have given 
their consent for specific purposes (or a few other, limited situations such as where necessary 
for compliance with a legal obligations), and the data controller bears the burden of proof for 
this consent.461  Importantly, this consent would not provide a legal basis for processing the 
data ‘where there is a significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the 
controller’.462 That would certainly appear to be the case in the relationship between Google 
and its users, where Google is in a much stronger bargaining position than the vast majority 
of users. In this case, in order to process their personal data, Google would have to fulfil the 
criteria for one of the alternative situations to obtaining user consent, of which the most 
relevant to this scenario would be: necessary for the performance of a contract to which the 
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data subject is party or in order to take steps at the data subject’s request prior to entering a 
contract; or processing being necessary for the controller’s legitimate interests except where 
these interests are overridden by the data subject’s interests, fundamental rights and 
freedoms.463 Here, the contractual situation or pre-contractual situation might be implied from 
users’ use of Google’s search engine, yet the extent to which Google’s collection of data about 
them is ‘necessary’ for the performance of this contract is disputable. Google may argue that 
the collection of user data is necessary for its legitimate interests, such as running its business, 
yet users’ data protection, free expression and privacy rights would seem to override such an 
interest.  
 
However, this wording was amended by the European Parliament in its adoption of the draft, 
which replaced the text on the imbalance of positions with a provision that would make 
consent ‘purpose-limited’, losing its validity when that purpose ceases to exist or as soon as 
the processing of that personal data is no longer necessary for the original purpose. Yet, this 
amended provision would also entail that the provision of a service is not to be made 
conditional to the data subject consenting to the processing of data not necessary for the 
provision of that service.464 This would still be restrictive of Google’s activities but not as 
potentially debilitating as the Regulation’s original text. Certainly Google’s ability to collect 
data for one purpose eg use of its search services and then use it for other purposes would be 
curtailed, but also Google would not be entitled to collect and process more data than is 
necessary for the provision of whatever service is at issue, assuming its legal basis for 
collecting data is the user’s consent. 
 
Therefore, it would seem that the Data Protection Regulation, if enacted, would restrict 
Google’s gathering and processing of its users’ personal data to that which is necessary for the 
performance of the specific service, and would not allow this data to be used for other 
purposes without obtaining the user’s consent. However, the Regulation is unlikely to be in 
force for some time and its final form is uncertain, as discussed above.  
 
The European Data Protection Supervisor considers that it also may be necessary to 
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incorporate violations of the right to data protection into the concept of consumer harm in the 
context of competition enforcement, such as when a dominant entity is restricting users’ 
freedom of choice and control over their personal data.465 Although data protection law may 
apply nonetheless, integrating it into a competition law analysis may be desirable given the 
higher fines for anticompetitive conduct compared with breaches of data protection law, and 
to utilise the resources available to competition investigators. As already mentioned, 
fundamental rights including data protection are binding on European institutions, including 
the Commission and courts in their competition roles, and can entail the invalidation of laws, 
measures and decisions which infringe these rights, thus decisions in competition matters 
ought to respect them. 
 
Yet, data protection law itself might be thought as a better protector of personal data than 
competition law, which, as already discussed in various places in this thesis, is (in its current 
form anyway) not well suited to taking account of ‘non-economic’, difficult to quantify 
values such as fundamental rights. 466  The cooperation between competition and data 
protection agencies that the European Data Protection Supervisor also recommends may be a 
more appropriate path to follow to deal with scenarios exhibiting competition issues as well 
as data protection concerns.467  
 
While in the U.S. there is growing regulatory activism around privacy and data protection, as 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the approach taken is largely self-regulatory, with 
privacy activists actually appealing to the antitrust regime to intervene when dominant 
entities infringe on privacy. If the antitrust regime does not uphold their privacy in practice, 
then the limited privacy regime already in place is unlikely to help. Aside from the FTC's 
cognisance of the limits of its legal authority in this area regarding antitrust and privacy, 
Pasquale has also identified the conceptual limits of competition law (at least in the U.S.) to 
govern 'dominant' search engines, since economics-based, consumer welfare-oriented 
competition analysis cannot deal properly with inter alia privacy concerns.468 Indeed, within 
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that neoclassical model, the state should not interfere with the collection, analysis and use of 
data as this might even interfere with competition and the ability of companies to sell data to 
each other, so antitrust may be antithetical to the protection of user data and privacy.  
 
Furthermore the neoliberal view of privacy (which is more prevalent in the US than EU)  as a 
commodity to be bought and sold via users’ ‘consent’ to terms of service contracts is 
criticised as not reflecting what privacy is for users, ie a ‘social practice’.469 Instead, Pasquale 
views that is it the unequal power relationship between user and dominant corporation which 
is the real problem for both privacy and antitrust, and he advocates for more transparency 
about data use by these corporations in order to determine whether there is anticompetitive 
conduct as well as privacy infringements. Newman also argues that improved protection of 
personal privacy in the US context may also have spillover effects in ‘reducing monopoly 
power of players like Google and encouraging a fairer economic return to individuals when 
they do choose to share that data with commercial entities’ through facilitating data 
portability for instance.470 While competition and privacy concerns may be entwined in this 
context, the laws that deal with each have differing methodologies of achieving their goals. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that this imbalanced power relationship is the current 
manifestation of antitrust/competition’s main target. Unless antitrust is redirected back at 
tackling large concentrations of private power for its effect on the socio-political as well as 
the economic, it seems unlikely that it will prove to be a useful tool in upholding the privacy 
and protection of users’ data. 
 
In any event, it would seem that what data protection laws there are, or might be in the EU, 
may go some way to addressing some of the concerns around user data and privacy, they also 
are limited to only applying to ‘personal data’ and their effective enforcement is not always 
guaranteed. They also do not prevent data generated by users being gathered in the first place, 
especially if it is not personal data, and even personal data can be gathered so long it is in 
accordance with data protection law. The current configuration of incentives for search 
engines such as Google to proliferate data about users is not altered by the intervention of 
data protection law. 
 
Due to the large amount of concentration in the market for search, users do not have a real 
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choice either to use Google’s services without their data being collected and processed, or to 
use similarly robust and well-functioning search engines which uphold the protection of their 
data and privacy. Without more aggressive data protection/privacy based intervention, or 
antitrust/competition enforcement which is suspicious of such vast accumulations of power 
for its non-economic as well as economic consequences, it seems the vastly unequal positions 
of users vis-à-vis Google will persist. 
  
 
c) Fundamental and constitutional rights 
 
The human/constitutional rights legal regimes could also be called on to aid users regarding 
their access to information and privacy more generally vis-à-vis Google.  
 
Users’ privacy claims would be similar to those outlined in the preceding section, while their 
free expression claims would relate to the concerns raised about the possibility of Google 
censoring certain information in its search results, and bias in how those results are presented. 
These affect users’ abilities to send and receive information. 
 
The machinations of the ECHR regime in Europe regarding fundamental rights, especially in 
situations involving freedom of expression between private parties as opposed to the State has 
been discussed at length in the previous chapter on Internet provision (in Section 3.7 a) ‘Free 
expression’). 
 
The potential censorship by Google by deliberating leaving certain results that would 
otherwise be ‘relevant’ out of its results page, and thus producing biased results, would seem 
to be the stronger case for a breach of users’ free expression, either as the creator of those 
results or as a person who wishes to receive this information. However, the possibility to 
receive this information in other ways, for instance via another search engine or directly 
inputting the web address into a browser, may distinguish these circumstances from those 
found to infringe the applicants’ rights in the Kurshid Mustapa case discussed in the previous 
chapter. The concern with Google presenting biased results may only be seen as a possible 
infringement of Article 10 if it implicates media plurality ie Google is biasing results in such 
a way that diminishes media plurality. If Google’s censorship of results also implicates media 
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plurality, then this may also be grounds for a finding of Art 10 infringement. In any event, 
restrictions of users’ Art 10 rights can be justified ‘for the protection of the… rights of 
others’, which might be considered to include Google’s right to carry on its business. 
 
The Council of Europe has turned its attention to search engines, and in April 2012 its 
Committee of Ministers adopted a Recommendation to Member States concerning the 
protection and promotion of respect for human rights with regard to search engines.471 The 
non-binding recommendation recognises the potential challenges from search engines to the 
right of freedom of expression (Art 10 of the ECHR) and the right to a private life (Art 8), 
which may come from the design of algorithms, de-indexing and/or partial treatment or 
biased results, concentration in the market, a lack of transparency about how results are 
selected and ranked, the ability of search engines to gather and index content which may not 
have been intended for mass communication, general data processing and retention, and the 
generation of new kinds of personal data such as individual search histories and behavioural 
profiles. The recommendation, of course, is not legally binding, and is merely suggestions for 
the Member States to follow, if they see fit, for instance in the form of new legislation and 
regulation or amendments to current rules. 
 
However, thus far it does not seem that the recommendation has been followed by Member 
States, and users’ privacy and free expression remains problems for privately-owned and 
operated platforms such as search engines including Google.  
 
As for the US situation, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the recent federal court decision 
involving Baidu may suggest that Google would be found to have its own First Amendment 
rights and so may not be subject to interference with its search engine in the interests of its 
users’ First Amendment rights. As regards constitutional protections of privacy, the American 
situation is encompassed by the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable seizures 
and searches by the State, so would not be effective in this situation where it is another 
private party interfering with users’ privacy, particular when users may be considered to have 
‘disclosed’ their information to another party, and so the ‘third party doctrine’ is likely to 
apply, by which people are not entitled to an expectation of privacy in the information they 
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voluntarily provide to third parties for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.472 
 
 
d) Ex ante Regulation  
 
Prior or ex ante regulation of search engines is another possibility, especially if the legal 
regimes above do not adequately address user concerns. There have been various proposals 
for regulation as well as, or in place of, appeal to other legal regimes for addressing in full the 
problems that a dominant search engine creates. These proposals appear to be motivated by a 
mixture of a wish to address a market failure, namely the asymmetry of information between 
Google and its users over how Google works, as well as a desire to pursue certain social goals 
such as free expression for users. 
 
In Europe, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers advocated a co-regulatory 
approach to search engines. Member States should cooperate with the private sector and civil 
society to develop strategies to protect fundamental rights and freedoms pertaining to search 
engine operation, particularly regarding transparency over how the search engines provide 
information, the criteria according to which search results are organised, how content not 
intended for mass communication (although in the public space) should be ranked and 
indexed, transparency as to the collection of personal data, empowerment of users to access 
and modify their personal data held by search engine providers, the minimisation of the 
collection and processing of personal data, and the assurance that search engine services are 
accessible to people with disabilities. Member States should also consider offering users a 
choice of search engines, particularly to search outputs based on criteria of public value. This 
may act as some kind of substitute for competition law inasmuch as the user has options of 
different search engines to use, including those which may not (wholly) be driven by 
concerns of profit. However, as mentioned above, Member States so far have not acted on this 
recommendation, and as it stands the recommendation is also non-binding. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to see what incentive search engines would have for such cooperation unless they are 
‘threatened’ by the possibility of new legislation and regulation which would restrict their 
activities unless they cooperate.  
 
                                                             
472
 Smith v Maryland 442 US 735 (1979); United States v Miller 425 US 435 (1976) 
 205 
  
Furthermore, regulation similar to that advocated for Internet Service Providers in the net 
neutrality debate has been suggested for search engines including Google. Interestingly, 
Google itself was an early advocate of net neutrality regulation for ISPs, before ‘modifying’ 
its position on the issue in 2010. An equivalent obligation on Google might encompass non-
discrimination rules for its search results, as well as a requirement that Google does not 
‘block’ content which would otherwise be considered a ‘relevant’ result for a search.  
However, without knowing more about how Google's search algorithm works and how 
'neutral' or not it already is in determining results, it may be difficult to design such an 
obligation of neutrality and see that it is effectively put in place, although co-regulation may 
have a role to play here by which Google would be ‘incentivised’ to co-operate in the design 
of the rules. With ISPs it is easier to determine whether they are acting in a non-neutral 
fashion due to their technical makeup. Furthermore, truly neutral design for search engines 
may not exist since every design choice necessarily reflects certain normative values, in this 
case around what is ‘relevant’.473 
 
Yet a transparency obligation may also be considered, either on its own or as part of a broader 
package of ex ante regulation. This would address, at least in part, the design problem for 
‘search neutrality’ and would enable oversight of search engines’ activities to ensure they are 
operating in accordance with such an obligation. Some kind of transparency obligation could 
have been imposed on Google as part of the commitments agreement with the Commission, 
but this did not happen in practice. Had it been imposed, aside from potentially aiding 
Google’s competitors in exposing any ‘bias’ against them in Google’s search results, it may 
also have had benefits for users at large, inasmuch as they could understand too how Google 
goes about determining ‘relevance’ for its search results, and use this information to aid users’ 
choice between different search engines as well as giving them the tools to determine ‘the 
appropriate level of cognitive authority to assign to their search results’.474  
 
In the US context, given the limits of competition law to deal with privacy and other ‘non-
economic’ concerns due to its current goal of maximising ‘consumer welfare’ yet along 
narrow efficiency terms and disregarding the ‘cultural and political consequences of 
concentrated corporate power’ due to its legal economic basis which privileges ‘market 
outcomes’, Pasquale argues that search engines should instead be thought of as an ‘essential 
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cultural and political facility’ and regulated accordingly, using tools beyond competition 
law.475 He has also previously advocated the increased regulation of search engines including 
protection for users’ privacy and increased transparency over how search results are 
ordered.476  
 
Nevertheless, despite these suggestions for law and regulation to deal with Google’s 
dominance, given the imperfect solutions offered by areas of existing law for user autonomy 
concerns, there has been no attempt to implement any of them. This inaction may be 
explained by the regulatory climate in the US and Europe. The regulation of communications 
in both jurisdictions operates according to a mostly ‘market-based’ approach, which, as 
mentioned above, has reflected the ascendancy of neoliberalism and its corresponding 
doctrine of ‘light touch’ regulation of private entities. Alongside this development, there has 
been the attempted capture by corporate interests of public regulatory bodies. A glaring 
example is the aforementioned corporate lobbying of European institutions during the 
legislative process for a new Data Protection Regulation. This has resulted in governments of 
liberal democracies being loathe in practice to extend any further regulation of private 
entities, especially for seemingly ‘non-economic’ purposes, in accordance with the mantra 
that the market will provide. Alternatively, as may end up being the case with the European 
Commission’s investigation into Google for alleged anticompetitive practices, lobbying by 
other corporate actors may result in an outcome of more ex ante regulation of Google but it 
may well only be beneficial to their businesses and not to society at large. 
 
In any event, the legislative and regulatory solutions outlined above would entail significant 
intervention and ‘interference’ with the market for online search and advertising. Given the 
general environment, it is not surprising that these solutions for Google’s dominance may be 
thought of as idealistic or going too far. Furthermore, the risk remains that even if regulation 
concerning Google is enacted, it may be difficult to enforce for the reasons discussed above, 
that understanding how Google works may be a difficult task for regulators, and a co-
regulatory solution may run the risk of regulatory capture by Google to a greater extent given 
the close working relationship that would be likely to ensue between the regulator and the 
regulated. Moreover, the extension of regulation to other intermediaries, whether other search 
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engines such as Bing, or social networks, for instance, such as Facebook, may follow from 
such regulation of Google, which would be a costly task in both time and resources. In any 
event, given Google’s search engine is subject to a great deal of innovation and alternations to 
how the algorithm works, this fast-pace of change may render attempts to regulate obsolete in 
practice. Finally, at least in terms of privacy and data protection concerns, in the wake of the 
Snowden revelations it would seem that states also have an interest in private parties 
engaging in data collection about Internet users which states can then tap into for their own 
purposes, and so the now-more-visible ‘Invisible Handshake’ may also operate to deter 
regulation of conduct that gives rise to this data collection – as the collection is in both the 
interests of Google for its business model and nation-states for their own surveillance 
purposes. 
 
 
e) Extra-legal solutions 
 
If ex ante regulation of search engines along the lines suggested above seems unlikely to be 
designed and implemented in practice, then attention turns to the possibilities offered by 
extra-legal solutions. 
 
One suggestion has been for a publicly-funded search engine which would compete with 
Google and its ilk.477 Nevertheless, Lewandowski notes that such initiatives have already 
been trialled, such as the French project Qaero, but this alternative only has an ‘insignificant’ 
market share and so can be considered to have ‘failed’ as an online search tool.478 He critiques 
the idea of publicly funding a single alternative search engine to Google as ‘placing all eggs 
in the one basket’ ie the engine could fail for a number of reasons which may not even be 
related to the quality of search offered, such as poor marketing. Instead, he suggests an 
alternative path: ‘to create a search engine index and make it available to other providers’, 
based on an open structure, access to the index being on a fair and transparent basis, and 
institutional resilience in the form of state sponsorship (not subject to the unpredictability of 
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the market).479  This model is similar to that proposed by Pasquale: a non-governmental 
agency indexing and archiving the web, using open standards for ranking and rating websites, 
which might provide ‘an important alternative source of information and metadata on ranking 
processes’.480 This is also similar to the transparency and interoperability approach to Internet 
regulation advanced by Brown and Marsden.481 In any event, this kind of publicly funded 
search index would enable, it is hoped, the creation of various alternative search engines to 
provide users with a more substantial choice than what they currently have. 
 
 
A more radical position is taken by Fuchs, specifically in response to the issues around the 
use and exploitation of user data: as a solution, Google should not be dissolved, nor are 
alternatives needed nor are its services ‘a danger to humanity’.482 Instead he advocates that 
Google should be ‘expropriated and transformed into a public, non-profit non-commercial 
organization that serves the common good’, although he does not detail what the legal basis 
for this would be – and expropriation usually involves some compensation being paid to the 
original owner, which could run into an enormous sum in the case of Google. He outlines 
how this public search engine could look like, such as its services being run by non-profit 
organisations such as universities and supported by public funding. Interestingly, 
Viadhyanathan has previously identified Google as remedying what he terms ‘public failures’ 
ie the opposite of a ‘market failure’, when the state cannot satisfy public needs and deliver 
services effectively – Google has ‘stepped into voids better filled by the public sector’.483 
 
While there seems consensus that an alternative to the status quo brought about by State 
action of some sort is desirable to remedy the problems identified, the preceding paragraphs 
present alternative paths to follow in order to achieve this: either the State should set up a new 
search engine as an alternative to Google, or Google itself should be nationalised. However, 
Fuchs also admits that despite these suggestions, a truly non-exploitative search engine for 
the benefit of humanity may only be possible through the general establishment of a 
commons-based Internet in a commons-based society.  
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In the interim, creating a strong rival to Google with a public service mandate seems the most 
realistic extra-legal solution, since the expropriation of Google would require an amount of 
‘intervention in the market’ far beyond what would be deemed acceptable in contemporary 
Euro-American developed states, even if it would provide the advantage of acquiring 
Google’s existing equipment and know-how as opposed to starting from a more preliminary 
stage with the design of a Google alternative.  
 
Nevertheless, caution is due regarding the state’s involvement in creating an alternative to 
Google from the perspective of protecting and upholding users’ rights. The concerns around 
data protection, privacy and free expression encompassed by users’ use of Google’s search 
engine and the amount of data gathering about them that the use of Google entails should also 
be at the forefront of the design of a state-backed alternative to Google. This alternative 
should not be used as a platform for states to gain even more intrusive information about their 
citizens, particularly in the context of the Snowden revelations about the misuse of state 
surveillance powers and the recent decision by the CJEU in finding the Data Retention 
Directive to be unlawful due to its lack of proportionality and undue interference with 
citizens’ privacy and data protection rights.484 
 
Thus, it may well be that P2P design is also most appropriate for a true alternative to Google’s 
monopoly – both its ‘radical’ one and its competition law conceived one. Handley advocates 
P2P search engine YaCy as both a solution to the problems presented by Google and other 
for-profit data-gathering centralised search engines, and an enabler of users’ autonomy 
online.485 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the problem of dominance and Internet search through an 
interrogation of the practices of the dominant entity, Google, and the concerns that such a 
dominant entity poses for users and their autonomy: both in terms of undesirable economic 
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consequences encompassed in a standard competition investigation and the undesirable ‘non-
economic’ consequences of dominance that the use and operation of Google entail, such as 
the infringement of privacy and data protection, and free expression concerns related to the 
‘gatekeeper’ role Google plays for users wishing to access information on the Web. 
 
The progress and outcomes of the competition investigations into Google have been 
examined. The European investigation is particularly interesting given the lack of clarity as to 
whether Google is actually abusing its dominant position in violation of EU competition law 
rules, yet the Commission has advocated a settlement with Google that would nevertheless 
see some (albeit fairly minor) changes as to how it sets out its search results, and now seems 
to be demanding more stringent commitments from Google. Precisely what has driven the 
Commission to adopt this course of action is unclear, but it actually seems a more 
‘interventionist’ approach than the ‘More Economic Approach’ would normally entail in this 
situation - unless the lobbying from European-based competitors of Google can account for 
the Commission’s conduct. 
 
However, neither competition law nor its somewhat unusual enforcement by the Commission 
goes very far to addressing the concerns around Google for users. Thus far there has been no 
more transparency around how Google conducts searches via its secretive algorithm, 
transparency which also would have addressed in part at least the concerns already identified 
around bias and censorship.  Whether more transparency regarding the search algorithm will 
form a part of a possible fourth set of commitments from Google remains to be seen. 
 
It is true that other areas of law could be used more effectively to deal with the problems 
raised. In particular, the reform of data protection law currently underway in the EU may well 
empower users to a greater extent over the collection and use of their information.  
 
Nevertheless, it would seem that ex ante regulation (in theory at least) is a more desirable 
avenue to protecting and upholding users’ rights vis-à-vis Google. This chapter has outlined 
certain proposals for regulatory reform, which may involve transparency and ‘search 
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neutrality’ obligations being placed on Google, and it is argued that these would be more 
effective in achieving the aim of protecting and empowering users than competition law 
itself. Yet the regulatory inaction in this field and the lack of prospect of any regulation 
actually being put in place at a near point in the future despite a 2012 Council of Europe 
Recommendation along these lines does not inspire confidence that ex ante regulation is a 
realistic solution. In addition, there are the usual concerns around the success of any 
regulation that might be enacted given the practical problems of enforcement, the regulation 
being ‘too little, too late’, and the possibility of regulatory capture. 
 
Thus, again it is the extra-legal solutions to which attention ought to be turned, which may be 
in the form of a publicly-funded search engine (or possibly - yet unlikely - the public 
expropriation of Google), in order to provide a non-profit alternative to the status quo given 
the market is not providing it. This, however, would need to be properly designed too in order 
to ensure data minimisation, transparency, neutrality and so on, and indeed it may be that a 
P2P equivalent is the most desirable option in practice again given the untrustworthiness of 
public power to advance user autonomy, evidenced by its vast surveillance of Internet users. 
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CHAPTER 5 DOMINANCE, DEVICES AND APP STORES 
 
When the Internet became publicly available in the early 1990s, the average user accessed it 
on a desktop computer, or (less likely) a laptop via a fixed line connection. In the interim, 
technological developments have given rise to a proliferation of devices, especially mobile, 
with which users can connect to the Internet, such as smartphones, e-book readers, games 
consoles, tablets and netbooks as well as laptops and desktops. The development of mobile 
devices on the one hand, and the move to cloud computing on the other hand (which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter), has contributed to a different Internet 
experience, arguably one more 'closed' than the Internet of the early 1990s. While desktop and 
laptop computers and their operating systems did not themselves influence the extent of the 
Internet that was available on them (but online service providers such as AOL and 
CompuServe did limit the Internet experience by offering limited 'walled garden' access in the 
early 1990s), it is now the devices themselves and their vertical integration with other parts of 
their manufacturer's business, such as ‘app stores’, which determine the kind of Internet with 
which the user engages, and Internet-dependent applications which these devices run. 
Interestingly, with the launch of Google's Chromebook and Chromebox which are designed 
solely for running Web-based applications and storing data in the cloud (rather than these 
applications being run offline on the machine and data stored on the user’s machine as well), 
this trend towards closed devices has also penetrated the traditionally agnostic laptop and 
desktop markets respectively.  
 
This move to more 'closed' devices used to access the Internet and run Internet-based 
applications has raised concerns about continued innovation, free expression, privacy, 
ownership and control, and competition – in other words, user autonomy. The markets for 
Internet devices are characterised by vertical integration of the device provider and 
distribution platforms (‘app stores’) to access content and applications for the device. 
Furthermore, these devices are increasingly relying on cloud services (which are usually part 
of the vertically integrated value chain) to store data as opposed to on the device itself. Due to 
the link between the device and the cloud service, the cloud operator can also control the data 
stored on the device or what data stored elsewhere is accessible to the device user. As will be 
seen below, this gives such device manufacturers much more control over the programs, apps 
and content that run on the device compared to 'traditional' desktop or laptop computers. This 
power can manifest in potentially anticompetitive behaviour eg discriminating in favour of 
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the device provider's vertically integrated content, or 'ideologically' censorious conduct such 
as refusing to allow users access to an app which is in some way controversial.  
 
Justifications for allowing a more 'reduced' access to the Internet for mobile devices 
compared to 'fixed' or desktop devices have been based on the fact that mobile devices 
engage the use of a scarce resource in the form of the electromagnetic spectrum to function, 
whereas desktop devices are connected to the Internet via a fixed-line which does not rely on 
the electromagnetic spectrum. As a result, early access to the mobile Internet was far more 
restricted than desktop access. Indeed, as late as 2008 the UK's Advertising Standards Agency 
banned an advert for the iPhone which claimed it could access all parts of the Internet for 
being misleading since it did not support Flash or Java so not all websites could be fully seen.   
 
However, with advances in technology which have brought high speed mobile Internet in the 
form of 4G and the convergence of the distinction between mobile and desktop as city-wide 
wifi networks are increasingly implemented, the difference becomes less pronounced. 
Furthermore, even the issue of the scarcity of electromagnetic spectrum may well be 
diminishing as spectrum-agile networks and cognitive devices become increasingly prevalent, 
which can detect available channels in wireless spectrum and accordingly change their 
transmission or reception parameters to maximise the amount of wireless communications 
that can take place concurrently. A further technical justification for ‘reduced’ Internet access 
for smartphones at least has been that the smaller size of screen entails websites may not 
display properly or fully, but with the increased use of smartphones along with technological 
advances and specially designed mobile versions of webpages this is no longer a major 
concern. 
 
Another justification for allowing such reduced Internet access is that of security, and this 
seems to be the dominant justification for what happens with mobile devices and their 
Internet access and functionality via 'apps'. In this way, device manufacturers and/or software 
distribution platform operators ensure that only 'safe' applications are available to users ie no 
viruses or illegal content. However, this process gives device manufacturers and software 
distribution platform operators (almost) complete control over what users can do and view on 
their devices, and, as will be seen below, only users who are themselves technically skilled 
can break out of this system.  
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The transition from the open desktop 'culture' to the closed and 'sanitised' environment of 
mobile devices has been documented by Zittrain, who laments the trend exhibited by mobile 
devices to be deliberately designed as less open platforms for user innovation compared to 
‘traditional’ desktop and laptop computers, or as he puts it, less ‘generative’. 486  He 
acknowledges the advantages to a more controlled environment, such as the aforementioned 
security gains, but warns of the corresponding disadvantages for innovation and progress, 
especially given the track record of the Internet itself as a system open to widespread change 
has produced more innovation and benefits than a ‘closed’ system which can only be altered 
by a centralised entity (eg a single company). Furthermore, the lack of ‘generativity’ and the 
according lock-in of users to certain platforms operated by one entity can have a negative 
effect on competition due to a lack of data portability and interoperability.487 
 
This chapter will examine problems of dominance, Internet-enabled (usually mobile) devices 
(such as e-book readers, tablet computers and smartphones) and ‘app stores’, comprising a 
discussion of gatekeeping including the economic and non-economic effects that such 
gatekeeping, especially when concentrated and ring-fenced via technology and contract, may 
have, taking into account the specific control over online information flows that this control 
encompasses and its effects on user autonomy. The structure of the mobile device value chain 
will be explained, before going on to consider the problems of dominance, gatekeeping and 
control of online information flows posed by mobile devices for users. Allegations of 
anticompetitive conduct against Apple and Google in particular will be explored, followed by 
a determination of which practices (if any) would be found abusive in practice. The extent to 
which other existing areas of law might address these problems will be considered, to 
determine whether or not there is also a ‘gap’ in the law as it stands, and so other solutions 
may be needed. 
 
 
5.1 The mobile device value chain 
 
The definitions between different kinds of Internet-enabled mobile devices is blurred, but 
they can be defined in distinction to laptops and desktop computers, and include smartphones, 
tablet computers and certain e-book readers. These categories of mobile devices converge into 
                                                             
486
 Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (Yale University Press 2008) 
487
 ibid 177 
 216 
  
each other, especially when the same operating system is used for both tablets and 
smartphones, as is the case with iPad and iPhone Apple devices which both use Apple’s iOS 
operating system, and Google Nexus smartphone and tablet devices which both use the 
Android operating system. Here, it is only the size of the device and possibly the ability to 
make phone calls through the mobile phone network which distinguish a smartphone from a 
tablet. 
 
Functionality, particularly when it comes to e-book readers, can also illustrate distinctions 
between the devices. E-book readers have had a principal function of displaying and storing 
e-books to be read by users. Yet there have been developments in these devices: now most e-
book readers now have some form of Internet connectivity, either being wifi-enabled or 
working on 3G/4G mobile networks. This Internet connectivity is sometimes restricted to 
having access to online e-book distribution platforms, or one online platform in particular 
from which users can buy e-books to read on their device (as is the case with Amazon 
devices), yet does not encompass general web browsing ability. Interestingly, the trend is 
currently away from dedicated e-book reading devices such as the 'traditional' Kindle towards 
multi-functional mobile devices which can support a variety of content types, with it being 
posited that dedicated e-book readers, especially those using e-ink, will become a niche 
market.488 
 
One important feature of all mobile devices, though, is the strong level of vertical integration 
encompassed in their value chain, which is significantly greater than the situation with ‘non-
mobile’ desktop and laptop computers. While ‘PC’ desktops and laptops may typically be 
made by a certain manufacturer, they use a different operating system (often Microsoft 
Windows) which can then run any compatible third party applications/programs and can store 
any compatible files on the computer itself. Apple desktops and laptops are more vertically 
integrated inasmuch as Apple is the manufacturer as well as the operating system owner for 
these systems, but these devices can also run any compatible third party 
applications/programs and store any compatible files. However, mobile devices can 
encompass the same corporation acting as manufacturer, operating system provider and 
application provider. Furthermore, mobile devices have also been designed to constitute 
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another virtual ‘layer’ in this value chain in the form of ‘app stores’, namely ‘controlled 
environment[s] for applications (‘apps’)’.489 These app stores offer an extra point of control 
for their vertically integrated operators, which must approve third party apps before they are 
available to users in the app stores. Due to the more restricted ‘architecture’ of mobile device 
operating systems and device functionality, power is thus concentrated in the app store 
operators, which are usually also vertically integrated with the device manufacturer and/or 
operating system provider. 
 
App store operators operate in another example of a two- (or multi-sided) market and provide 
a platform where the two sides meet. On one side are users (the device owners) and on the 
other side are app developers. App store operators often produce apps that are made available 
in the stores for users, but they also provide access to the app store to the offerings of third 
party developers. The apps themselves may be downloaded for free or for a fee, or they may 
be downloaded for free but parts of their functionality may be subject to ‘in-app’ purchases. 
The app store operator may take a percentage of any price paid either for the app itself or the 
in-app purchases as well as the app developer if it is a third party. 
 
 
5.2 Problems with mobile devices and app stores 
 
This configuration implicates two broad categories of problems for users and third party app 
developers: problems concerning anticompetitive conduct from the entities which control the 
app store; and problems of expression and control, that the app store operators can ‘censor’ 
certain apps for non-economic reasons or put other restrictions on what users can do with 
their devices.  
 
 
a) Competition 
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The concerns around competition encompass the ‘gatekeeping’ or ‘control’ function that app 
store operators exercise over what is available within the store to users. For instance, an app 
store operator which also makes apps ‘in-house’ may have an incentive to exclude apps from 
third parties which compete with its own offerings. The app store operator may also have an 
incentive to engage in predatory pricing ie offering its own apps at a low or zero price with 
the intention of raising the price for users once its competitors have exited the market.  
 
There are also other issues of competition given the high level of vertical integration of the 
value chain. Users who purchase, for instance, an Apple device are forced to use the Apple 
app store and operating system unless they ‘jailbreak’ the device. In order to ‘jailbreak’ these 
devices, however, and load on an alternative operating system and/or access an alternative 
app store, certain digital rights management measures (DRMs)/technical protected measures 
(TPMs) whose primary purpose is to protect digital copyrighted material may need to be 
circumvented. Various problems arise here since the circumvention of these digital ‘locks’ 
may be illegal, even if there is no infringement of copyright (due to anti-circumvention 
provisions introduced initially by the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, possibly also 
supplemented by contractual terms), and the purpose is to provide users with a choice of 
operating system and/or app store. Thus, the vertically integrated provider’s control over the 
value chain and ability to resist competition can be entrenched by the laws around 
circumventing TPMs by restricting users’ choice at these various parts of the value chain. 
 
 
b) Free expression and control 
 
These characteristics of mobile device value chains and control also pose other, ‘non-
economic’ problems for users. Firstly, the app store operators can ensure that certain apps are 
not approved and made available in the store for users for reasons other than competition. The 
inclusion of apps in the Apple App Store, for instance, is governed by the non-negotiable App 
Store Review Guidelines (as well as general Terms of Use). Some apps containing ‘adult’, 
pornographic or erotic content have not been approved for inclusion in the App Store, even 
though this content is not necessarily illegal. Other apps with controversial political (but still 
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legal) content have been removed from the App Store as well, such an app which provided 
access to WikiLeaks’ content on the leaked US embassy cables from 2010 (Apple gave no 
reason as to why it was removed),
490
 and another app created to raise awareness of the US’s 
‘drone war’ was rejected by Apple on various occasions for inter alia being ‘objectionable 
and crude’.491 Thus app store operators can perform a censoring role over what content and 
applications users can receive and use. Indeed, Hestres considers that the control that Apple 
and other App Store/operating system providers exercise over what apps are approved or not 
‘poses a greater barrier to content diversity and freedom of expression than lack of 
technological generativity’.492 
 
This control extends as well to users’ ability to use their mobile devices however they wish. 
The use of DRMs/TPMs to ‘lock’ users into a particular app store or operating system and the 
more limited functionality of these mobile devices via their original design and their 
operations compared to desktop and laptop computers leaves users much less able to use their 
devices as they may wish. This is compounded by the degree of legal ‘greyness’ in certain 
circumstances when it comes to jailbreaking the devices, which will be discussed below. 
 
Similarly to the scenarios discussed in other chapters of this thesis, if there are truly 
competitive markets, then these problems either may not exist or may not pose significant 
disadvantages to users – users (and developers for that matter) could switch to other operators 
in a competitive market, and the market would offer differentiated solutions, such as certain 
operators giving users more freedom and choice in response to their demand. However, it is 
submitted here too that when markets are not competitive, these problems of expression and 
control are exacerbated. Furthermore, the price of these devices, usually running into the 
€100s, as well as smartphones often being packaged with 12 or 24 month contracts with a 
mobile network operator, entail that it is difficult and expensive to switch devices if users are 
unhappy with what their provider offers, and so even a competitive market may not provide 
much relief for users who are in practice ‘locked-in’ to a particular device ‘ecosystem’. 
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c) Privacy 
 
There are also heightened privacy concerns over mobile devices and their app store 
ecosystems, since the operation of the app stores has implicated the collection of a large 
amount of data about users. For certain apps to be downloaded to a user’s device, the user 
must agree to the app store itself and sometimes also the third party developer having access 
to certain information about that user and how she operates her device. Furthermore, there 
have been allegations that app store operators have passed along personal information about 
users to third party developers in a less than transparent fashion.
493
 
 
‘In-kind’ payments by users of their personal data or metadata characterises mobile device 
ecosystems in a similar way to the user side of search engines, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Users may be able to download certain apps for free inasmuch as they do not pay a 
sum of money for the app, but they do ‘pay’ by handing over information about themselves 
and their conduct. 
 
Privacy issues for mobile devices may be exacerbated by the greater reliance on the ‘cloud’ 
that these devices have (and have been designed to have) – so files may be more easily stored 
in the ‘cloud’ (again, often a vertically integrated offering by the same company that 
manufacturers the device, manages the app stores, provides apps) rather than on the device 
itself, as was traditionally the case with desktop and laptop computers. This line of control 
enables a large amount of data to be collected about users, and the ‘mobile’ nature of these 
devices too provides a rich supply of data about the location of the user when she is using the 
device. 
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While the user may ‘consent’ when she first buys the device and each time she downloads a 
new app to use, it may not be clear exactly what is being consented to (in terms of exactly 
what data is being gathered) and the average user may not understand the language in the 
privacy policy.
494
 Furthermore, there is no real ‘choice’ on this matter between the different 
offerings from Apple, Google, etc given none of them provide users with a mobile device 
which does not invade their privacy. Accordingly, a lack of respect for user privacy when 
using these devices and applications entails an interference with user autonomy and is 
exacerbated by the concentration of the market and an absence of true choice. 
 
 
5.3 Mobile devices, apps and market developments 
 
As discussed above, mobile device markets are characterised by their two-sided nature – the 
platform is provided which acts as a meeting place for users on the one side and app 
developers and content providers on the other side. The markets are also characterised by a 
strong degree of vertical integration, where device manufacturers are integrated with 
operating systems, app stores, cloud services and applications. 
 
Related to this strong degree of vertical integration are the network effects which also 
characterise these markets, and contribute to their concentration around certain big players, 
namely Google, Apple and, to a lesser extent, Amazon. The more users that these platform 
ecosystems have, the more attractive they are to app developers and content providers as their 
offerings can reach more potential customers. Accordingly, the more a mobile device 
ecosystem offers in terms of a variety of content and applications, the more attractive these 
ecosystems will be to end users. 
 
Another characteristic of these mobile device ecosystems, again mentioned above, is the 
strong degree of ‘lock-in’ users experience, which makes switching to competitors’ offerings 
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more challenging. This lock-in is achieved in various ways: with smartphones, it can be due 
to users obtaining the device as part of a long-term contact with a particular network provider 
(with penalties for the user if she terminates the contract before the period is over) – thus 
lock-in by legal means. Another significant method of lock-in is the design of the devices and 
operating systems, which entails that only one app store from which applications for the 
device can be downloaded is available, and this is usually a vertically integrated offering of 
the device manufacturer and/or operating system provider. Users are thus ‘locked-in’ by 
technical means to using that app store and the applications it approves. As mentioned above, 
it is possible for users to choose another app store or operating system via ‘jailbreaking’ the 
device and then have a wider/different selection of apps available, but this is not a simple 
procedure. If the device is not jailbroken, then the app store operator/operating system 
provider/device manufacturer exercises ultimate power and control over the content that can 
be accessed on it and the programs that it can run. For Apple, for instance, this vertical 
integration has been a feature of its business model for a long time, predating the 
development of mobile devices. 
 
This lock-in is compounded by the legal status of jailbreaking. Aside from jailbreaking 
devices in order to use other software and applications being a somewhat technically complex 
procedure, the process involves breaking DRMs/TPMs. These technical locks are intended to 
protect copyright and prevent infringement by limiting the user's ability to copy/lend/modify 
files and devices, and they also allow syncing between 'approved' devices - but their practical 
application often goes much further than this purpose, for instance preventing interoperability 
of file formats and devices, or preventing the use of copyrighted works that are legal, such as 
fair use/dealing or copying for private/research purposes.  
 
Hackers have worked out technical measures to get around, remove or ‘break’ DRM but these 
are not necessarily legal even though these ‘breaking’ techniques have at least a dual use: on 
the one hand they can be used to infringe copyright, but on the other hand they can be used 
for legitimate reasons such as to facilitate interoperability. The law on this point comes from 
Article 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, which provides that signatory states should 
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors to protect their work, ie 
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DRMs/TPMs. Both the US and the EU are signatories to this treaty, and have transposed it 
into their domestic laws. In the US it is found in section 103 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, which makes it illegal to circumvent DRM measures, although claims not to 
affect defences to copyright infringement such as fair use. The Librarian of Congress also 
issues exemptions to this rule: there is currently an exemption for jailbreaking smartphones, 
but not for jailbreaking tablets or e-books readers. In any event, it is at least a grey area as to 
whether breaking DRM to make a file or device interoperable or to load on different 
software/content is legal. In the EU, it is Article 6 of the ‘Copyright’ or ‘Infosoc’ Directive 
that transposes this provision, and it discusses Member States making available national 
exemptions/limitations in the absence of voluntary measures being taken by rightsholders. 
However, different European Member States have identified different exceptions (or 
exceptions with differing scopes) to the prohibition on circumvention, and the EU also lacks a 
similar process to that overseen by the Librarian of Congress in the US regarding the issuing 
of exceptions.495 As a result of this opacity as to the legal situation for users, jailbreaking can 
be viewed as a ‘legally unattractive option’, especially when there is no explicit exception for 
it such as for smartphones in the US.496 
 
 
a) Market leaders 
 
While precise market definition can prove tricky for mobile devices given overlapping 
functionality and use by users, certain large players can be identified as raising dominance 
concerns, especially Apple and Google. 
 
Apple is active in both the smartphone and tablet markets, pioneering tablet take-up with the 
introduction of its iPad. As mentioned already, Apple provides its own operating system on 
its devices, the iOS, and also operates the Apple App Store for these devices as well as 
providing its own apps alongside the offerings of third parties. 
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Google provides its own devices in the form of the Nexus branded tablets and smartphones, 
but it also offers its Android mobile device operating system to be used by other device 
manufacturers, with Samsung being a notable manufacturer which has used Android in its 
devices. Android is an open source operating system - Google releases the source code under 
an Apache licence, which allows the software to be modified and distributed freely by the 
device manufacturers and wireless carriers. However, Google has trademarked ‘Android’ and 
only permits others to use this trademark and call what they have done ‘Android’ as well as 
use the Google Play app store, apps created by Google and related data if their version passes 
Google's certification tests and adheres to various other terms. Nevertheless, Android has 
undergone a process of fragmentation with ‘forked’ versions of it emerging - indeed, 
Amazon's Kindle Fire uses a forked version of Android that is not approved by Google, and 
has its own app store rather than using Google's services.  
 
At the time of writing, systems running the Android operating system have a share of the 
European tablet market of almost 70%, while Apple’s share is 29%.497 Android systems also 
lead European smartphone markets overall, with a share of 71%, against Apple’s declining 
share of 16%.498 Apple’s share in the UK is higher, of around 32% but in other EU5 markets 
its share is as low as 8%.499  
 
In the US, Android’s market share has grown over the last year or so, such that it now has 
around 50% of the smartphone market compared to Apple’s share of 44%.500 As for tablets, 
Apple has a larger market share than in Europe, with around 52% of the market in North 
America (US and Canada), but its market share there is also declining in favour of Android 
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systems.501 
 
From this it can be seen that the market in the US is more competitive inasmuch as the market 
shares would suggest no one entity has market power, while in the EU the Android operating 
system’s indicative shares of around 70% of both the smartphone and tablet markets may 
present a stronger case for it having a dominant position in these markets. 
 
As for app stores, globally the Apple App Store has a 65% market share to Google Play’s 
35% in terms of revenue,502 even if Google Play facilitates 75% of all app downloads.503 
 
Nevertheless, even if one player does not have a dominant position in these broader markets, 
and so there is little cause for concern from a competition perspective, the possibility of user 
lock-in and each brand of device/app store constituting a market in itself can create a situation 
in which there are problems for competition, and most certainly problems for user autonomy 
once stuck in such a situation. 
 
 
b) Allegations of anticompetitive conduct 
 
Both Google and Apple have been accused of behaving anticompetitively in the running of 
their mobile device ecosystems. 
 
 
i) Apple 
 
A scenario which pre-dates Internet-enabled mobile devices but involves a predecessor to the 
iPhone was the antitrust proceedings against Apple’s portable digital music device, the iPod 
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(whose original versions did not have Internet connectivity) in the US.504  
 
The complaint, in the form of a class action, concerned the alleged tying, in violation of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, of the iPod device to Apple’s iTunes store (which can be 
viewed as a predecessor of the Apple App Store) and was triggered by the iPod not supporting 
a music file format engineered by a competitor via the use of Apple’s proprietary DRM.505 
This entailed that iPod device owners would have to obtain their music files via the iTunes 
store, and music bought through the iTunes store could only be played on iPods and not 
competitors’ digital music devices. The claim of tying was subsequently dropped, and 
modified twice, with the finalised argument being that that Apple engaged in alleged 
monopolization based on inflated prices for iTunes music downloads, thus users paid prices 
of a supracompetitive level. The plaintiff alleged that as a result of Apple’s proprietary DRM, 
Apple achieved a monopoly in the personal digital music player and audio download markets, 
and that Apple maintained and furthered its monopoly in these markets through the use of 
software updates intended to prevent Apple’s competitors from selling music files that were 
compatible with iPod, and playing music bought through iTunes on other devices, thus 
enabling Apple to charge supracompetitive prices for music downloads. Furthermore, it was 
claimed that the use of this proprietary DRM on music files was anticompetitive conduct on 
Apple’s behalf. 
 
The case was dismissed by a District Court and this dismissal was upheld on appeal by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.506 The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a 
monopolization claim for damages based on overcharged music downloads since she failed to 
plead sufficient facts: indeed, in the relevant time period Apple had continuously charged the 
same price regardless of whether there were competitors present and so the plaintiff failed to 
show that Apple’s software updates affected the music prices, and failed to show that Apple’s 
prices were supracompetitive in the circumstances. The plaintiff had also failed to show that 
the use of proprietary DRM constituted an antitrust injury, given a restriction of consumer 
choice in itself does not constitute an antitrust injury, and a lack of allegation that the 
presence of DRM on the files harmed competition in the music download market ie was an 
injury to competition. There were also procedural issues in this case which contributed to its 
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dismissal, but it does seem to suggest that the use of DRM (or TPMs) will not in itself be 
anticompetitive – it must also produce an anticompetitive outcome for it to constitute antitrust 
injury. 
 
The class action proceeded with some other plaintiffs, and went to trial again in late 2014.507 
However, the jury at trial found no antitrust violation, due to Apple making legitimate product 
and security improvements to the iPod devices and the iTunes software, seemingly following 
the Kodak and IBM lines of case law discussed in the previous chapter. At the time of writing, 
this decision has been appealed. 
 
Apple has also faced other controversies in the US specifically regarding the governance of 
its App Store. Apple initially blocked the voice over IP (VoIP) service Skype as an app for its 
iPhone in the US which was contracted to AT&T for use with its 3G mobile network, 
presumably to prevent competition for AT&T's voice services, but Skype was finally made 
available in 2009, possibly due to some informal regulatory pressure as AT&T specifically 
informed the FCC of their decision.508 Google's Voice app had also been rejected from the 
App Store which prompted the Federal Communications Commission to question this 
decision.509 Apple had argued that the Google Voice app merely replicated existing iPhone 
features,510 but eventually it made the Google Voice app available in the App Store, quite 
possibly because antitrust agencies (FTC or DoJ) might have viewed Apple’s conduct as 
anticompetitive and abusive.511 
 
Furthermore, Apple has been involved in more litigation in the US. In the proceedings in 
Ward et al v Apple, the complainants alleged that Apple had violated section 2 of the Sherman 
Act by entering into exclusive distribution contracts in the US with AT&T, locking iPhone 
buyers into these voice and data contracts. These proceedings were consolidated with another 
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class action alleging that Apple unlawfully stifled competition and consumer choice and 
artificially increased the prices in the aftermarkets for iPhone voice and data services and for 
iPhone software apps by retaining exclusive control over the iPhone’s design, features and 
operating software, refusing to approve any app by an outside developer which did not pay an 
annual fee of $99 to use Apple’s software development kit or agree to 30% of any app sale 
going to Apple, and not providing iPhone customers with any means by which they could 
download third party apps not approved by Apple. A US District Court dismissed the 
complaint due to standing issues concerning the plaintiffs’ ability to bring the antitrust case 
and the questionable accuracy of some of their allegations.512 This decision leaves open the 
possibility of a better-worded complaint being made in which the plaintiffs’ standing is 
established, and certainly does not definitively establish that Apple’s conduct is not 
anticompetitive. However, to establish Apple’s conduct is anticompetitive and in breach of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, Apple would have to be shown to have a dominant position, 
and from the subsection above, this does not appear to be the case for the US smartphone 
market. Thus it may have to be demonstrated that these aftermarkets for iPhone voice and 
data services, and apps exist, which is not necessarily a straightforward task in practice, as 
will be explored below. 
 
Finally, Apple has been embroiled in litigation regarding anticompetitive conduct vis-à-vis 
the distribution of e-books. 513  Apple and five of the ‘Big Six’ book publishers (namely 
HarperCollins, Hachette, Simon & Schuster, Penguin and Macmillan) have been investigated 
for alleged price-fixing in both the EU and US. Apple provides access to e-books on its 
mobile devices via its iBookstore app, though also allows users to purchase or otherwise 
obtain e-books from other sources, such as via Amazon’s Kindle app, but all content being 
read outside of an app must be uploaded to Apple’s distribution platforms and Apple has also 
tried to ensure that e-books being sold from other sources are not available for lower prices 
than via the iBookstore. The particular conduct which was the subject of the competition 
investigations concerned new ‘agency’ contracts that Apple entered into with the book 
publishers which gave them more control over retail prices and also gave Apple 30% of the 
final retail prices and an assurance that the e-books would not be sold elsewhere for less than 
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Apple’s price for them. The European Commission investigated Apple and the book 
publishers for alleged price fixing in breach of Art 101 TFEU, suspecting that the shift to 
agency contracts may have been the result of collusion between competing publishers with 
Apple’s help and may have had as their goal the increase of retail e-book prices or the 
prevention of the emergence of lower prices for consumers. Apple and the publishers 
eventually offered commitments to the Commission that they would terminate the existing 
agency agreements and not adopt clauses which would prevent them from selling e-books 
more cheaply via Apple’s competitors compared to Apple’s prices for five years. However, in 
the US, all of the publishers settled with the Department of Justice which filed a civil antitrust 
suit against them, while Apple opted not to settle and the case went to trial. The District Court 
judge held that Apple had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, finding direct and 
circumstantial evidence that Apple had conspired with the publishers to eliminate retail price 
competition and raise the price of e-books.514 The DoJ had proposed a remedy to Apple’s 
illegal conduct that would have had consequences beyond the e-book markets: it wanted 
Apple to be prohibited from entering from entering into agreements with suppliers of other 
types of content as well as e-books (eg music, films, TV) that were likely to increase the 
prices at which Apple’s competitors might sell that content too.515 Furthermore, the DoJ also 
proposed that Apple must allow competing e-book sellers such as Amazon and Barnes & 
Noble to provide links from their e-book apps for Apple devices to their e-bookstores.516 Yet 
neither of these remedies made the final judgement from September 2013, which concerned 
only e-books, stipulated that the agency agreements must be terminated as well as agreements 
containing clauses which restrict the retailer’s ability to set the retail price of an e-book or 
clauses which attempt to ensure that other retailers will not sell e-books for lower prices.517  
 
While the final judgement is likely to ensure lower e-book prices and more competitive e-
book markets for consumer, the measures initially proposed by the DoJ but left out in the end 
would have had more wide-ranging consequences, particularly for the operation of Apple’s 
App Store. Similar aspects of the model Apple used to contract with the book publishers are 
found in Apple’s contracts with other entities selling their content/apps through its App Store, 
including newspaper publishers and software developers, such as a 30% cut of overall profits 
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going to Apple. Previously Apple had wanted an assurance that the other party not sell its 
wares elsewhere for a price lower than that which it offers via the App Store (although it 
would seem that Apple no longer enforces this requirement),518 and Apple has ensured that 
the other party does not include signups for paid services to be accessible directly in the app 
other than those available through the In App Purchase feature (which must abide by Apple’s 
pricing rules). The DoJ’s initial proposal would not have prevented Apple from continuing to 
receive a 30% cut of revenue but it might have averted the move to agency contracts in other 
content sector and have encouraged more competition among content retailers. The initial 
proposal would also, however, have affected the In-App Purchase rules by allowing third 
party providers in the form of rival e-book retail distributors to provide direct links to their 
platforms from inside their apps, while Apple’s rules entail that third parties which do not 
wish to follow the rules and wish to sell content via their own prices must do so through their 
websites, accessible via iPad and iPhone browsers, or even create a ‘web app’ in HTML5, 
which is what the Financial Times preferred to maintaining an Apple App Store app. 
However, there have been allegations that certain web apps may run slowly on Apple devices 
when launched from the home screen, possibly to deter users from these apps and encourage 
them to use ones available through the Apple App Store.519 
 
While there are thus other options for content providers than adhering to Apple’s In-App 
Purchase rules they are less convenient for users, and attempts to circumvent Apple’s App 
Store rules by creating web apps may provide a lower quality experience for users compared 
to using Apple-sanctioned apps. 
 
 
ii) Google 
 
Google and its Android-fronted mobile ecosystem have also been accused of anticompetitive 
conduct.  
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The online search-facing side of the European Commission’s competition investigation into 
Google was discussed previously in Chapter 3; however that investigation also has concerned 
other aspects of Google’s business. Indeed, part of Microsoft’s complaint to the Commission 
alleging anticompetitive behaviour from Google included an allegation that Google prevented 
Microsoft's smartphones from working properly with YouTube, as contrasted with the 
situation with YouTube and phones using Google's Android operating system (and apparently 
Apple iPhones as well). Microsoft competes with Google in inter alia the search market, and 
the mobile operating system market - initially with Windows Mobile for smartphones, which 
was succeeded by Windows Phone, and Windows 8 for tablet computers.  
 
Furthermore, the FairSearch coalition of Google’s competitors filed another complaint with 
the Commission regarding Google’s practice of obliging manufacturers which wish to use the 
Android operating system to ‘pre-load an entire suite of Google mobile services and to give 
them prominent default placement on the phone’.520 However, this formulation of the problem 
somewhat obscures the actual situation with Google’s demands – in fact, manufacturers are 
free to use the Android operating system without pre-loading Google apps, but if they wish to 
pre-load some Google apps, they must pre-load a whole suite of them as opposed to just the 
apps which are more prominent or popular. Yet more recent information has surfaced which 
suggests that if manufacturers wish to use the most recent version of Android, they must pre-
load a suite of Google apps and services, although they can use older version of Android 
without being obliged to load on these additional Google products. 521  It seems that the 
European Commission has a renewed interest in this case and at the time of writing has been 
inquiring further into Google’s precise business practices in this area. 
 
There are, however, important differences between how Google and Apple operate their 
mobile device ecosystems. Firstly, unlike Apple, Google permits other app stores beyond its 
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own Google Play to be installed on devices running Android operating systems,522 except 
possibly the situation in which a manufacturer wishes to install the latest version of Android. 
Secondly, bona fide Android apps can be installed and executed on a device without needing 
to go through Google Play, either via the aforementioned non-Google app stores which 
Google permits, or directly downloaded from a developer’s website – this process is known 
as ‘sideloading’. Finally, ‘rooting’ the device is another option open to Android users, similar 
to ‘jailbreaking’ Apple devices inasmuch as both processes give the user ‘superuser’ 
administrative privileges, but distinct from jailbreaking as using a different operating system 
or app store is usually permitted on Android devices (while not on Apple ones) by the device 
vendor. 
 
Thus, any claim that Google is engaging in anticompetitive bundling would seem to involve 
only the apps rather than the apps plus Android operating system (unless the speculation 
about manufacturers wanting to install the latest version of Android is accurate). Even then, 
since the apps are available via other means such as sideloading, it may be that a strong 
competition claim would only involve the Google Play app/store – ie if a manufacturer 
wishes to offer the Google mobile device ecosystem comprising the Android operating system 
and the Google Play app store, it must also pre-load various other Google apps onto the 
device before it is sold.523 If it is indeed true that Google is requiring manufacturers to pre-
load various Google app and services onto their devices if they wish to use the most recent 
version of the Android operating system, then this may be the most convincing example of 
possible anticompetitive bundling. The European Commission’s continuing inquiries on this 
point ought to clarify whether this is actually the situation in practice. 
 
Google is also being sued in the US on similar grounds.524 The complaint alleges that Google 
is acting anticompetitively in including Google’s search app in this pre-loaded suite of 
applications, especially given ‘consumers do not know how to switch, nor will they go to the 
trouble of switching the default search engine on their devices, so this practice is a highly 
effective means of ensuring that consumers will use Google search to conduct general 
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Internet queries rather than one of its competitors’ search products’.525 The contention is that 
the agreements that Google makes with manufacturers which wish to pre-install these apps 
are in restraint of trade and are designed to maintain and extend Google’s dominance in 
search markets via tying Google apps the manufacturer may want to other apps, such as 
search, that the manufacturer may not want to pre-install.  
 
 
5.4 Is there anticompetitive conduct? 
 
In the following subsections, Apple and Google’s conduct will be examined to see whether 
they are in fact engaging in anticompetitive conduct in the running of their mobile device 
ecosystems. The relevant markets will be considered, and competitive constraints incumbent 
on both entities will be discussed. If either Apple or Google is found to have market power in 
a particular mobile device market, then whether their conduct amounts to an abuse of a 
dominant position will be considered. The harmful conduct that will be considered in this 
section is threefold: the blocking of apps (which are otherwise legal) by an app store operator; 
the tying of products and services in one mobile device market to products and services in 
another market; and the use of DRM to achieve user lock-in and a lack of interoperability.  
 
 
a) Relevant markets and market share 
 
For the complaints outlined in the previous section to constitute anticompetitive conduct, 
Apple and Google must be found to have dominant positions in the relevant market, hence 
market definition is the first step. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is a high degree of vertical integration in 
mobile device markets, and also conglomeration inasmuch as the main players in these 
markets are also active in other information markets as well, most prominently Google whose 
online search engine forms the basis for Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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i) Device/operating system markets 
 
Certain relevant markets can be defined for the possible anticompetitive conduct. Firstly, 
there is the market for Internet-enabled mobile devices, which can be further subdivided into 
markets for smartphones and markets for tablets. Secondly there is the market for operating 
systems for mobile devices. Apple and Google are active in both of these markets, but Google 
only has a small presence in the device markets with its Nexus range, which does not even 
make up a majority of devices using its own Android operating system.
526
 
 
In any event, it would seem that any of these market definitions would be too wide in order to 
find that Apple was dominant/had market power based on market share. From the figures 
detailed in the section on Market Leaders above, Apple and Google are the two major players 
in mobile device markets in the US and EU. While Android may have a larger share of 
mobile operating system markets in the EU and a slightly larger share of the tablet market 
operating systems, Apple has the larger share of tablet operating systems in the US, with both 
companies having similarly sized shares of the smartphone market. However, these figures 
are for new devices currently being sold and do not reflect the devices already sold, which 
given Apple’s first mover advantage, may give Apple a larger market share. In any event, 
these shares suggest that these markets are not concentrated around one sole entity and might 
well be judged competitive since market shares have not remained static over the last few 
years. 
 
Narrower markets around particular branded devices may also be defined eg Apple iPhones 
may be found to constitute their own market, so Apple is the only player in this market and 
thus dominant. Indeed, this seemed to be the approach taken in a French case regarding a 
contract entered into between Apple and Orange for exclusive distribution rights concerning 
the iPhone in France, Belgium and Romania, which was alleged by another mobile network 
operator to be anticompetitive on the grounds of imposing unjustifiable vertical restraints, and 
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found to be anticompetitive by the Conseil de la Concurrence, a decision which was upheld 
by the Paris Court of Appeal.
527
 Cox considers that the iPhone’s ‘unique characteristics’ gave 
Apple ‘monopolist bargaining power’, which seemed to be hinted at in the Conseil de la 
Concurrence’s research for the case, and was explicit in the French Supreme Court’s 
reasoning, that the iPhone’s industrial design combined with its functions rendered it distinct 
from other smartphones.
528
  
 
The question remains from this is the extent to which Apple products are substitutable for eg 
Android products. The Apple/Orange litigation in France took place before mobile devices 
with Android operating systems became widely available, and so it could be argued that while 
at the time those procedures were occurring, iPhone constituted a product market in 
themselves, the launch and take-up of Android-enabled products (as well as mobile devices 
running other operating systems) has provided an equivalent to Apple products in terms of 
design and functionality, belied by the ‘patent wars’ which have included allegations that 
Android infringed Apple’s patents. It is unclear whether the Conseil de la Concurrence used 
the SSNIP test in the Apple/Orange litigation, but it would seem at the time of writing that if 
Apple did attempt to raise its prices then it would likely lose market share to competitors. 
 
Nevertheless, Apple may be considered to offer a sufficiently ‘different’ experience to 
devices running Android operating systems for Apple devices to constitute separate product 
markets in themselves, due to factors such as the perception of quality and security the Apple 
ecosystem offers compared to that of Android.  
 
Furthermore, from the ‘demand’ side of the market, app developers are likely to make 
separate apps for the Apple App Store and the Google Play/other Android app stores given 
the different APIs that each ecosystem uses – therefore they may be regarded as separate 
markets from that side as well. 
 
In any event, even if Apple devices are not considered to constitute their own product markets 
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per se, the Apple App Store or iOS operating system for instance may be considered as a 
complementary product constituting an ‘aftermarket’ – such that even if Apple does not have 
power over the smartphone or tablet market, it may have a dominant position in the secondary 
market for iPhone or iPad app stores or operating systems. This is assessed on an empirical, 
case-by-case basis, and depends on inter alia whether consumers take into account the prices 
(and other features) of this secondary market for app stores when making their initial 
purchase on the primary ie smartphone or tablet market. Yet mobile devices might be 
considered to be ‘experience goods’, whereby product characteristics are difficult to observe 
in advance but can be ascertained upon consumption, or might be considered experience 
goods at least for consumers who have never purchased one before. If they are considered as 
such, then consumers may be unlikely to take into account features of the secondary markets 
prior to purchasing the primary product ie the device, and so the aftermarkets analysis will 
not hold. 
 
Regarding Google, as mentioned above it has only a small share of device markets with its 
Nexus range. However, it is in the operating system markets rather than device market where 
Google, through Android, may have market power. Nevertheless, the ‘open’ nature of the 
Android system, which is distributed on a free software basis, would be at odds with a finding 
of market power since Google permits Android to be taken and modified by others for no 
charge (so long as the latter makes the source code of the new system available), thus anyone 
can freely produce a version of Android to ‘compete’ with Google’s.529 In any event, the 
allegations against Google relate to its apps/app store rather than the Android operating 
system itself, which as mentioned is distributed on a free software basis, and, unlike the 
Apple ecosystem, using the Android operating system on a device does not require using the 
app store, Google Play, as well. 
 
 
ii) App Stores 
 
If mobile app stores can be taken to be another market, then market share can be calculated in 
two ways: either via revenue for the app store provider, in which case Apple leads the market 
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globally, or in terms of app downloads, in which Google Play leads. It is important to note 
here that data collected through apps is another way in which Google ‘feeds’ its overall 
business model of acquiring large amounts of information about users, so even if apps are 
‘free’ in terms of not costing money, or little money compared to what users or developers 
pay through the Apple App Store, particularly users may be ‘paying’ instead via the 
collection of their personal information while they are using the app and the device. 
 
The market for mobile app stores may be further subdivided, for instance into narrower 
markets for mobile app stores on Apple/iOS devices (which as mentioned above could also be 
considered an ‘aftermarket’ for these devices – Apple may not be dominant in the smartphone 
or tablet markets, but would be dominant in this market if it is considered a separate 
secondary market) and app stores on Android. Google Play is considered to be the leading 
Android app store in terms of number of apps available and downloads of those apps,
530
 but 
there are other app stores for Android not affiliated to Google, and there are fewer barriers to 
using these alternatives compared to the situation with Apple devices. 
 
 
iii) Markets for specific apps 
 
Further markets may be defined for specific types of app, such as for search engine apps (as 
alleged in the American Android complaint), or video apps (such as was implicit from 
Microsoft’s European complaint). In both of these cases, it is Google which is the entity 
behinds these apps – and the fact these particular Google services are the subject of 
competition concerns concurs with Kenny and Pon’s view of where Google captures value in 
the mobile device ecosystem, that it is presumably here due to the user data and advertising 
revenue generated by these apps, as opposed to aspects of the mobile devices themselves.
531
 
 
For search apps, they may be judged to be also in a separate relevant market to ‘desktop’ 
search or ‘browser’ search, with which the competition investigations into Google detailed in 
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Chapter 3 were principally concerned. Whether they constitute a separate market in 
themselves will depend on their substitutability: the extent to which desktop or browser 
search is substitutable for search app search. This may well be the case given the different 
functionality of each, and the ‘better experience’ that search via a search app may offer on a 
mobile device compared to via a browser. In any event, even if search apps are judged to 
constitute a separate market, then it would seem that Google still has a dominant position in 
this market globally and also in the US at least.
532
 It is likely that Google would also 
dominate the search app market in the EU as well.  
 
As for YouTube, the relevant market would need to be defined, which is not clear – it may be 
the market for online video content aggregators or specific apps for online video content 
aggregation. How market share might be measured in whatever market is defined is also 
unclear – it may be measured either by views, downloads and/or advertising revenue. 
Nevertheless, YouTube has an important position globally as generating a large amount of 
advertising revenue as well as being a very popular online resource in terms of total views,
533
 
so may well be found to have a leading share in that market. 
 
 
b) Competitive constraints 
 
Before dominance or market power can be ascertained, the competitive constraints in each 
market must be examined. 
 
The markets for mobile Internet devices are currently reasonably competitive from the 
consumer perspective. There is competition among Apple devices, Android-enabled devices, 
devices running Windows Mobiles etc, and, except in the case of Apple, there is a selection of 
manufacturers making devices running each operating system – whether Google’s Android 
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for which there is no charge, or Windows Mobile operating system for which device 
manufacturers pay Microsoft for a licence to use. It is submitted that there is not significant 
buyer power on the part of the device manufacturers given the consolidation of the mobile 
operating system markets around Apple, Google and (to a lesser extent) Microsoft, and the 
network effects each exhibit for users and app developers. As mentioned above, market 
shares for different players have fluctuated over recent years, which suggests these markets 
are competitive and in terms of device provider, there seems to be none with an overall 
dominant share. While there are high barriers to entry for a completely new manufacturer, for 
established phone or computer manufacturers the barriers to entering these new markets are 
relatively low, particularly given the availability of free operating systems such as Android to 
install onto their devices.  
 
However, it is a different picture if a market specifically for Apple products is found to exist. 
Apple is completely dominant over these products as it is the only vendor and it does not 
license its iOS operating system to other manufacturers to use with their devices. This is also 
the case for any Apple product aftermarkets that may be identified, such as for the Apple App 
Store or iOS operating system – aside from ‘jailbroken’ devices, Apple is entirely dominant 
in these markets and so has market power. While it is unclear how many Apple devices have 
been jailbroken and so ensuring Apple is subject to competition in these aftermarkets, the 
scant evidence available suggests that only a very small percentage of Apple products are 
indeed jailbroken eg 2% of the total,
534
 and so the practice of jailbreaking is likely to be 
insufficient to exercise much of a competitive constraint on Apple in these aftermarkets. In 
consequence, users experience a high degree of ‘lock-in’ to Apple’s ecosystem when they 
acquire an Apple device given the lack of choice offered in terms of operating system and 
App Store, as well as the difficulty in switching to rivals’ offerings, which essentially must be 
done through jailbreaking – a complex and sometimes unsuccessful process. 
 
The overall situation for app stores in general is likely to be competitive as well, since there 
are various app stores in circulation exerting competitive constraints on each other. This is 
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especially the case concerning Android devices, on which Google permits a choice of app 
store, including its own Google Play offering but also the offerings of competitors. 
Nevertheless, these app stores also exhibit network effects inasmuch as the more users there 
are, the more attractive developing an app for a specific app store is from the perspective of 
developers, while conversely the more apps there are available in an app store, the more 
attractive that store is for users. For Apple devices, the Apple App Store could be considered 
a specific aftermarket in which Apple is dominant even if it is not accepted that Apple 
products themselves form their own relevant market, as discussed above. 
 
Finally, as regards the markets for specific apps, in theory these ought to be competitive given 
the low entry barriers a priori for creating an app to run on mobile devices. However, in the 
specific circumstances of search engine apps, this market would seem to mirror the entry 
barriers in the search engine market as discussed in Chapter 3, most notably the vast amount 
of user data over which Google presides which would be difficult to replicate by many 
potential competitors (except possibly Facebook), which leads to Google having a dominant 
position in these markets at least in the EU. YouTube as a video content aggregator would 
seem to experience more competitive constraints, from other video hosting/aggregating sites 
and apps and possibly also from social networks and other user generated content platforms. 
However, YouTube is likely to benefit from network effects inasmuch as the more users 
upload videos to it, the more attractive it will be to those wishing to watch videos, and the 
more users it has as an audience, the more attractive it will be to those wishing to upload their 
videos and have them seen. 
 
 
c) Abuse of dominant position 
 
Here, three types of conduct in mobile device ecosystems which are most injurious to users’ 
autonomy will be considered to determine whether they would constitute anticompetitive 
behaviour. As mentioned above, these three types of conduct are: tying products and services 
from one market to products and services in another, thus depriving users of choice; the 
mobile device ecosystem operator locking users into that ecosystem, also depriving them of 
choice; and a mobile app store blocking apps. 
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i) Tying 
 
Tying is problematic for user autonomy in mobile device ecosystems because it deprives 
them of a choice of products and services, including from competitors of the mobile device 
ecosystem operator and permits the ecosystem operator to exert a high level of control. Two 
instances of tying will be examined here: Apple’s tying of its operating system, app store and 
possibly also individual Apple apps to the initial purchase of the mobile device; and Google’s 
alleged tying of a pre-loaded suite of its apps to either certain other Google apps or the 
current version of the Android operating system. 
 
Taking the situation with Apple first, in order to show tying the relevant market would have 
to be one specifically for Apple-branded devices, although the discussion above shows that 
the market may not be defined so tightly around Apple products, and in the general market for 
smartphones or tablets Apple will not have a dominant position). Assuming this is the correct 
characterisation of the relevant market, the anticompetitive conduct on Apple’s behalf would 
be an abuse of dominance in tying its devices to downstream markets for operating systems, 
App Stores and possibly also certain individual Apple-owned apps. This situation is 
reminiscent of the Microsoft case,
535
 where Microsoft engaged in ‘technical tying’ by 
physically integrating the tied product into the tying product so that it was impossible to take 
one product without the other – here it is impossible (or at least only possible via the legally 
questionable jailbreaking) to take Apple devices (the tying product) without also getting the 
Apple operating system and the Apple App Store on them (the tied products).  
 
To show anticompetitive tying, aside from a dominant position, there must be two distinct 
products being tied as opposed to a single integrated one, however in this situation that does 
not seem to pose a problem: as the conduct of other players (particularly Google) in these 
markets demonstrates, the device is distinct from the operating system which is distinct from 
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the app store. Customers must also be coerced into purchasing both the tying and tied product: 
in the Microsoft case, the General Court found that there had been coercion of customers to 
take the Windows Media Player application with Windows operating system since it was 
‘technically bundled’ and impossible to uninstall from the operating system. Here, unless the 
device is jailbroken, it would be impossible to uninstall the operating system or app store 
from the Apple device, and it is submitted that this is an analogous situation to that of 
Microsoft. This is unlikely to be the case with individual Apple apps however, as it is possible 
to uninstall them.  
 
Finally, it must be demonstrated that the tie has an anticompetitive foreclosure effect. It 
would appear that this is the case here, that the market for operating systems on Apple 
devices and/or app stores on Apple devices is indeed foreclosed as a result of the tie between 
the device and these other products since no other players are able to compete in these 
markets as a result. Thus, unless Apple was able to show an objective justification for this tie, 
or that the tie enhances efficiency, it is likely it would be judged anticompetitive. One 
justification may be the ‘safety’ of the experience Apple offers on its devices – that users are 
sure that they will receive a quality and ‘family friendly’ product at all stages from the device 
itself to the applications available on the device, however a similar justification was rejected 
by the Commission in Hilti,
536
 which was upheld on appeal by the General Court.
 537
  
 
If the market is not defined as being a narrow one for Apple products only, then the 
aftermarkets approach could be taken, ie that Apple may not have market power on the wider 
markets for smartphones and tablets, but does have power in the secondary markets of 
operating systems and/or app stores for Apple devices. If this approach is followed, then the 
tying would be between the operating system iOS and the App Store and in accordance with 
the steps above, it would be likely that this scenario would be judged anticompetitive if these 
aftermarkets are found to exist. If these aftermarkets can be found to exist, then it would seem 
that the tying claim on this basis would be more likely to succeed than the claim based on 
Apple products as constituting their own separate market. While this might have been more 
credible some years ago, the competitive constraint exercised by similar products using other 
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operating systems such as Android would appear to place Apple devices in more general 
markets for smartphones and tablets. Thus, it is submitted that it is unlikely that Apple will be 
found to have the requisite dominant position at the time of writing and so it is unlikely to be 
found to have engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the form of abuse of dominance. 
 
Regarding Google’s conduct, the tying claims concern Google’s alleged tying of certain 
desirable Google apps to a whole suite of (supposedly less desirable) Google apps if a device 
manufacturer wants to pre-load any Google apps onto an Android operating system-enabled 
device. If the claim regarding app pre-loading onto the most recent version of Android is true, 
then this may also constitute tying: the Google app suite is tied to the operating system. 
 
Regarding the first situation, of Google tying certain apps to others, Google would have to be 
found to have a dominant position over the ‘tying’ apps ie the desirable ones that devices 
manufacturers would wish to pre-load. As mentioned in the section 5.4 a) (iii) (Markets for 
specific apps) it is unclear what the relevant markets here are, but supposing that Google did 
have a dominant position with YouTube for instance in a properly-defined market, then it 
would appear that Google is tying two distinct products: the desirable apps to the less 
desirable apps. The issue of coercion may be more difficult to establish, and depends upon the 
truth of the allegation that Google coerces device manufacturers into pre-loading the Google 
app suite if they wish to use the most recent version of Android. If this is not the case, then 
the tying situation only arises when the device manufacturers wish to preload some apps 
before the device is sold to the user, in which case they must preload the whole suite if they 
wish any of the individual apps. Users are still able to download the apps (including 
Google’s) they wish on their devices once they have bought the device, even if there has been 
no pre-loading of Google apps. Nevertheless, if this situation is deemed to mount to coercion 
ie not possible to get the tying apps without the tied apps, then the anticompetitive foreclosure 
effects must be found, that Google is leveraging its dominance in certain markets into other 
markets, which may well be the case in practice. Furthermore, there must be no objective 
justification for the tie, and indeed it is difficult to see what objective justification Google 
could have here beyond attempting to increase its market share in other markets/increase the 
amount of data it gathers about users in order to boost the advertising side of its business by 
engaging in this conduct.  
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As regards the possible second situation, of Google possibly tying the most recent version of 
Android to its suite of pre-loaded apps, then Google would have to be demonstrated to have a 
dominant position in the ‘tying’ product market, ie that of operating systems. In the EU at 
least, this may well be the case since Android has around a 70% share of the smartphone and 
tablet markets there which is sufficient to constitute dominance. The apps also constitute a 
separate market to the operating system, and coercion is likely to be established if the 
allegations are true, that manufacturers must take this app suite if they wish the latest version 
of Android. Again, it would be difficult to see what the objective justification is for this 
conduct. However, one weakness in this claim may lie in the fact that if the allegations are 
true, it is only the most recent version of Android which is implicated in the tying, while other 
versions of Android can be used by manufacturers without this obligation to pre-load apps. 
The most recent version of Android may be viewed to have a much smaller share of the 
market than Android operating systems taken altogether, and so the dominant position may 
not be found in the first place, and thus the tying would not be anticompetitive. 
 
Thus, as regards anticompetitive tying in mobile device ecosystems, it seems that in Apple’s 
case it will only be found if either a narrow market for Apple products is defined (in which 
case there may be tying between these devices, the operating system and/or the app store, but 
not individual apps themselves) or if aftermarkets for Apple products exist, in which case 
Apple may be tying its operating system to app store in an anticompetitive fashion. Google 
may also be found to be engaging in anticompetitive tying in its pre-loaded app suite, either in 
terms of tying some apps to other apps, or tying the most recent version of Android to these 
apps.  
 
In terms of remedies for any anticompetitive conduct found to exist, Apple may be forced to 
give users a choice of operating system or app store, which would represent a major change to 
its business practices –although as mentioned above, Apple is unlikely to be found to have a 
dominant position in the requisite market in the first place and so it is unlikely it will be found 
to have engaged in an anticompetitive abuse of dominance. In Google’s case, the remedy is 
likely to encompass Google being forced to offer certain individual apps for pre-loading onto 
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Android devices rather than forcing device manufacturers to pre-load the app suite, or force 
Google to offer the latest version of Android without forcing device manufacturers to pre-
load apps. However, these remedies are unlikely to alter fundamentally how Google conducts 
its mobile device business from the user perspective particularly with regards to Google’s 
data gathering, but then Google’s mobile ecosystem is decidedly more ‘open’ than Apple’s 
and gives the user more control (although not total control) over their devices. 
 
 
ii) Lock-in 
 
Another scenario which may constitute an abuse of dominance is the use of DRMs and TPMs 
in mobile device ecosystems to ‘lock’ users technically into that ecosystem – for instance, by 
preventing them from accessing a choice of app store (in the case of Apple devices), a choice 
of cloud service or certain other apps, content and services, and possibly also preventing users 
from engaging in data portability to a rival’s service. 
 
These DRMs and TPMs usually involve certain standards protected by intellectual property, 
and the exclusive rights of the intellectual property holder – the device ecosystem operator – 
are usually to be respected notwithstanding the restrictions on portability and interoperability 
the operations of these standards can involve. However, in certain, exceptional circumstances, 
a dominant player preventing interoperability of such standards may be viewed as an abuse of 
dominance.
538
 Indeed, this was one of the findings in the European Microsoft case, that 
Microsoft had to give its competitors full access to the information which would allow them 
to interoperate with its services, otherwise they would not be able to compete viably with 
Microsoft.  
 
In mobile device markets, then this would require the finding of a dominant position initially. 
Whether a dominant position may be found in these markets has been discussed above. 
                                                             
538
 Inge Graef and others, ‘Putting the Right to Data Portability into a Competition Law Perspective’ (2013) 
Law: The Journal of the Higher School of Economics Annual Review, 53 
 246 
  
Google may be the most likely candidate to have a dominant position in EU smartphone and 
tablet markets, regarding its Android operating system and certain apps, but it generally 
engages in less lock-in than Apple. Apple may only have this dominant position if its devices 
are taken to be markets in themselves, or if aftermarkets are found. Even in these scenarios, it 
is unclear whether the requisite ‘exceptional circumstances’ would be found in mobile device 
markets, particular where there does seem to be competition overall in the markets. 
 
 
iii) Blocking apps 
 
The practice of blocking apps created by third party developers by app store operators may 
also be subjected to competition scrutiny as constituting a possible abuse of a dominant 
position namely a refusal to deal.  
 
However, it would have to be demonstrated that entry into the particular app store was an 
essential facility or ‘indispensable’ for a developer wishing to compete in the downstream 
apps markets in accordance with the requirement from the Bronner case. There are various 
other app stores which the developer could use to distribute the app, as well as ‘web apps’ 
such as the Financial Times approach, and then of course distribution of that information via 
the web browsers on these devices. Although jailbreaking the device may not be attractive for 
many users due to a lack of technical knowledge and the risks involved with doing so, 
accessing information through the web browser is likely to be attractive and accessible even 
to users without much technical knowledge, even if the contents may not be fully optimised 
for mobile devices. Furthermore, the app store operator may well have objective justifications 
for not including certain apps, such as that they contain prohibited content in accordance with 
its guidelines for developers – content which may be prohibited by the app store even if it is 
not prohibited by the law on eg pornography.  
 
Thus in the absence of a finding of essential facility, an app store, even one with a dominant 
position, is unlikely to be acting anticompetitively in blocking apps. 
 247 
  
 
 
iv) Summary 
 
Competition law in the particular form of abuse of dominance is unlikely in practice to do 
much to alleviate user concerns with private economic power exercised over mobile device 
ecosystems. Apple may not be judged to have a dominant position in any market, even though 
its business practices in its mobile device ecosystem are the most restrictive of user freedom 
and choice. Google may be more likely to be engaging in anticompetitive conduct, 
particularly tying, but from the user perspective its conduct is less limiting of user choice 
(although poses plenty of privacy problems – yet these are unlikely to be addressed here) and 
remedies for any anticompetitive conduct are more likely to be beneficial to device 
manufacturers. Lock-in using DRMs and TPMs and app stores blocking apps are unlikely to 
be anticompetitive due to the intellectual property rights involved in the former case, and the 
high threshold that needs to be reached in order for a refusal to deal to be found. Thus, ‘gaps’ 
are left by this area of law when it comes to protecting users’ interests vis-à-vis for-profit 
mobile device ecosystems. 
 
 
5.5 Other legal regimes 
 
Given competition law’s abuse of dominance is unlikely to address all the problems identified 
at the beginning of this chapter which are posed by private economic power over mobile 
device ecosystems, other areas of law will be considered here to determine the extent to 
which they fill in the ‘gaps’. 
 
 
a) Free expression 
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Earlier in this chapter, a lack of free expression for users was identified as one of the 
problems posed by mobile devices due to the higher level of control over them that their 
vendors exercise, particularly Apple. 
 
Previous chapters have identified at length how laws protecting freedom of expression may 
apply to scenarios where it is another private party restricting users’ free expression, 
particularly Chapter 3 on Internet provision (Section 3.7 a)), so the full detail will not be 
repeated here. Suffice it to say that in Europe, Art 10 of the ECHR has been found to have 
some horizontal effect in disputes between two private parties and it has also been found to 
apply to restrictions on the freedom to receive information on the Internet, yet whether it has 
been infringed depends highly on the facts of the situation at hand. The Yilidrim decision 
shows that some expression being blocked from being received by users over the Internet can 
constitute a violation of Article 10 – which would be relevant to the circumstances of this 
situation as well, where Apple (for instance) can block certain classes of content or apps. Yet 
while these apps may be blocked or restricted, if the content is still available on the device via 
the browser or web apps then it is highly unlikely that Art 10 would be found to have been 
infringed – and even if the information is available by other means, although not via a mobile 
device, then this is probably sufficient to ensure that Art 10 has not been violated, in 
accordance with the Khurshid Mustafa case. One other avenue may be if Apple’s App Store 
management practices were having a sufficiently adverse effect on media plurality, as this has 
been another scenario about which the ECtHR has been particularly concerned, although it 
would seem that if the material that Apple is prohibiting from its App Store is still available 
via the web browser, then Apple’s prohibition is unlikely to amount in practice to being a 
threat to media plurality in a particular territory. 
 
In the US, it is likely that the operators of mobile device ecosystems will be considered  
‘speakers’ for the purposes of the First Amendment and so interference with how they 
operates their app store on expression grounds is likely not to be possible in practice, even to 
uphold the free expression rights of others. 
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In addition, mobile device ecosystem operators may well be able to use their intellectual 
property rights in order to fend off free expression claims of users, as well as claims in 
competition as discussed above, either in terms of what is included in the app stores, or in 
terms of the lock-in users experience when buying a device (particularly Apple’s), when there 
is no choice of operating system, app store, etc. Since intellectual property and particularly 
technical protection measures protecting this intellectual property is used at each stage of 
Apple’s device value chain for one, then Apple may argue that its exclusive rights granted 
under this regime permit it to decide how its property is used and by whom. Furthermore, this 
is also the case as to restrictions Apple and its ilk may place on third party app developers, 
since application programming interfaces (APIs) have recently been found to enjoy copyright 
protection in the US at least.
539
 
 
Thus due to combination of the high barriers that must be traversed in terms of finding an 
infringement of Art 10 in these circumstances, and the intellectual property protections that 
mobile device vendors enjoy which allows them to ‘lock’ users and developers for that matter 
into their particular mobile Internet device ecosystems, it is unlikely that free expression laws 
can aid users in addressing the problems that Internet mobile device vendors pose for their 
free expression and free flow of online information. 
 
 
b) Data protection and privacy 
 
The data protection and privacy problems are not addressed at all by any potential 
competition intervention in mobile device markets. Again, the European data protection 
regime has been explained at greater length already earlier in this thesis, particularly in 
Chapter 4, so a detailed account will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that in the current 
Data Protection Directive, personal data can only be processed under limited circumstances in 
which the criteria of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality are fulfilled.  
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The British Information Commissioner’s Office has issued more specific guidance to mobile 
app developers as to how they can comply with data protection law, which emphasises data 
minimisation and privacy by design as desirable traits for apps collecting user data.
540
 While 
data minimisation and privacy by design are laudable goals for mobile apps and the systems 
on which they run, the option for users not to have their data gathered in the first place while 
using these devices and applications is usually not present. Users who may wish to preserve 
their privacy either must agree to standard term contracts when using the devices and apps, or 
not agree and thus not use the apps. Data protection law will not mandate these companies to 
give users another option, that they can use the services and not have their data collected, 
even if they may have to pay an additional fee. This lack of real choice for users is 
compounded by the fact that all mobile ecosystems are engaging in this data-gathering 
conduct so even if a user opts out of eg the Android ecosystem, they do not encounter a 
qualitative difference in this regard when using eg the Apple ecosystem. 
 
The reform to European data protection law in the form of the draft Regulation currently 
under discussion may ensure that app developers and mobile device vendors must seek user 
consent more actively than the existing law mandates. The original text of the draft 
Regulation, in which user consent would not provide a legal basis for processing data where 
there is a significant imbalance between the data subject and controller’s position, would 
possibly have entailed that large corporations such as Google and Apple providing mobile 
devices and apps would not be permitted to process user data given this imbalance between 
them and users. However, this provision has been amended by the European Parliament to 
read that consent must be ‘purpose-limited’ – such that these corporations would only be 
permitted to process users’ personal data for a specific purpose and would have to seek users’ 
consent again to process it for another purpose. While this would put some restrictions on 
what these corporations could do with the data they collect, it is not as restrictive (and 
protective of user privacy) as the original formulation of the text. Moreover, the draft 
Regulation text adopted by the Parliament would not prevent this user data being collected in 
the first place, which is effectively the strongest way to protect user privacy. 
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The configuration of popular mobile device ecosystems ensures a much greater intrusion into 
user privacy than previous desktop/laptop computers entailed, or even pre-smartphone mobile 
phones (dumbphones?). The grouping of computer facilities with connectivity over telecoms 
infrastructure, GPS tracking, built-in cameras and the development of high-speed mobile 
Internet ensures that a large amount of data about an individual’s movements beyond Internet 
browsing for instance can now be gathered – such as real-time location, images and so on.541 
The portability of such devices too has spillover effects in other, hitherto offline, areas of life 
– raising concerns about privacy in public places for instance, where previously CCTV was 
perhaps the main threat to data protection and individual privacy, whereas now other citizens 
are equipped with machines that perform similar functions, with a large amount of the data 
generated being collected and stored by vast global corporations. Here, even if individual 
mobile device users agree to terms and conditions which outline privacy protections (or lack 
thereof), other citizens circulating in public places may become incidental data subjects yet 
not have expressed any consent for their image to be taken or other data to be gathered about 
them. Thus the portability of these devices demonstrates one limitation of the current data 
protection regime. This trend is likely to be exacerbated with the rise of the Internet of Things 
adding many more data-gathering Internet-enabled artefacts to the network. 
 
Nevertheless, one aspect of the draft Regulation that may be of benefit to users given the 
lock-in they experience in these mobile device ecosystems is the proposed right to data 
portability, whereby users would be able to obtain their personal data held by a particular 
entity, in order to move to a competitor for instance, yet with the proviso that this right only 
would apply if the data is already in ‘a structured and commonly used format’.542 However, if 
the user has provided their personal data and the processing is done based on the user’s 
consent or on a contract, the user should have a right to port that data in a commonly used 
electronic format, seemingly mandating that in these situations the data controller must 
provide that data in a commonly used format.  
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Even if the Regulation is enacted and comes into force, this does not represent a particularly 
strong right for users, since entities processing user data on a basis which is not user consent 
or a contract could sidestep some of its stipulations by not arranging the user data into such a 
structured and commonly used format.543 Furthermore, in the former scenario (of users being 
able to access their personal data if it is already in a structured and commonly used format), 
that data will not necessarily be deleted from the repository where it is being held. 
 
 
c) Regulation 
 
Given current laws on competition, free expression and privacy are inadequate to address all 
of the concerns identified at the beginning of this chapter, possible regulatory avenues for 
mobile Internet devices ought now be explored.  
 
Some kind of mandated ‘openness’ or ‘neutrality’ in how app stores function may address the 
free expression and competition concerns that arise in mobile device ecosystems. Mac Sithigh 
has suggested that electronic programming guides (EPGs) regulation in the EU may provide a 
possible model for app stores to adopt, whereby fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
access terms are imposed on the provision of EPGs, regardless of whether there is significant 
market power or a dominant position, although these do not amount to a right to be included 
or price regulation as such, but requirements to conduct themselves in a particular way when 
entering into dealings with other parties, which are publicly available, unlike Apple’s opaque 
review guidelines for developers.
544
 Certainly app stores, especially those with more 
prescriptive terms for inclusion such as Apple, would benefit consumers and the competitive 
process by being more transparent about how they accept or reject third party apps, and in this 
way would uphold the interests of developers on their side of the market. 
 
However, this process would still not necessarily guarantee the freedom of users, especially 
those on the other side of the market, to receive information via app stores. To do this, 
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Hestres suggests a more ‘invasive’ regulatory approach to that effect in the form of ‘app 
neutrality’ (inspired by suggested net neutrality guidelines, discussed in Chapter 2): 
 
 The app store operator (in Hestres’ example, Apple) would reject apps that contain 
universally accepted illegal content or facilitate/incite universally accepted illegal 
behaviour – such as child pornography/paedophilia; 
 Apps that violate national laws, which themselves conflict with internationally 
recognised human rights laws and standards would not be rejected; 
 Apps could be rejected for technical reasons, such as the potential damage they 
may cause to devices; 
 There must be clear, unambiguous, publicly available developer guidelines; 
 When rejecting apps, the app store operator would provide clear reasons for doing 
so, that refer to the specific guidelines allegedly rejected by the developer; 
 A transparent appeals process for rejected apps would be established; 
 If an app which was initially approved is now rejected, clear reasons referring 
explicitly to the guidelines would be provided.
545
 
 
It is submitted that the adoption of guidelines akin to these would allay the free expression 
concerns regarding what apps are included in app stores, especially the Apple App Store 
which is particularly controlled in a top-down manner. In this way, a less paternalistic 
approach would be taken to users, giving them more autonomy over the content they access, 
as well as possibly having spillover effects as regards competition in the app store offerings. 
 
However, this approach only concentrates on app stores themselves, and does not address the 
technical issue of interoperability and a lack of choice of app store and operating system for 
Apple devices in particular, which is also experienced to lesser degrees in other mobile device 
ecosystems. As explored earlier in this chapter, a lack of interoperability or access to 
competitors’ products in itself is not an infringement of competition law: there must be a 
dominant position, and even then ‘exceptional circumstances’ may be necessary for access to 
be granted. Yet this does not aid users who are locked into these particular proprietary mobile 
device ecosystems. Thus some form of mandated interoperability with other systems, and the 
presenting of users with a choice of operating systems and/or app store when they first 
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purchase a mobile device would be welcome. The limited right to data portability included in 
the draft Data Protection Regulation even if it did come into force may be only of limited 
practical benefit, since it does not mandate user data being made available in an interoperable 
fashion, leaving that choice up to the entity doing the data processing – unless the data is 
obtained via user consent or a contract. A stronger right would address competition, privacy 
and free expression concerns by ensuring that users could ‘take their data with them’ 
regardless of the basis on which their data was collected in the first place, moving to other 
services, with that data being deleted from the servers of the original provider – reducing 
switching costs, protecting their private information and permitting them more freedom over 
their devices and online presence.  
 
Thus some kind of app neutrality regulation such as that suggested by Hestres would address 
the expression problems inherent in how Apple in particular operates its App Store and deals 
with third party apps. Some kind of interoperability/data portability regulation such as a 
stronger version of the right to data portability proposed in the EU draft Data Protection 
Regulation would address the problems around user lock-in to particular branded mobile 
device ecosystems and programs. Yet the deeper privacy problems still remain and perhaps 
can only be solved at a more socio-cultural level than current legal conceptions of the 
problem. For instance, data protection laws and privacy contracts focus on the device user 
and her (more informed or less informed) consent, yet these devices can also constitute an 
infringement of others’ privacy given their near-constant Internet connectedness, their 
geolocation revelations (via the Internet and/or mobile phone masts) and their capacity to 
collect data about other people such as photographs or audio in public places. Given 
advancements in technology whereby facial recognition of a particular individual from a 
photo is possible, or voice from an audio recording, there is a deep problem in how these 
devices facilitate near-constant surveillance of peers. Of course, this is convenient for Elkin-
Koren and Salzberger’s Invisible Handshake discussed earlier in this thesis, by which the 
nation-state co-opts the private providers of devices and services to perform information 
gathering on citizens, thus there is little incentive for government to reduce the privacy-
invading impact of these devices by laws and regulation if that will affect its own proxy 
surveillance activities. This status quo also suits corporations whose business models are 
based on or aided by gathering data about users ie Fuch’s ‘economic surveillance’.546 Thus, it 
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is submitted a broader paradigm shift is necessary in order to ensure an adequate level of non-
interference with private persons and their behaviour and the current legal, political and 
economic climate is otherwise unlikely to facilitate that level of protection. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored issues for dominance and mobile Internet devices, looking at the 
familiar combination of competition, free expression and privacy. At best, the anticompetitive 
abuses taking places in these scenario are abusive tying of one level of the mobile device 
ecosystem to another (in Apple’s case) or certain desirable apps to other less desirable apps 
(in Google’s case). Yet the remedies for these potential abuses are likely to be no more severe 
than users being given a choice of offerings from competitors along with the hitherto tied 
product. The remedies are unlikely to be as invasive as to change fundamentally the operating 
of the app store, for instance, or ensure users are given the choice to use certain services 
without their personal data being gathered, even for an extra fee. 
 
Other areas of law have been explored to discern whether they can offer more protection to 
users and their interest when engaging in these mobile device ecosystems. Free expression 
laws are unlikely to facilitate this greater protection of users unless certain content is blocked 
entirely from them (including via web browsers and possibly not available at all via any other 
means) or there is a threat to media plurality, highly specific circumstances that may not arise. 
The data protection regime in the EU does little to stop these services gathering vast amounts 
of data about users, which are usually governed by standard terms and conditions to which 
users must ‘agree’ and abide by the stated rules on data gathering, or disagree and not use the 
services at all. 
 
Ex ante regulation would address the main competition and free expression concerns that 
arise, through ‘app neutrality’ rules at the app store level, by which broadly speaking app 
store operators would have to include apps that contain otherwise legitimate material and are 
not harmful to the network or device (eg such as being sufficiently secure and not introducing 
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viruses). This would address problems around app store operators not including apps made by 
rivals and apps that may be ‘ideologically awkward’ but otherwise legal. Furthermore, a 
strong right to data portability for users may well ensure that they are not ‘locked-in’ to the 
entire Apple ecosystem when they buy an Apple product, further stimulating competition and 
giving them more freedom over their own devices. 
 
However, the issue of privacy in these mobile ecosystems and outside of the systems remains, 
and is only likely to be exacerbated by the onward march of the Internet of Things and the 
norm of sustained data gathering from any source possible, promoted by Big Data evangelists 
yet co-opted by governments for their ‘political’ surveillance programmes and large 
information corporations for their ‘economic’ surveillance programmes. This unholy 
marriage of state and corporate interests in advancing data slurping technologies is unlikely to 
be subject to sufficient pressure to reform from the law, architecture, market and norms as 
they currently are, and it is submitted a socio-cultural change is necessary in order to preserve 
individual privacy and autonomy from this technocorporatist alliance. 
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CHAPTER 6 DOMINANCE AND THE CLOUD 
 
In this chapter, dominance and the cloud will be examined. While there is no single definition 
of the cloud or cloud computing, it can be thought of as the storage of data and processing in 
a location which is not the user's own computer,547 or the provision of computer resources on-
demand over the Internet.548 The programs and applications run on an external server, and 
data is stored on this external server, rather than on the user’s own device, and so is an 
example of the client-server model. Even if the term ‘cloud computing’ was not coined until 
recently, users have been storing their data in ‘the cloud’ at least since they have been using 
web-based email clients such as Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo mail etc – if a user sends a document 
as an attachment, the sent email including the attached file will be retained and stored by the 
email provider. However, ‘cloud computing’ became the ‘mainstream’ term to describe the 
remote programs, applications and data storage services with the launch of Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) in 2005.549 
 
Cloud facilities offer many advantages to users such as remote storage, easy and ubiquitous 
accessibility, the storage or processing of (very) large amounts of data which would not be 
possible on a user’s device, the opportunity to collaborate with other users privately and 
remotely, and so on. However, cloud computing also poses problems for users, including for 
competition given the lack of interoperability and data portability, along with other issues 
regarding the control of information, data protection and privacy. In addition, surveillance is 
heightened with the placing of yet more user data in the cloud, accompanied by the trends 
observed with mobile devices to store data, especially content, in the cloud rather than on the 
users' devices (as has been seen in the previous chapter). 
 
It is important to point out that there is no one type of cloud or cloud computing. There are 
‘public’ clouds, ‘private’ clouds, ‘community’ clouds, hybrid clouds (encompassing a mixture 
of eg private and public) and even distributed clouds. The major deployment models for cloud 
computing are public, private and hybrid. Public clouds encompass services rendered over a 
network open for use by the general public and usually only offer access to the cloud via the 
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Internet. Examples of public cloud providers include Amazon, Microsoft and Google. Private 
clouds are operated solely for a single organisation which may be managed internally or by a 
third party provided and can be hosted either internally or externally. They usually are subject 
to more security settings and protections than public clouds. Community clouds occupy a 
positive between public and private clouds, in which infrastructure is shared among a few 
organisations with common interests, with costs shared between fewer users than public 
clouds yet more users than private clouds. Hybrid clouds encompass a mixture of services 
typical of private, public and hybrid clouds. 
 
This chapter will concentrate on dominance and public cloud services, since these cloud 
services directly use the Internet for users’ connections, and thus directly implicate online 
information flows (as opposed to data flows in closed private networks).  
 
 
6.1 Problems with the cloud 
 
There are various issues that arise from use of the cloud by users, encompassing the now-
familiar trio of privacy/data protection, free expression/control and competition. Despite the 
name, public clouds are another sector in which the players are private corporations providing 
these services for profit. 
 
a) Privacy and data protection 
 
Privacy and data protection are engaged by use of cloud services since users usually have to 
provide credentials to access these services, as well as the high likelihood of confidential, 
personal and otherwise sensitive information being divulged through their use, and the rich 
contextual picture that can be built of these users and their habits also through use of the 
cloud. 
 
While users may be able to minimise the risk of privacy and data protection breaches by not 
storing sensitive data in cloud services, or by relying on more than one provider, 550  the 
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metadata about their conduct in interacting with cloud services could still be collected by the 
cloud provider. Metadata can be conceptualised as the data ‘about’ a communication as 
opposed to the content of that communication – such as IP address of the sender/receiver, 
time, date, place of connection, etc. However, the theoretical distinction between metadata 
and communications content cannot be sustained so neatly in practice. Metadata can paint a 
highly detailed picture of an individual and in some circumstances can be ‘even more 
revealing than the content of our communications’.551 
 
Indeed, this collection of data about users, whether via the content of their communications 
with the cloud or the metadata that these communications generates, fuels the business 
models of some cloud providers, which may provide, for instance, data storage space in the 
cloud for no monetary cost to users, but may harvest and aggregate this data as ‘recompense’ 
for the ‘free’ service, which can then be sold on to advertisers (or accessed by governments 
for surveillance purposes).  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Google is a major cloud services provider to individual users with its 
Google Drive cloud data storage service, and this forms one of the portfolio of Google 
services from which it gathers data, as mentioned in the previous chapters. 
 
Furthermore, there are often jurisdictional issues concerning cloud providers which provide 
services to customers geographically located in other countries, and may have their servers 
geographically located in yet another country. Such a scenario may exacerbate privacy 
concerns given the differing privacy and data protection standards in different countries and 
their practical enforceability abroad, as well as the possibility of data being accessed by the 
governments of countries of which a user is not a citizen.552 
 
 
b) Free expression and control 
 
The issue of users' control of data resurfaces here as well – by moving their data to the cloud 
                                                             
551
 Bryce Clayton Newell and Joseph T Tennis, ‘Me, My Metadata, and the NSA: Privacy and Government 
Metadata Surveillance Programs’ (iConference 2014, Berlin, March 2014), 2 
552
 Dan Svantesson and Roger Clarke, ‘Privacy and consumer risks in cloud computing’ (2010) 26(4) Computer 
Law & Security Review 391 
 262 
  
either in terms of storing files in the cloud or using applications in the cloud from which data 
about them is gathered, they give the cloud provider more effective control over the 
management of their data. There are implications on the one hand for the ownership and 
property over the data contained in cloud storage,553 and on the other hand for freedom of 
expression, given the surveillance role that the data storage provider has over the information 
uploaded to it and the power it has to censor that information.554 
 
Indeed, Lametti sees the move to the cloud as not only potentially rendering the concept of 
user privacy meaningless, but also reducing the possibilities for users to participate in the 
Internet as ‘creators, collaborators and sharers’ ie a reduction of user autonomy online, and 
this is compounded by the fact the devices they use to interact with the Internet are 
increasingly emasculated ie smartphones and tablets (which are more restricted than 
traditional computers and laptops, as seen in the previous chapter).555 The consequence of this 
is that providers have a greater capacity to manage and control what users do within the 
cloud, thus weakening users’ online autonomy, and arguably also their free expression 
broadly conceived.556 While this is not the fault of the cloud per se, its implementation along 
with the rise of mobile devices and their entwinement leads to this dramatic loss of user 
privacy, leaving users without a means of using such devices or using the cloud in ways in 
which their privacy is preserved. 
 
In addition, the use of digital rights management (DRMs) to control content and applications 
in the cloud is often done in a way which is more restrictive of users than the law entails. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, these ‘digital locks’ are used to protect copyrighted 
content and software, but they often do not reflect the permitted exceptions to copyright that 
exist in the law for users, such as fair dealing/use, and have the effect of reducing data 
portability and interoperability. Users may not be able to remove the content or applications 
which they have legally bought from one cloud ecosystem to another as a result of DRMs. In 
addition, interoperability can also be limited by contractual terms which oblige users to use 
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certain cloud services when purchasing eg a certain device. 
 
 
c) Competition and dominance 
 
Similarly to other Internet markets already examined, in theory at least some of the privacy, 
data protection and data control concerns would be addressed by a competitive market for 
cloud data storage services, in which users (as consumers) would switch provider if they were 
dissatisfied with the terms and conditions, and consumer demand for services with privacy 
protection etc would be met by providers. 
 
Nevertheless, the cloud itself promotes centralisation in the Internet (although perhaps not 
under the control of just one entity), since it has become profitable for large-scale data storage 
(along with other computing services) to move from a local computer and server to the 
resources of a non-local centralised system.557 Furthermore, thus far the move to the cloud 
has also facilitated vertical integration in the Internet, with cloud providers competing with 
each other for users to use their services, for instance by offering cloud storage for free or for 
a small cost, and integrating other services with their cloud services in order to make their 
cloud services more attractive. 558  Once users choose the particular cloud provider, they 
usually experience lock-in due to a lack of interoperability and high switching costs to other 
providers, and perhaps even the inability to access their data in cloud storage on the devices 
of competitors, or experience restriction in the content that is available to them depending on 
the vertically integrated cloud provider’s ‘commercial and ideological interests’.559  
 
In addition, there are various features of cloud markets which facilitate dominance. Firstly, 
the market for data storage in the cloud can be characterised as being two-sided with the 
presence of network effects. The network effects and the associated accumulation of user data 
and meta-data by platforms whose revenue is based on selling this information to advertisers 
can constitute a barrier to entry for potential competitors which want to enter the market. This 
is particularly so when these cloud services are not interoperable with each other (as is often 
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the case in practice), which limits users' mobility and ability to switch between competing 
platforms. The reason is that potential competitors in the form of alternative cloud providers 
in these circumstances would have to make large investments in technical infrastructure, 
software and advertisement to provide a service of sufficient quality and sufficiently popular 
to compete with what already exists, thus there are economies of scale and scope in the 
operation of data centres.560 Data portability does not appear to be a problem that will be 
solved by the market since providers currently have no incentive to facilitate it. 561 
Furthermore, since the provision of cloud services to individual users tend to be governed by 
standard form contracts, and the existence of unequal bargaining power between these parties 
in favour of the cloud provider, which can result in unfair and potentially anti-competitive 
terms that can raise switching costs and lead to consumer lock-in.562  
 
A further feature of cloud markets is the possibility of leveraging dominance from one market 
into another – either a dominant position in a cloud market into a non-cloud market, or a 
dominant position in a non-cloud market, such as that for mobile devices, mobile device 
operating systems etc, into a cloud market. Indeed, as will be seen below, given that a 
dominant position is unlikely to be found in cloud markets, the leveraging of dominance from 
a non-cloud market into the cloud may constitute the most likely finding of abusive conduct. 
This conduct may be related to a lack of interoperability and data portability, restricting what 
users can do with their information by preventing interoperability or portability may be part 
of this tying – that if the user uses a particular mobile device, for instance, then she is tied to 
using a particular cloud service, and is not able, or at least inhibited from choosing another 
service by a lack of interoperability and portability. 
 
 
6.2 Cloud computing and market developments 
 
Overall, it seems that markets for cloud computing are relatively competitive. Cloud 
computing is a broad and vague term, and so encompasses a variety of functions – software as 
a service, infrastructure as a service, platform as a service etc. Thus an overall market for 
cloud computing would be defined in a very broad fashion and would likely not exhibit 
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dominance. Indeed, Sluijs and others noted in 2006 that markets for cloud computing were 
actually quite competitive,563 and it is submitted that this remains the case now, with various 
large vertically integrated providers such as Google, Amazon, and Apple, as well as other 
cloud-only players all vying with each other to provide cloud services. It seems unlikely that 
in a generalised market for cloud computing services any one of these players could be 
deemed to have a dominant position, especially in the US with its high threshold for 
dominance. Even if the market is defined more narrowly, such as for data storage in the cloud, 
then it is still submitted that this market would also be found to be sufficiently competitive 
not to have given rise to a dominant player.  
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, certain cloud providers are vertically integrated with other 
Internet services, in whose markets they may be dominant, with a prime candidate being 
Google, which has a dominant position in the European online search market. Thus cloud 
markets could be implicated in anticompetitive conduct in other markets, such as an attempt 
to tie a cloud service to use of search, or a particular mobile device. 
 
Furthermore, the net neutrality debate discussed in Chapter 3 has a bearing on competition in 
cloud computing markets. This is because if priority access to the network is permitted (and 
thus there is a deviation from the principles of net neutrality), then incumbents may well pay 
for such priority access to ensure the connection with their users is as quick and of as high a 
quality as possible, which will increase the entry barrier for potential entrants since they will 
require an even greater investment in order to enter that market. There is also the possibility 
for cloud providers to merge with ISPs and become vertically integrated, with the potential 
for the newly vertically integrated player to discriminate in favour of its own cloud services 
eg by providing them more quickly to the end user or by blocking the services of a cloud 
competitor. Thus competition and openness in the network layers has a direct bearing on 
cloud computing since the cloud depends directly on these layers to function.564 
 
At the time of writing, markets for cloud computing per se are probably insufficiently mature 
for substantial competition issues to emerge, however it is possible to see that the ways in 
which they are developing already raise prospective competition concerns, aside from the 
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privacy and control/free expression issues mentioned above.565 Thus, this chapter is shorter in 
length and more forward-looking in style than the others of this thesis which are ‘reactive’ to 
concrete events, in particular alleged abuses of dominance. Instead, this chapter will assess 
the extent to which current laws are able to deal with the problems caused by accumulations 
of private power in cloud computing causing this initial concern. This is not an overly 
theoretical endeavour given the trends towards moving more and more content and data 
storage, platforms and applications to the cloud as opposed to running on users’ own devices, 
and thus the control that cloud providers will increasingly possess.  
 
 
6.3 Effectiveness of competition law in addressing cloud concerns 
 
This section will consider how effective competition law may be in addressing the dominance 
concerns around cloud computing as detailed at the beginning of this chapter. This is unlikely 
to be an easy process as dominance as recognised by competition law is unlikely to be found 
in cloud markets as they currently stand (and given the lack of dominance, a violation of Art 
102 TFEU will not be found), nor does there seem to be the requisite conditions for collective 
dominance or collusion (ie a breach of Art 101 TFEU). Nevertheless, problems for 
competition are already emerging in these markets, particularly the locking-in of users to 
particular branded cloud ecosystems and the leveraging of dominance from an external 
market into cloud markets. The problem with competition law, though, is that it can only act 
reactively to deal with these problems once they blossom into full-blown infringements – 
rather than nip them in the bud as they emerge.566 
 
 
a) Market definition 
 
Market definition is a key first step for assessing the effectiveness of competition law in 
addressing dominance concerns in the cloud. Given cloud computing markets overall are 
probably competitive, a broadly drawn market definition is unlikely to lead to a finding that a 
particular player is dominant. Thus narrower markets would need to be defined to arrive 
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closer to that finding of dominance. As has already been discussed in this thesis, market 
definition depends on substitutability of services and products, particularly from the 
consumer’s point of view, so how the precise boundaries of the market will be drawn will 
depend on the extent to which certain cloud services are viewed as being substitutes for each 
other. However, given that cloud computing services often exhibit features such as a lack of 
portability of data and services by users and consumer lock-in, making switching to a rival’s 
service more difficult, it is possible that very narrow markets might be defined for a particular 
cloud service, such as a market for Google Drive or a market for Dropbox, in which either of 
these players would be found to be dominant as they are the only player in that very 
narrowly-defined market.  
 
 
b) Competitive constraints 
 
Competitive constraints in the form of entry barriers and switching costs exist in cloud 
computing markets. As mentioned above, there is already a degree of user lock-in. Other 
barriers to new entrants in cloud markets include the costs in providing cloud infrastructure 
such as data centres, software and a sufficiently large bandwidth connection such that users 
do not experience interruptions in service. The net neutrality debate is also of relevance here 
since if ‘prioritised’ or ‘special’ services are permitted, then this could pose a further barrier to 
new entrants. Leading cloud services are likely to want to guarantee a certain quality of 
service for their users and take advantage of the possibility to pay for a prioritised service for 
their data packets to users, thus raising the costs of an entity which wished to enter the market 
to compete. 
 
Furthermore, cloud operators’ offerings may be protected by intellectual property, mainly 
copyright and patents, giving the cloud operator exclusive rights. If ‘proprietary’ and ‘closed’ 
standards are adopted by cloud computing operators for their services, then this will 
contribute to a lack of interoperability between their services and their rivals’ services, which 
in itself is not anticompetitive but will contribute to users’ switching costs. 
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c) Operation of abuse of dominance 
 
Only if the market is sufficiently narrowly defined is dominance likely to be found and thus 
trigger the application of competition law. So if the market is defined more broadly, a finding 
of dominance is less likely and cloud computing players’ conduct towards users such as 
stymying data portability and locking them into a particular cloud system is unlikely to be 
found to be anticompetitive. 
 
A dominant cloud provider will have incentives to retain as many users (and their data) as 
possible, so will be incentivised to restrict data portability and may also be incentivised to 
restrict the interoperability of their ecosystem with those of rivals, lest it lose users to these 
other services. Restricting interoperability and data portability per se will not constitute an 
abuse of dominance – there is usually intellectual property protection of the standards used by 
the dominant player, and these exclusive rights are generally to be respected.  
 
However, in certain, exceptional circumstances, a dominant player preventing interoperability 
of such standards may be viewed as an abuse of dominance.
567
 Indeed, this was one of the 
findings in the European Microsoft case, that Microsoft had to give its competitors full access 
to the information which would allow them to interoperate with its services, otherwise they 
would not be able to compete viably with Microsoft. While such a finding, and its remedy, 
may have positive spillover effects for users, such as increasing the possibility of them being 
able to engage in data portability, it is unlikely that these exceptional circumstances will be 
found in cloud markets, even if dominance is found, and so it is unlikely that a lack of 
interoperability will constitute an abuse of dominance.  Also, the circumstances of the 
Microsoft case were that Microsoft was leveraging its dominance from one market (for 
operating systems) into another (for work group server operating systems) and so it may also 
have to be shown that a cloud operator is leveraging its dominance from one market into 
another by refusing to interoperate with rivals’ services. in the situation of eg a user storing 
her files in the cloud, and wanting to move those files to another cloud operator’s service 
constituting another player in the same market, then if the first, original operator refused to 
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interoperate this would not be an attempt to leverage dominance from one market into another, 
as the entities are competing in the same market. While it is possible that a cloud operator 
would refuse interoperability in order to leverage its dominant position in one cloud market 
eg for file storage into another market eg the provision of a certain software service for those 
files already stored in the cloud, this would only seem to be one criterion for the lack of 
interoperability to be found to be an abuse of this dominant position. 
 
A dominant cloud provider may also have an incentive to leverage its dominant position from 
one market into another, which could prevent users using a cloud service having a choice of 
eg mobile app as the leveraging of dominance involves the tying of the cloud service to a 
particular mobile app – or vice versa. Indeed, although it is unlikely that a cloud provider 
would have a dominant position in a cloud market (unless it is very tightly drawn eg around 
one provider’s particular offering), it is possible that cloud services may be tied to another 
product or service in which the same owner has a dominant position which could result in the 
leveraging of a dominant position from that another market into the market for cloud services 
and users being deprived of choice. If such a tie is found to constitute anticompetitive conduct, 
then remedying this situation could ensure users are given choices when it comes to which 
cloud service they use in conjunction with other online services.  
 
Moreover, even if primary cloud computing markets are competitive, it is possible that a 
particular cloud operator may attempt to impose, for instance, the use of that operator’s 
software on users already using the cloud service, thus constituting a possible example of 
abusive conduct in an aftermarket. Whether there are primary and secondary markets 
comprised in a particular combination of products and services is highly context-dependent. 
Distinctness of the two claimed products or services is important, and a key question will be 
whether consumers take into account the prices and other features of the secondary market, eg 
for software in the cloud, when making their initial purchase/decision in the primary market 
for cloud provision ie did the consumer view that they were acquiring a ‘package’?  
 
As more content and applications are being moved to the cloud or being accessible via cloud 
services, Renda recognises that cloud operators constitute another online gatekeeper, and in 
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theory similar competition issues may arise as have done with the physical network 
infrastructure (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3): refusals to deal with certain content 
or applications with the result that they are inaccessible/blocked to cloud users; preferential 
treatment to certain content and applications via agreements; and vertical integration leading 
to discrimination against upstream or downstream competitors.
568
 Yet the operation of 
competition law here links back to the discussion of the operation of competition law (and 
existing ex ante regulation) in Internet provision markets (Section 3.6 Adequacy of 
competition law and current regulation), and there, a finding of dominance was key to 
whether competition law operates to sanction this kind of conduct by an ISP. If there is no 
dominant position, then accordingly and perhaps obviously, these behaviours will not be 
found illegal under competition law’s abuse of dominance. Given the lack of specific 
regulation of cloud computing as well, conduct which may be harmful to users such as 
restricting what they can access in the cloud and not permitting them to take their data with 
them to other services is likely to be unaddressed if done by non-dominant providers, and, as 
seen above, even a dominant player restricting interoperability may not be abusing that 
dominance. 
 
Thus, unless a dominant position can be found, either by a very tight market definition or 
through finding a dominant position in a cloud computing aftermarket, it is unlikely that 
competition law’s abuse of dominance mechanism will aid users in the problems they face 
with cloud computing. Yet these problems are already emerging from cloud markets, and 
include a lack of interoperability of services, an inability for users to take their data with them 
from one service to a rival’s (or take it out of the cloud and offline completely), and a lack of 
choice for users when a cloud service is tied to another product or service. However, absent 
any merger in this sector which would enable competition authorities to consider some of 
these user-harming tendencies in cloud markets, or evidence of collusive conduct or 
collective dominance among cloud providers, European competition authorities must wait for 
the achievement of a position of dominance by one player before they can potentially 
intervene to address any possible abuses. 
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From the user perspective this seems highly inadequate – there are already threats to their 
autonomy by cloud service operators in terms of a restriction of their choice, a lack of 
interoperability and an absence of data portability, yet as it stands competition law is unlikely 
to provide solutions to these problems. As this conduct without dominance is unlikely to be 
anticompetitive, and as the achievement of dominance itself is likely to be permitted, 
competition law seems impotent – one must wait for the worst to happen even if it was 
already predicted and current conduct and conditions could be observed to lead in that 
direction.  
 
 
6.4 Other legal regimes 
 
Given the unlikelihood of competition law being effective in practice vis-à-vis cloud 
computing providers to address the concerns identified at the beginning of this chapter, other 
legal regimes will be considered here. 
 
 
a) Data protection and privacy 
 
In the EU, the data protection laws will apply prima facie to the processing of data in the 
cloud when the data controller is based in the EU, and personal data should not be transferred 
out of the EU to third countries which do not provide an adequate level of protection.  
 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party issued an Opinion on Cloud Computing in 
which it identified the lack of control by users over the personal data they commit to the 
cloud, specifically due to a lack of interoperability and lack of confidentiality (given the 
possibility of law enforcement requests for the data, including from agencies outside of the 
EU), and a lack of transparency over how precisely the personal data is being processed, 
including it being transferred to countries outside the EU.569 The applicability of the EU data 
protection regime, however, will become more complicated if the controller is not based in 
the EU: the data protection laws will apply if the controller uses equipment located in the 
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territory of a Member State (except only for purposes of transit), even if the controller is 
established elsewhere. Yet, at the moment it appears that a data controller based outside of the 
EU with no equipment (or only transit equipment) physically in the EU’s territory will not fall 
under the data protection laws, even if that entity is processing the personal data of EU 
citizens. Furthermore, the data controller in these situations is likely to be the person or entity 
using the cloud services eg by uploading their data to the cloud, while the cloud provider 
providing the virtual infrastructure or service is likely to be considered a mere processor of 
data rather than a data controller. In addition, cloud operators which put the data uploaded to 
their services to further uses, such as analysing it for their own business purposes, may be 
considered to be data controllers as well. This is likely to be the case for certain ‘freemium’ 
cloud services, which are provided at zero monetary cost to users but whose providers recoup 
costs in other ways, such as by gathering data about users and selling it on to advertisers etc. 
Services such as Google Drive might well operate under this business model- if this is indeed 
the case, Google would be considered to be a data controller as well as a processer. 
 
The proposals for reform of EU data protection law currently under consideration would 
modify the provisions on jurisdiction ie when the application of EU data protection law is 
triggered. What is proposed is that the laws will still cover data controllers which are 
established in the EU but also cover other entities which process EU citizens’ personal data in 
relation to ‘the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in the Union; or… the 
monitoring of their behaviour’. Thus the trigger is the personal data of EU citizens being 
processed, rather than the geographical location in which the data controller or processer is 
established. Nevertheless, some uncertainties remain or are created by this new wording, such 
as the case of a third country data controller with an EU subsidiary, where it is unclear that 
the third country controller itself (and not just the subsidiary) would itself be directly subject 
to EU data protection law.570 Nevertheless, this formulation, if adopted, would attempt to 
offer protection to EU citizens’ personal data in more scenarios than the current rules, with 
the protection ‘following’ the EU citizen’s personal data through the cloud, rather than the 
protection being based upon the geographical establishment of the data controller. Yet the 
practical enforceability of such jurisdictional reach remains a problem, particularly if the data 
controller has no assets in an EU Member State. Furthermore, the concerns about a third 
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country’s law enforcement agencies accessing EU citizens’ data remain, particularly in light 
of the Snowden revelations and more specifically following the recent ruling of a US judge 
that Internet companies must provide information about their customers geographically stored 
overseas (including in the EU) when issued with a valid search warrant from US law 
enforcement agencies.571 Indeed, there have been some moves away from US cloud providers 
and towards EU-based alternatives in the wake of these events, so as to avoid US law 
enforcement agency interference and to ensure the applicability of EU data protection rules to 
EU citizens’ personal data.572 
 
Another aspect of the draft Data Protection Regulation relevant to the discussion in this 
chapter is the proposed right to data portability which may remedy some of the lock-in users 
experience in using the cloud. This right would enable users to obtain a copy of their personal 
data held by a particular entity, which could then be used to move to a competing cloud 
service for instance, yet with the proviso that this right only would apply if the data is already 
in ‘a structured and commonly used format’.573 Furthermore, it does not entail that the user’s 
data held with the first provider will be deleted – although the proposed ‘right to be forgotten’ 
may also operate to achieve this outcome.574 However, if the user has provided their personal 
data and the processing is done based on the user’s consent or on a contract, the user would 
have a separate right to port that data in a commonly used electronic format, and transmit it to 
another ‘automated processing system… without hindrance from the controller’, seemingly 
mandating that in these situations the data controller must provide that data in a commonly 
used format. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this first aspect of the right to data 
portability will be included in a final draft of the Data Protection Regulation since it is 
opposed by both the European Parliament and Council: these organs would restrict the second 
aspect of the right to situations in which the data subject has ‘provided’ the personal data, yet 
it is not clear what ‘providing’ one’s data would mean in practice, ie how ‘actively’ the data 
must be given by the data subject.575  
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In any event, these provisions do not equate to particularly strong rights for users, since 
entities processing user data on a basis which is not user consent or a contract could sidestep 
some of its stipulations by not arranging the user data into such a structured and commonly 
used format.576 Furthermore, the right to data portability only applies to transfers of personal 
data, and information which does not quality as personal will be outside the scope of this 
right.577 However, for personal data processed on the basis of user consent or contract, it 
seems that data controllers must provide this data in a commonly used format such that users 
can switch with their data to a rival service, yet there are many occasions in which this 
obligation will not apply ‘given the breadth of situations when processing of data is not based 
on consent or contract’.578 
 
Nevertheless, some right to (personal) data portability, perhaps accompanied by explicit 
interoperability requirements on cloud providers, would address some of the competition, 
control and privacy concerns identified at the beginning of this chapter, and so its adoption in 
law should be encouraged. A stronger response to these concerns would entail a right to the 
portability of ALL data, and not just that which is personal, along with interoperability 
requirements on cloud providers. Furthermore, clarification about the application of EU data 
protection law to non-EU cloud providers handling the EU residents’ data along the lines 
suggested by the proposed regulation would aid the enforcement of these rules, such that the 
trigger for their application would be the handling of this data, as opposed to where the cloud 
provider is situated. However, this is one of the most contentious parts of the proposed 
regulation, entailing strong opposition by the US and US-based companies, and so it is by no 
means clear that it will reach the stage of final implementation. Furthermore, problems may 
still remain regarding the effective enforcement of EU data protection law vis-à-vis entities 
operating outside of the EU.   
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b) Free expression 
 
Competition law and data protection law (particularly if the proposals for reform are enacted) 
would go some way to addressing the free expression concerns raised at the beginning of this 
chapter, namely the increased control over what users access and upload that cloud providers 
have, the increased possibility of surveillance of user activity and the increased lock-in users 
experience when using cloud services (either via technical means or contractual terms). If a 
player is found to have a dominant position in a particular cloud market, then its actions such 
as preventing interoperability between its services and those of others or forbidding users to 
port their data stored with that player may amount to anticompetitive conduct addressed by 
Art 102 TFEU. Furthermore, a dominant player restricting the content and services users can 
access in or via the cloud may also amount to an abuse of that dominant position via tying its 
different products and services together. As seen in the previous subsection on data protection 
and privacy, the right to data portability, if enacted, may alleviate some of the concerns 
around user lock-in. 
 
Nevertheless, the problems for free expression that cloud computing presents are not fully 
addressed by these other legal regimes. Competition is only triggered where there is a finding 
of dominance or collusion (or if a merger is proposed), so the users of cloud players that are 
not dominant in their particular market nor exhibit collusive conduct will not be able to seek 
remedies from this area of law. While the right to data portability would seem to apply to non-
dominant players as well as those with a dominant position, in its current formulation it is not 
a particularly strong right – since it only applies to personal data and only operates in specific 
circumstances, as detailed above. 
 
The discussion on the application of free expression laws to the net neutrality debate in 
Chapter 3 is relevant to how free expression laws might be applied in the cloud context. The 
law is unlikely to address the lack of interoperability/data portability, but if cloud providers 
are restricting users’ access to content via the cloud, then this restriction may be found to be 
an infringement of Art 10 ECHR. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, a finding of 
infringement is highly context-dependent, and previous case law has tended to set a high bar 
as to whether this kind of conduct will amount to an infringement. It may be that it will only 
amount to an infringement if it is not possible for users to access this content in any other way 
(including offline). Furthermore, it may be necessary that a whole class of content is blocked 
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by the cloud provider. As noted in the context of this discussion in Chapter 3, an alternative 
route to finding an infringement of Art 10 may be if the cloud provider’s conduct in some 
way affects media plurality – and in the increasing move towards online ‘walled gardens’ this 
may be less of a fanciful thought as it was during the height of the 1990s cyberliberterian 
utopianism. Indeed, given the profit-motivation of commercial cloud providers, they have 
incentives to disseminate ‘popular content which attracts a greater number of users and thus 
generates higher advertising revenues… at the detriment of less popular, but not necessarily 
less important content which receives less visibility’.579 
 
While state-mandated online ubiquitous surveillance facilitated by private parties has been 
recognised in recent CJEU jurisprudence to pose problems for users’ right to free 
expression,580 such surveillance being carried out for private parties’ own purposes and not 
obliged by law has not been found to be illegal, providing the private parties abide by data 
protection law and their own contractual arrangements, in particular privacy policies.  
 
Thus, it seems that the application of the right to free expression in Europe to cloud providers 
will be highly context-dependent, and is only likely to apply if a cloud provider is restricting 
users’ access to content via the cloud – and even then, probably only if this restriction means 
that users are not able to access this content via any other means. The right is unlikely to 
entail changes to cloud providers’ other business practices, such as surveillance and the 
locking-in of users and prevention of interoperability and data portability. 
 
 
6.5 Extra-legal solutions 
 
Given the current laws in the form of competition, data protection and free expression laws 
only go some small way to protecting users’ interests in cloud computing but do not protect 
and promote all of them, and not necessarily in every set of circumstances, it can be seen here 
that there is a ‘gap’ in EU law when it comes to upholding users’ autonomy online against the 
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 For instance: Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v Societe belge des auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs (SABAM) 
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threats to it from private power in the form of for-profit cloud providers. Here, other options 
beyond current law will be considered to determine whether they would be more effective in 
enhancing user autonomy than the current legal situation. 
 
Regulation or other government action would be one option to ‘fill’ this gap in the current 
law. This might encompass the implementation of some kind of privacy by default/design 
when it comes to new technologies and promoting international standards on privacy and data 
protection in the cloud may be welcomed. However, governments themselves have an interest 
in ensuring users’ communications are available to them for their own law enforcement 
purposes and so are unlikely to promote strong privacy protections which could stymie their 
own surveillance efforts. It also seems highly unlikely that international consensus could be 
reached on these issues. This is particularly the case given the divergence in data protection 
and privacy standards between the US and EU, let alone other global powers (both greater 
and lesser), and the direct and indirect resistance of the US and American businesses to the 
EU data protection reforms currently under discussion. If global standardisation of norms is 
to occur, then pragmatically it may result in a norms being agreed that are not particularly 
strong protections of individual privacy (and free expression) so the whole exercise may 
produce unwelcome outcomes. 
 
At the national or regional level (in the case of the EU), some more regulation of cloud 
services could be more achievable. This might include obligations on cloud providers to 
facilitate interoperability with each other, to allow data portability, and not to interfere with 
users’ right to receive and impart information which is otherwise legal. Nevertheless, the 
problems with jurisdiction in the cloud may persevere unless there is more invasive regulation 
here too: for instance obliging cloud operators providing services to EU citizens to be entirely 
geographically based in the EU’s territory. 
 
Users may also be encouraged to encrypt their data, so that even if it goes into the cloud they 
retain more privacy over the information that they put into it, although encryption does not 
address the fundamental power imbalances in the cloud in favour of the cloud provider, and 
just means that the cloud provider cannot see exactly what the information is – or may just 
need to employ decryption services. 
 
At the policy level, alternative cloud infrastructures might be promoted, such as ‘community 
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clouds’, whereby groups of individuals set up their own cloud services, without a profit 
motive and independent of the state apparatus, according to a commons-based peer 
production model. These community clouds might use peer to peer technologies in order to 
protect user interests,581 such as the Freedom Box (a small device comprising a server) which 
provides a decentralised architecture for users to exchange information and communicate 
securely,582 or ownCloud which is a free software alternative to commercial cloud providers 
which includes encryption and can be installed on a private server.  The mesh networks 
discussed in Chapter 3 may also facilitate the setting up of community cloud services on a 
peer to peer basis.  
 
While De Filippi acknowledges that there are problems with peer to peer technologies, 
especially for ‘normal’ Internet users who may not be so technically adept, their ‘mere 
existence’ provides a safeguard for users eager to retain autonomy and freedom of 
communication, or who are no longer satisfied with the growing encroachments on privacy 
and civil liberties implemented by cloud operators’583 – and thus should be encouraged as a 
‘third way’ between private, for-profit clouds and state-controlled clouds. 
 
However, the proliferation of data about users in the cloud is not limited to direct interactions 
of the user with cloud services, but also includes government and corporate use of the cloud 
via contracting out/the subcontracting of services, so there will also be data held in the cloud 
by a third party about an individual collected by the public services of her country or her 
bank, credit card company etc. Thus - opting out of legal/regulatory solutions entirely is not 
realistic for users – so other solutions must also be pursued. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
While this chapter may be viewed as more ‘speculative’ when it comes to issues of private 
economic power over online information flows to the detriment of user autonomy than the 
others in this thesis (as well as being shorter in length), it addresses cloud services at a stage 
before there have been competition investigations into them, yet when issues of dominance 
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are emerging. Given the progressive move towards placing more content, services and 
infrastructure in the cloud, this chapter provides a forward-looking consideration of the 
problems for users that arise, and recommends ‘nipping them in the bud’ before they become 
fully blown competition issues. In any event, cloud services already present problems for the 
effective enforcement of what data protection law there currently is, as well as represent a 
‘gatekeeping’ point for users accessing certain content and services online (with the 
associated surveillance and censorship capacities that status brings). 
 
Existing competition laws may address some of the concerns identified in the initial part of 
this chapter, such as a lack of interoperability between one provider’s products/services and 
those of others, but only if dominance/market power is found. The only other trigger for 
competition investigation here would be a suspicion of collusion among cloud providers – or 
possibly a planned merger, although none are currently on competition authorities’ horizon. 
Otherwise, competition law will not intervene more generally to promote choice, 
interoperability, portability and free access to content and services. Users may find that even 
if there is not dominance in the competition law sense, they still do not have a ‘real’ choice 
among cloud providers’ offerings – whether it is because they are all offering similar services 
even if there are many players in the market or because users are locked in to a particular 
cloud service via contracts or technical measures and so are unable to switch providers – thus 
with no choice but to stay with the original cloud provider. 
 
EU data protection law, particularly if the reforms comprised by the proposed Data Protection 
Regulation are enacted, would go some way to addressing user concerns, particularly in the 
form of the mooted right to data portability. However, as has been discussed above, this right 
to data portability is not a very strong right nor does it cover all data that users may have in 
the cloud. Furthermore, it is not even clear what final form the proposed Regulation might 
take given the controversies over its provisions and the amount of lobbying going on to 
mitigate its effects on Internet businesses, particularly those from outside of the EU. 
 
The problem remains, in any event, of jurisdiction and the enforceability of whatever laws 
that may already be in existence vis-à-vis the cloud, given the lack of transparency over 
where information ‘in the cloud’ is actually hosted physically, the ability of that information 
to be transferred very easily between data centres in different parts of the world, and the 
differing norms that different countries apply to data being held in the cloud when it is being 
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hosted on their geographical territory. 
 
Pragmatically, it is submitted that a regional or national initiative to impose more regulation 
on cloud providers in the interests of users may be achievable. This regulation could comprise 
obligations on cloud providers to facilitate interoperability with each other, to allow data 
portability, and not to interfere with users’ right to receive and impart information which is 
otherwise legal. Regulation may also be required to address the problem of enforceability of 
law, for instance obliging cloud providers to be entirely geographically based within a 
particular jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the practical problems with regulation have already been 
recognised in this thesis regarding the influence of lobbying on the regulatory process as well 
as the time taken to get to the stage of regulation being contrasted against the often-much-
quicker rate of technological development. Given the controversies over the proposed Data 
Protection Regulation and the slow speed at which it is moving along its journey to 
implementation, it seems highly likely that any further attempts to regulate cloud services 
would be subject to a high level of resistance by the industry (except possibly European-
based cloud operators which might be likely to benefit in part at least from such regulation). 
Furthermore, the problem remains of convincing regulators to make an intervention in the 
market given the general ‘light touch’ trend, and even though larger problems can be 
anticipated, the net neutrality example in Chapter 3 demonstrates that in practice if regulators 
intervene at all, it can be many years afterwards, by which time conditions have changed – 
and not necessarily for the better. 
 
Thus, as immediate solutions to the problems that cloud services present for users’ autonomy 
online, technical and other extra-legal methods emerge again as the most expedient. Users 
should be encouraged to encrypt data they send to the cloud, as well as participate in 
‘community cloud’ schemes based on peer to peer technologies. These seem to be the only 
methods by which users’ privacy and freedom of communication – in other words, users’ 
autonomy – can be retained in the cloud. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has considered the rise and manifestation of private economic power wielded by 
for-profit corporations over online information flows in the EU, making comparisons where 
relevant with the situation in the US. The law and regulation which principally apply to these 
concentrations of private economic power has been examined, which is mainly competition 
law (antitrust), ex ante regulation in the case of Internet provision examined in Chapter 3, 
data protection and fundamental rights, to determine the extent to which the law as it 
currently stands can promote not just the standard goal of ‘consumer welfare’ but also the 
more expansive and liberating concept of ‘user autonomy’. 
 
Four substantive case studies have been considered in this thesis, namely Internet provision, 
search engines, mobile devices and app stores, and the cloud. These case studies have been 
chosen since they each encompass a ‘choke point’ over online information flows to and from 
users, and so can be considered to be in a gatekeeping position. They have also been chosen 
as they provide examples of corporate dominance over these online information flows, either 
in the form of a ‘dominant position’ as recognised in competition law, or as markets whose 
main - if not all - participants are large, often transnational, for-profit corporations which 
might be thought of as examples of Illich’s ‘radical monopoly’ where true choice for users 
between true alternatives does not exist. 
 
In each case study contained in this thesis, it can be seen that the law and regulation which 
does apply to the given situation - competition law supplemented by fundamental rights to 
free expression and privacy and EU data protection law - fall short of fully protecting and 
promoting user autonomy in this context of corporate dominance over online information 
flows. Thus there are ‘gaps’ in the existing legal framework when it comes to protecting and 
promoting user autonomy. 
 
It is submitted that the influence of neoliberalism over EU law, policy and regulation vis-à-vis 
private economic power in Internet markets (if not in other markets as well) can explain, at 
least in part, this state of affairs. EU competition law’s contemporary neoliberal influence and 
More Economic Approach has entailed that values aside from those encompassed by the 
nebulous goal of consumer welfare cannot be promoted easily within the competition analysis 
and limitation of private economic power. Furthermore, the triumphalism of neoliberalism in 
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promoting minimalist ‘light touch’ ex ante regulation of private economic power in EU 
communications markets explains the general lack of anterior regulation in this area. In 
addition, fundamental rights are also caught up in this neoliberal conception of the world 
given their application is mainly vis-à-vis the nation-state despite globally there being 
transnational accumulations of capital which are more powerful financially than some nation-
states and the very real violation of rights that these corporations’ business entails in certain 
circumstances.
584
 Data protection law, while exceptional in its application of certain aspects 
of privacy rights to private entities, is narrow in its scope (‘personal data’) and not always 
well-enforced – and is the target of an intense wave of corporate lobbying to minimise any 
further ‘burden’ its reform may impose on these entities to bring it more in line with the 
techo-social reality and the vast proliferation of data about individuals held and used for the 
pursuit of profit (and conveniently accessible to nation-states’ espionage agencies as well). 
 
The proposed net neutrality regulation represents an exception to this trend of avoiding ex 
ante regulation of information gatekeepers, but can also be critiqued for being too little, too 
late: many years that have passed since it was first raised as a problem for both competition 
and digital rights, which has entailed that technology and business methods have moved on, 
which is not clearly addressed in the regulation. 
 
The European Commission’s competition investigation into Google is another exception to 
this trend, given it is not clear that Google has actually abused its dominant position. While it 
is unclear precisely what is motivating the Commission in its actions, in any event so far they 
are still fairly ‘light touch’ when it comes to tackling the myriad problems posed for users by 
the large concentration of corporate power which Google encapsulates. 
 
Indeed, in most case studies of this thesis, alternative, usually technical, ‘self-help’ methods 
for users in the form alternatives to the corporate information gatekeepers are proposed. 
These alternatives involve peer to peer design as a means of re-establishing decentralisation, 
eroding the gatekeeping potential, and providing better protection and promotion of user 
autonomy in terms of facilitating free speech, more user control over infrastructure, enhanced 
user privacy (as it is more difficult to carry out surveillance of decentralised P2P systems) as 
well as solidarity and sharing among network participants rather than the extraction of value 
                                                             
584
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from users by large for-profit corporations. These alternatives have specifically been chosen 
not on a technodeterministic basis, but because they embody the normative values of free 
expression, privacy and decentralisation advanced by the idea of user autonomy. 
 
This thesis is limited inasmuch as it does not consider in great detail conceptual reforms to 
competition law to promote user autonomy, which may be possible but would be a longer 
term project. Instead a realistic and immediate approach is taken to the problems that exist 
now with these large concentrations of private power online manifesting in commodified 
information gatekeepers and how they may be resolved in the short term with existing law, 
regulation and extra-legal methods. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the Introduction, the 
reform of the law, particularly competition law and regulation, in ways which would promote 
user autonomy online, and perhaps autonomy for citizens in other areas of life as well may be 
a much larger project, part of a broader and more profound societal change. As the 
implications of the EU’s Charter for Fundamental Rights for competition and economic 
regulation become more apparent, the ‘constitutionalisation’ of these parts of the legal 
framework will be a more pressing issue, and one ripe for further research at the intersection 
of economic considerations and human rights, both vis-à-vis new technologies and other areas 
of life, such as the environment. The European Data Protection Supervisor’s comments on 
this topic are thus to be welcomed as starting this discussion in the EU, and the final outcome 
of the Google search investigation may be instructive as to other institutions’ views on the 
matter. 
 
Another limit to this thesis is its concentration on private economic power, and accordingly 
excludes a thorough consideration of the exercise of state power over online information 
flows to the detriment of user autonomy. While there is some acknowledgement of the 
coupling of state and private economic power in the form of the Invisible Handshake, a 
detailed consideration of this relationship is outside the scope of this thesis due to 
considerations of length. The state has very much re-asserted itself (if it ever was truly absent) 
in recent years, including states of a so-called ‘liberal democratic’ persuasion, as evidenced in 
particular by the mass surveillance and data gathering programmes operated by the US and its 
allies in different parts of the world.  The state interest in surveillance of Internet users 
whether directly or indirectly via third parties, as has been acknowledged in this thesis, may 
entail that reform to privacy and data protection law which would promote optimal conditions 
for user autonomy online is unlikely to be achieved in practice any time soon. Nevertheless, 
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the peer to peer alternatives offered to the status quo ought to serve to promote and protect 
user autonomy vis-à-vis the state as well as vis-à-vis private economic power. In any event, 
how the state interest in surveillance, the co-option of private providers for this end, and the 
War on Terror justifications given for these alliances accords with neoliberal ideology, and 
how and whether the law including communications regulation and fundamental rights can 
effectively manage and oversee these relationships for the benefit of users forms another 
avenue for future research.  
 
In the meantime, it is submitted that reform of Internet law and policy reform in the EU in the 
short term should proceed on a basis in which users’ autonomy is recognised, celebrated and 
promoted to the greatest extent possible within the current legal, economic and regulatory 
framework. Yet, given the challenges to this happening in practice, technical solutions 
designed with privacy, free expression and the decentralised resistance of control in mind 
may be the most realistic means of protecting and promoting user autonomy online, and so 
EU law and policy in this area at least should not prevent these solutions from doing so. 
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